### 1

Energy production must substantially increase use of an energy and NOT development of technology for that purpose

COAG 9 (Department of Climate Change on behalf of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Expert Group on Streamlining Greenhouse and Energy Reporting, "national Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Streamlining Protocol," http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/publications/greenhouse-report/nger-streamlining-protocol.pdf)

‘Energy production’ is defined in NGER Regulation 2.23: Production of energy, in relation to a facility, means any one of the following: (a) the extraction or capture of energy from natural sources for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in operation of the facility; (b) the manufacture of energy by the conversion of energy from one form to another form for **final consumption** by or from the operation of the facility or for use other than in the operation of the facility.

#### Violation – plan increases infrastructure for energy, not actual energy consumption

#### A. Limits – justifies an infinite combination of R&D, tech and cooperation aff’s – explodes negative research burden

**B. Neg Ground – Spikes links to energy trade off DAs and in-depth case debates – err neg – bidirectional energy types, mechanisms and massive uniqueness problems for DAs**

**T is a voter competitive equity and jurisdiction**

### 2

#### A. Our interpretation is that financial incentives are TEMPORARY measures –

Piscitello, 98  (E. Scott World Bank, and V. Susan Bogach, "Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy Development," 1998, google books, p. 10-11, accessed 2-24-13, mss]

Approaches to financial incentives for grid-connected wind farms and PV solar home systems are evolving toward a similar diretion and are following similar interrelated rends. In many countries, the approaches are also being applied to the general development of renewable energy systems. The direction is evolving as a result of the growing experience with financial incentive policies. Governments are not considering policies in terms of their costs; the way that the cost burden is shared (for example, among diferent levels of government, utilities, electricity consumers and general taxpayers); and their effectiveness in achieving results (such as installed capacity, cost reduction, local manufacturing). Most policies to encourage renewable energy are moving in the following directions: Incentives are clearly intended to be temporary measures. Performance based incentives are being used to encourage efficient projects. Comepttion is being explicitly or informally integrated into the implementation of financial incentives, to promote reduced technology and project development costs. The size of the financial incentive is being targeted to match the incremental life-cycle financial costs. Incentives are being developed with the consideration of changing market conditions.

#### Financial incentives are a direct transfer of resources with the effect of reducing the price for a non-government buyer an seller

Management Information Services 11 (The Nuclear Energy Institute, “60 Years of Energy Incentives: An Analysis of Federal Expeditures for Energy Development”)

A financial incentive is defined in this report as providing one or more of the following benefits: A transfer of economic resources by the Government to the buyer or seller of a good or service that has the effect of reducing the price paid, or, increasing the price received, respectively; Reducing the cost of production of the good or service; or, Creating or expanding a market for producers.

#### B. Violation - The affirmative plan offers funding – not an incentive because it’s not tied to a measurable performance target

Summerfield ‘7 (SUMMERFIELD 07, Brian, Senior Editor of Talent Management Magazine <http://www.talentmgt.com/newsletters/compensation_perspectives/2007/March/282/index.php> What Incentives Aren’t **When discussing incentives** systems, talent **managers need to make sure the proper meaning of the term is conveyed** **because occasionally it is misapplied.** The confusion isn't surprising — after all, "incentive" is quite broad, and sometimes people use the word to describe programs that don't **really** fit into that category. The following are categories within the overall compensation-and-benefits rubric that are not employee incentives in the narrow, talent management-related sense but might be considered as such in the more general understanding of the word. **Benefits** Things such as health insurance and pension plans **are definitely perquisites**, **but** they **aren't** really **incentives**. These programs are tied to the mere fact of employment, **not performance targets**. (Certainly, a salesperson isn't going to get more health coverage for exceeding a quarterly quota.) Rather, these programs are exactly what the name implies: benefits. Typically, benefits are aimed more at recruiting and retaining top-notch employees than at motivating them to achieve and surpass objectives. Fringe Benefits These are closely related to benefits but aren't quite the same — they could be called the icing on the benefits cake. Fringe benefits usually have more to do with what employees want than what they need, and they can range from an exciting and prestigious office location to a break room mini-fridge that's constantly stocked with soda. In spite of the slight dissimilarities between fringe benefits and benefits, they are not incentives for the same reason: They have more to do with attracting and keeping workers than encouraging them. Development Programs that help employees build up their knowledge and skill sets can be incentives in an indirect sense. In particular, individuals might work harder to qualify for a high-potential development program. But speaking generally, development is not an incentive, as its main purpose is to equip personnel with proficiencies they need to perform in their job. Motivation is secondary, if it's considered at all. Pay Compensation is a tricky one because, in a sense, it's the ultimate incentive — the paycheck is the reason employees show up to work in the first place. Most people cannot work for free and wouldn't be inclined to anyway. That said, where talent management is concerned, pay is based on work in the broader context. In other words, income is designed to induce employees to do their jobs and nothing more. What Incentives Are Defining something in the negative (as in, what it's not) can be illustrative, but it's not explicitly explanatory. So, then, what does "incentives" refer to in the compensation-and-benefits sphere? Specifically, **an incentive is** any monetary or nonmonetary **reward that aims to encourage a very narrowly defined performance or behavioral objective**. It can be applied at the individual, group, department or even enterprise level, but **it must be tied to some sort of measurable target**. It's purely motivational in nature. Some of you might be thinking, "Well, what about bonuses? Those are incentives, right?" That depends. An end-of-the-year bonus for the holidays wouldn't count as an incentive. Neither would an across-the-board bonus handed out to employees for exceeding profit forecasts after the fact. On the other hand, salespeople who work hard to exceed their quarterly quota to receive a cash reward are pursuing incentives. The point is that **incentives can't be arbitrary or routine, and the proposition must precede the achievement** (**e.g., "If you do X, then you'll get Y in return**.")

### 3

#### Chinese economic reorientation will happen now – but Xi’s capital is necessary to get it done

Ford 3/5/13 (“China’s Next Leaders Aim to Launch New Economic Era”) http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2013/0305/China-s-next-leaders-aim-to-launch-new-economic-era-video

Xi and Li will take the helm of a country that has enjoyed average annual gross domestic product growth of 10.5 percent for a decade, which has transformed the Chinese economy into the second largest in the world. But “raw growth is not enough anymore and is anyway bound to slow down,” says Kerry Brown, head of China Studies at [Sydney University](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/University+of+Sydney). **As the economy cools** (in his opening speech to the People’s Congress Tuesday, outgoing [Prime Minister Wen Jiabao](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Wen+Jiabao) predicted 7.5 percent growth this year,) the new government **will have to reorient** it away from dependence on heavy state investment and exports and toward the more sustainable foundation of domestic consumption. At the same time, Chinese economic reformers have been insisting for some time that for the sake of efficiency the government has to stop coddling the giant state-owned enterprises that enjoy monopolies over the “commanding heights” of the economy, and start giving private companies a greater chance to compete. “The rise of state capitalism has been strangling private enterprise, which is the real source of long-term economic growth,” says Zhang Jian, who teaches politics at [Peking University](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Peking+University). Cutting state-owned firms down to size, though, would be more than an economic challenge. The development in recent years of a “crony capitalist” system, in which senior Communist officials have used their political power to channel control over economic resources – and great wealth – to their relatives, means that reforming the state sector would directly challenge the interests of powerful political figures. “The major difficulty that the government faces if it wants to do something is the establishment, the entrenched interests in government and in the political-business alliance,” says Professor Zhang. 'Smashing vested interests' “The difficulty of effecting reform and the difficulty of fighting corruption are two aspects of the same problem,” adds [Nottingham](http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Nottingham)’s Professor Wang. Since being made head of the Communist Party last November, Xi has spoken often of his determination to root out corruption, which he has warned threatens to destroy the party. In recent months there has been a rash of officially sanctioned citizen reports on social media that have brought down some dishonest and womanizing local officials. Xi’s words “have raised expectations, so there must be a policy response,” says Dr. Brown. It is still unclear, however, whether the incoming president plans a traditional “strike hard” campaign targeting individual officials, such as previous governments have waged, or whether he intends to launch “a broader effort to rein in vested interests within the party,” Brown adds. “Smashing vested interests … will be a **critical battle for the next government**,” he adds. “The **question** is whether they have the **political capital** to **fight their own party**” which harbors so much corruption.

#### The plan drains Xi’s capital - renewables is a sticking point – generates massive controversy and mutual mistrust

DeLisle 12(Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI’s Asia Program and the Stephen Cozen Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Conference Report: Energy, Environment, and Security in Asia”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, October, <https://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/10/conference-report-energy-environment-and-security-asia>)

Despite the energy-related and broader foreign policy reasons for pursuing cooperation (including China’s desire to be seen as a responsible stakeholder in the international system), many formidable obstacles remain to U.S.-China collaboration on clean energy. The U.S.’s market-capitalist system and China’s state-capitalist systems do not mesh well in tackling many problems, including clean energy technology development. Mutual mistrust and genuinely conflicting interests characterize much of the political relationship and the upcoming U.S. election and Chinese leadership transition entail risks of increased misperception and provocation. Events and shocks often get in the way of potential collaboration: the Global Financial Crisis distracted policymakers from environmental issues and increased emphasis on growth by any means; the failure of the Copenhagen environmental conference scuttled near-term hopes for an international accord that would encourage green energy development; and recurrent frictions in U.S.-China relations generally (such as those over Tibet, arms sales to Taiwan, renminbi valuation, and sanctions on Iran) have posed chronic obstacles. Key clean energy sectors—including wind and solar—have been the loci of conflicts between China and the U.S., as well as Europe. For example, leading European companies in the wind power sector saw their market share in China plummet in favor of Chinese producers who had benefited from European cooperation and China’s new WTO-noncompliant domestic content requirements. For another example, solar power has made little headway in China’s domestic market even as Chinese firms have come to dominate the world market in solar panels, thanks partly to Chinese state support for producers and the U.S.’s and other developed states’ subsidies to support solar panel installation. China’s wind power and solar power policies have both become targets of WTO disputes targeting China.¶ Rozman argued that the impediments to U.S.-China cooperation are still more fundamental and intractable. Fundamentally, China’s strategic thinking is based in its assessment that the international balance of power is shifting in its favor and against the United States. China’s approach reflects the impact of its geopolitical calculations and a national identity laced with strident nationalism. Although the fall of Bo Xilai as a potential member of the top leadership was a setback for relative hardliners in domestic politics and foreign policy (including relations with the U.S.), his political demise did not portend an end to the influence of such views. Even if the U.S. and China can avoid mutual demonization, the two countries have genuine differences in priorities, including on matters that are related to or affect clean energy cooperation. In this context, prospects remained dim for transformative U.S.-China cooperation in a potentially sensitive issue area such as green energy.¶

#### Xi’s capital is key to a massive Chinese economic overhaul –

Lieberthal 3/14/13 (Kenneth Lieberthal, Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and senior fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development on PBS News Hour, interview with Judy Woodruff, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan-june13/china_03-14.html>)

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: Well, he's already tried to change the style by being much more of a kind of lively politician than his predecessor was.¶ But I think Gordon is right. We have to look to see whether he can **forge** the kind of **consensus** to make deep structural reforms in China that the country deeply needs if it's going to move forward.¶ JUDY WOODRUFF: For example?¶ KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: For example, they need to shift from an export-oriented and investment-focused economy to one that's much more focused on domestic consumption as a driver of economic development, which requires expanding the services sector, increasing incomes and so forth.¶ That runs against huge vested interests in China. So the question is whether he's going to be able to really rework incentives through this system so that he can build the services sector, build incomes, reduce huge capital-intensive infrastructure projects and reduce dependence on exports.¶ JUDY WOODRUFF: So, looking at him, Gordon Chang, from the United States, what will we see that looks different, do you think?¶ GORDON CHANG: I think the one thing we have been concerned about is all that, although he's been in power for only a few months, since last November, when he became general-secretary of the party, China has engaged on some very provocative maneuvers against the Japanese, because the Chinese claim sovereignty over the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.¶ People say that Xi Jinping is actually leading China's foreign policy on this issue, and if so, we're in trouble, because this is a very troubled area.¶ JUDY WOODRUFF: And do you believe, Ken Lieberthal, that that's a primary priority of his?¶ KENNETH LIEBERTHAL: I think his **real priority** is domestic.¶ What he needs is stability abroad in order to undertake reform domestically. But his big problem is that he -- that the Communist Party has really nurtured very ardent nationalism domestically, and he can't allow himself to get on the wrong side of that or he won't have the political capital to carry out reforms.¶ So he's trying to walk a tightrope. He has to be seen as strong in international affairs. But I don't think he's looking for trouble internationally. He'd rather avoid if it if he can.¶

#### **Chinese growth prevents global economic collapse, war over Taiwan and CCP collapse**

Lewis ‘08 [Dan, Research Director – Economic Research Council, “The Nightmare of a Chinese Economic Collapse,” World Finance, 5/13, <http://www.worldfinance.com/news/home/finalbell/article117.html>]

In 2001, Gordon Chang authored a global bestseller "The Coming Collapse of China." To suggest that the world’s largest nation of 1.3 billion people is on the brink of collapse is understandably for many, a deeply unnerving theme. And many seasoned “China Hands” rejected Chang’s thesis outright. In a very real sense, they were of course right. China’s expansion has continued over the last six years without a hitch. After notching up a staggering 10.7 percent growth last year, it is now the 4th largest economy in the world with a nominal GDP of $2.68trn. Yet there are two Chinas that concern us here; the 800 million who live in the cities, coastal and southern regions and the 500 million who live in the countryside and are mainly engaged in agriculture. The latter – which we in the West hear very little about – are still very poor and much less happy. Their poverty and misery do not necessarily spell an impending cataclysm – after all, that is how they have always have been. But it does illustrate the inequity of Chinese monetary policy. For many years, the Chinese yen has been held at an artificially low value to boost manufacturing exports. This has clearly worked for one side of the economy, but not for the purchasing power of consumers and the rural poor, some of who are getting even poorer. The central reason for this has been the inability of Chinese monetary policy to adequately support both Chinas. Meanwhile, rural unrest in China is on the rise – fuelled not only by an accelerating income gap with the coastal cities, but by an oft-reported appropriation of their land for little or no compensation by the state. According to Professor David B. Smith, one of the City’s most accurate and respected economists in recent years, potentially far more serious though is the impact that Chinese monetary policy could have on many Western nations such as the UK. Quite simply, China’s undervalued currency has enabled Western governments to maintain artificially strong currencies, reduce inflation and keep interest rates lower than they might otherwise be. We should therefore be very worried about how vulnerable Western economic growth is to an upward revaluation of the Chinese yuan. Should that revaluation happen to appease China’s rural poor, at a stroke, the dollar, sterling and the euro would quickly depreciate, rates in those currencies would have to rise substantially and the yield on government bonds would follow suit. This would add greatly to the debt servicing cost of budget deficits in the USA, the UK and much of euro land. A reduction in demand for imported Chinese goods would quickly entail a decline in China’s economic growth rate. That is alarming. It has been calculated that to keep China’s society stable – ie to manage the transition from a rural to an urban society without devastating unemployment - the minimum growth rate is 7.2 percent. Anything less than that and unemployment will rise and the massive shift in population from the country to the cities becomes unsustainable. This is when real discontent with communist party rule becomes vocal and hard to ignore. It doesn’t end there. That will at best bring a global recession. The crucial point is that communist authoritarian states have at least had some success in keeping a lid on ethnic tensions – so far. But when multi-ethnic communist countries fall apart from economic stress and the implosion of central power, history suggests that they don’t become successful democracies overnight. Far from it. There’s a very real chance that China might go the way of Yugoloslavia or the Soviet Union – chaos, civil unrest and internecine war. In the very worst case scenario, a Chinese government might seek to maintain national cohesion by going to war with Taiwan – whom America is pledged to defend.

#### Nuclear war and extinction

Straits Times ’00 (6-25, Lexis, No one gains in war over Taiwan)

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be **set on fire**. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the **destruction of civilisation**. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

### 4

#### Long term Saudi realignment with China is slow and inevitable – the plan drastically accelerates the switch

Jacobs ’12 - Senior Policy Analyst with the Institute for Gulf Affairs. His analyses have been featured on domestic media outlets in North Africa and the Middle East (Joshua Jacobs, February 25, 2012. “Saudis embrace China in new polygamy,” <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/NB25Ak01.html>)

In a tag team maneuver King Abdullah sent long time American ambassador Prince Bandar and his successor Prince Turki al-Faisal on a series of meetings to Beijing. The result has been a **steady series** of energy, trade, and securityagreements. As recently as a month ago Saudi Arabia and China inked a major civil nuclear cooperation agreement that has heralded much speculation about the future of Saudi nuclear ambitions and the extent of Chinese cooperation. While in the backdrop of the escalating tensions in the Persian Gulf and increasing economic pressure on Iran, the Saudi's have been engaging in a **mini-version of shuttle diplomacy** with China. Earlier this month the Saudi's assured Asian oil partners, but China in particular, that Saudi Arabia's reserve production capacity was more than enough to cover an Iranian shortfall. The goal being to leverage China from its protective stance over Iran, and join in the oil embargo or at least not impede further action by the United Nations Security Council. The flowering of the Sino-Saudi relationship has been remarkable both for its rapidity and the depth of some its connections. **However, there are significant stumbling blocks** for the development of a permanent alliance, and questions over what the goals of the relationship are. At the end of the day Saudi Arabia is still incredibly dependent upon the United States and the Western powers for its security guarantee. This is easily evidenced by the quantity of US bases in the region, the willingness of the US to deploy significant assets to the Gulf, and of course the nearly US$60 billion arms deal announced late last year. There is also a relative confluence of policy aims between Saudi Arabia and the United States over Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, something not evident with Beijing especially in light over their veto of the United Nations security council resolution on Syria. Indeed, it could be said that a growing Sino-Saudi relationship could reap dividends for the United States in the short to medium term. If Saudi Arabia can use its oil weight to leverage China out of its protective embrace of Iran, or to abandon its objections to a Syria intervention, Washington would uncork some champagne bottles. The use of Saudi crude to effect a more cooperative outlook on regional policy would be a major coup, and is a clear goal of the current diplomatic offensive by Riyadh. The real danger for the United States, and where Saudi Arabia may be hedging its bets, is **in the long term**. As Chinese power rises and it may in the coming decades become a viable replacement for the US security guarantee. This would afford Riyadh with what it has always dreamed of, a powerful and compliant protector. An alliance of the autocrats would relieve Saudi Arabia of the ceaseless pressures to reform, to end crackdowns, and to restrain its foreign policy - returning those decisions exclusively to the royal court instead. **More immediately**, the decision to forge ties with China may serve as a hedge against current pressures from the United States. Washington may **not want to push the envelope with Saudi Arabia**, if it believes it will push the al-Saud further into the Chinese orbit. This gives Riyadh wiggle room in its relationship with the United States, and gives China a risk free way to influence US regional policy objectives. Saudi Arabia has never had a duality in its foreign relations, it has been tethered to the United States virtually since the modern state was founded in the early 1930s, a relationship cemented by a state visit from President Roosevelt in 1945. The creation of a countervailing force with China as an ally is a new game for Saudi Arabia, and a relatively new one for China as well. It is also proving to be an increasingly useful tool for both, and will likely define the regional dynamic in the coming decade.

#### Near-term realignment spurs domestic debate in China, threatening the political transition

Meidan ’12 – an analyst in Eurasia Group’s Asia practice (Michal Meidan, March 13, 2012. “China's fast-growing Middle East problem,” http://eurasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/13/chinas\_fast\_growing\_middle\_east\_problem)

But Beijing's Middle East strategy is hardly the coherent, well-thought-out doctrine that some believe. Instead, it's the product of a number of (sometimes competing) domestic interests that must be coordinated **each time a crisis unfolds**. Worryingly for Beijing, as China's commercial ties to the Middle East increase, it will inexorably become more involved in the region's politics. In the process, the risk of antagonizing an important commodity supplier, getting on the wrong side of Washington, or fueling unwanted domestic debates will become more costly and more complicated. Some argue, simplistically, that when China blocks pressure on Iran to protect its commercial relations with that country, it pays no price for it. The reality is not nearly that simple. First, Beijing's decisions on Iran and Syria have clearly irked Washington. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dubbed the Syria veto "despicable." Moreover, ongoing oil trading between China and Iran has already led Washington to slap sanctions on a Chinese trader. In a year of presidential elections in the U.S. and political turnover in China, when both sides are trying to keep tensions at bay, Middle East politics will burden an already complicated relationship with an unwelcome irritant. But Beijing has more than the United States to worry about. Take China's ties with Saudi Arabia, which provides China with almost one fifth of its oil. Beijing's reluctance to support Western-led sanctions on Iran isn't going down well in Riyadh either. Nor has China's decision to veto the U.N. Security Council's Syria resolution, a choice that Beijing claims was intended to prevent the situation on the ground from escalating further. Finally, several diplomatic principles -- non-interference in a third country's sovereignty, support for non-proliferation, China's rise as a responsible stakeholder -- are increasingly being called into question by other governments. The decision to veto the U.N. Security Council resolution on Syria may have been motivated by diplomatic principles of non-interference in a country's sovereignty and by Beijing's desire to prevent the situation from getting worse, but it has plainly damaged popular perceptions of China elsewhere in the region, and Premier Wen Jiabao's criticism of the Iranian nuclear program rings hollow to Western ears. When thinking about its foreign policy goals, does Beijing really want to provide the **security framework** for the Middle East? These are difficult debates that Chinese leaders must have, but they will certainly want to **postpone them until after Beijing's leadership transition is complete next year**.

#### Failure of reform causes multiple nuclear wars

Yee and Storey 2 (Herbert Yee, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the Hong Kong Baptist University, and Ian Storey, Lecturer in Defence Studies at Deakin University, 2002 (The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality, RoutledgeCurzon, pg 5)

The fourth factor contributing to the perception of a China threat is the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC, resulting in **territorial fragmentation, civil war and waves of refugees** pouring into neighbouring countries. Naturally, any or all of these scenarios would have a **profoundly negative impact** on regional stability. Today the Chinese leadership faces a raft of internal problems, including the increasing political demands of its citizens, a growing population, a shortage of natural resources and a deterioration in the natural environment caused by rapid industrialisation and pollution. These problems are putting a strain on the central government's ability to govern effectively. Political disintegration or a Chinese civil war might result in millions of Chinese refugees seeking asylum in neighbouring countries. Such an unprecedented exodus of refugees from a collapsed PRC would no doubt put a severe strain on the limited resources of China's neighbours. A fragmented China could also result in another nightmare scenario - nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible local provincial leaders or warlords.'2 From this perspective, a disintegrating China would also pose a **threat to** its neighbours and **the world**.

### 5

#### CIR will pass – Obama pushing – momentum now.

Sink and Mali 3-25. [Justin, Meghashyam, reporters, "Obama: 'The time has come' to move immigration reform in Congress" The HIll -- thehill.com/video/administration/290129-obama-the-time-has-come-to-move-immigration-reform]

Obama said he expects debate on an immigration bill to “begin next month” at a ceremony where 28 people, including 13 armed servicemembers, became citizens.¶ Bipartisan groups in both the House and Senate are moving closer to unveiling separate immigration reform proposals, and the president is hoping to build momentum for a deal.¶ “We've known for years that our immigration system is broken, that we're not doing enough to harness the talent and ingenuity of all those who want to work hard and find a place in America,” Obama said. “And after avoiding the problem for years, the time has come to fix it once and for all. The time has come for comprehensive, sensible immigration reform.”¶ Speaking from the East Room, Obama argued that immigration strengthens the country.¶ “It keeps us vibrant, it keeps us hungry, it keeps us prosperous. It is what makes us such a dynamic country,” he said. “If we want to keep attracting the best and the brightest, we've got to do a better job of welcoming them.”¶ Advocates for immigration reform see a real chance for legislation to pass Congress this year, despite opposition from some House GOP lawmakers, many of whom have said they will oppose measures that grant “amnesty” to illegal immigrants and have questioned proposed protections for gay or lesbian couples.¶ Immigration reform is a potent political issue for Obama, who won more than 70 percent of the Hispanic vote in 2012. Since that showing, a growing number of conservative lawmakers have signaled they would back immigration reform, including measures to provide a pathway to citizenship.¶ Groups aligned with Obama have signaled their intention of pressuring Congress.¶ On Monday, The New York Times reported that Organizing for Action — the political group born from the president's reelection campaign — will launch a new online effort featuring the stories of some 7,000 supporters, some of whom entered the country illegally.¶ The Senate’s “Gang of Eight” introduced their framework, calling for a pathway to citizenship, heightened border security, increased high-skilled immigration and a guest worker program, in January.¶ But since then, senators have been tied down in negotiations over the details of the plan, with many key issues still unresolved.¶ Obama said he wanted to see debate begin on a congressional bill by April.¶ “We are making progress, but we've got to finish the job, because this issue is not new,” Obama said. “Everyone pretty much knows what's broken, everyone knows how to fix it.”¶ At a briefing later Monday with reporters, White House spokesman Josh Earnest insisted that the White House did not hold the event over concern with the progress of negotiations.¶ "We are pleased with the progress they are reportedly making" in the Senate, Earnest said, adding that President Obama had been in touch with members of the Gang of Eight.¶ Earnest also dismissed criticism from freshman Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who suggested over the weekend that Obama secretly hoped talks would fall through, so Democrats could gain a political wedge for the 2014 midterm elections.¶ "There's no evidence to support those claims," Earnest said.¶ Members of the Senate group predict their plan could move forward when legislators return from a two-week Easter break.¶ A bipartisan House group has yet to share details of their proposals, but their work has already received general support from leaders in both parties.

#### Capital is key to comprehensive bill.

Anniston Star, 3-27 [Editorial Board, "On the offensive: Obama is wise to start anew the push for immigration reform," 3-27-13, annistonstar.com/view/full\_story/22088295/article-On-the-offensive--Obama-is-wise-to-start-anew-the-push-for-immigration-reform?instance=opinion\_lead, accessed 3-28-13, mss]

The point: President Obama didn’t fulfill his promise of securing sweeping immigration-reform policies during his first term. Now in his second, Obama is beginning a new campaign to urge legislators — particularly Republicans — to find a bipartisan compromise that (a.) **isn’t watered down** and (b.) is effective. It’s a lot to ask. Nevertheless, Obama is wise to go on this offensive. The need, as always, is great. An Associated Press report this week points out that the president is working behind the scenes in order to **keep Republicans at the** negotiating **table** between now and Congress’ April 8 return from spring break. The key is the Senate working group, the Gang of Eight, that is putting together a bipartisan plan the White House has yet to see. “We’ll reserve judgment on the product of those discussions until it’s produced,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said.

#### Military spending causes backlash – energy supercharges the link.

Gholz 12. [Eugene, PhD, Associate Professor of Public Affairs, University of Texas at Austin, senior advisor to the deputy assistant secretary of defense for manufacturing and industrial base policy, “The dynamics of military innovation and the prospects for defense-led energy innovation” in Energy Innovation at the Department of Defense: Assessing the Opportunities, White Paper – March -- http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Energy%20Innovation%20at%20DoD.pdf ]

The old saw that the Army would rather plan ¶ than fight may be an exaggeration, but it holds more than a grain ¶ of truth. More than most organizations, the U.S. military is well ¶ prepared to deal with the complexity that energy innovation ¶ will inject into its routines, and even if the logistics system seems ¶ Byzantine and inefficient, the organizational culture does not ¶ have antibodies against this aspect of energy innovation.¶ **On the other** hand, investing in base infrastructure has tended ¶ to be a harder task for the military, because with a few exceptions ¶ the quality of facilities at bases is tangential to the organizations’ ¶ critical tasks. People may rib the Air Force for the priority attached ¶ to making sure that bases have a decent golf course, but the ¶ bases do not really suffer (or benefit) from overinvestment in ¶ what is perceived as “nice to have” luxuries. **It is local politics** and ¶ their impact on congressional votes **that** **maintains** a **robust** ¶ number of military **bases, and the politics feed on** the **money** ¶ that **soldiers and their families spend in the community, not** ¶ **on paying the additional up-front cost of installing** efficient or ¶ **experimental energy** technologies.¶ 96

The military installations ¶ that attract the most innovative spending are the installations ¶ where the spending contributes directly to American forces’ ¶ combat edge—bases like the National Training Center that ¶ allow for highly realistic combat exercises. Advocates of energy ¶ innovation are unlikely to meld their pitch smoothly with that ¶ high-end organizational mission. If, instead, they pitch the energy ¶ innovations as “efficiency-enhancing,” they will face the fate ¶ of every other efficiency-enhancing investment that military ¶ installations could make: energy innovation will be treated as a ¶ low priority somewhere in the mix of desiderata in the budget.

#### Immigration reform expands skilled labor --- spurs relations with India

Los Angeles **Times**, 11/9/**20**12 (Other countries eagerly await U.S. immigration reform, p. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world\_now/2012/11/us-immigration-reform-eagerly-awaited-by-source-countries.html)

"Comprehensive immigration reform will see expansion of skilled labor visas," predicted B. Lindsay Lowell, director of policy studies for the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University. A former research chief for the congressionally appointed Commission on Immigration Reform, Lowell said he expects to see at least a fivefold increase in the number of highly skilled labor visas that would provide "a significant shot in the arm for India and China." There is widespread consensus among economists and academics that skilled migration fosters new trade and business relationships between countries and enhances links to the global economy, Lowell said. "Countries like India and China weigh the opportunities of business abroad from their expats with the possibility of brain drain, and I think they still see the immigration opportunity as a bigger plus than not," he said.

#### US/India relations averts South Asian nuclear war

Schaffer, Spring **200**2 (Teresita – Director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Security, Washington Quarterly, p. Lexis)

Washington's increased interest in India since the late 1990s reflects India's economic expansion and position as Asia's newest rising power. New Delhi, for its part, is adjusting to the end of the Cold War. As a result, both giant democracies see that they can benefit by closer cooperation. For Washington, the advantages include a wider network of friends in Asia at a time when the region is changing rapidly, as well as a stronger position from which to help calm possible future nuclear tensions in the region. Enhanced trade and investment benefit both countries and are a prerequisite for improved U.S. relations with India. For India, the country's ambition to assume a stronger leadership role in the world and to maintain an economy that lifts its people out of poverty depends critically on good relations with the United States.

#### cir k2 econ ------- decline in immigration spurs new recession.

Smith 12. [Gerry, technology reporter, "Brain Drain: Why We're Driving Immigration Talent Overseas" Huffington Post -- November 5 -- www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/09/immigrant-entrepreneur\_n\_2077183.html]

Stories like his are not unique. They’re also troubling for the U.S. economy, advocates say. For the first time, the number of immigrant-founded startups is in decline, as foreign-born entrepreneurs struggle to obtain a limited number of visas and green cards and decide to launch companies in other countries that offer perks to start businesses there. Losing founders like Darash, who launch startups that create jobs, means that America risks losing a source of employment and a competitive edge in the global economy as the country claws its way out of a recession, they say.¶ For years, immigrant entrepreneurs have propelled the growth of Silicon Valley, building some of the most successful tech companies in the world: Sergey Brin, co-founder of Google, was born in Russia; Elon Musk, co-founder of PayPal and Tesla, was born in South Africa; Vinod Khosla, co-founder of Sun Microsystems, was born in India. When they immigrated, it was likely easier for them because there was not a backlog that there is today, according to Vivek Wadhwa, a professor at the Pratt School of Engineering at Duke University who researches high-tech immigration. Immigrants are more than twice as likely to start a business as native-born Americans, according to a report earlier this year by the Partnership for a New American Economy. And their companies have produced sizable economic benefits. This year, engineering and technology companies founded in the United States employed about 560,000 workers and generated $63 billion in sales, according to Wadhwa. About a quarter of those companies had at least one foreign-born founder.¶ An estimated three out of every four startups fail, if not more. But by the conventional wisdom of Silicon Valley, Darash’s chances were even slimmer. For one, he does not have a co-founder. He insists he doesn’t need one. (Paul Graham, creator of the startup incubator Y Combinator, has said having a co-founder is critical because “a startup is too much for one person to bear.”) Darash also never worked for a major tech company before, so he did not have the network of contacts that help other entrepreneurs find engineers and meet investors.¶ But what he has lacked in support and connections he has made up for through a work ethic that borders on obsession.¶ “Asaf is a stubborn guy,” said Adam Gries, a childhood friend and founder of Smart Bites, a smartphone app that teaches people English. “He gets into his head that something is going to happen and he’s tenacious.”¶ Darash awakes every morning at 4:30 a.m., takes the BART train from his home in Berkeley to San Francisco, and arrives at the office by 6 a.m. He works for an hour, then walks across the street to the gym to swim and lift weights (A back injury he suffered while serving in the Israeli army requires him to stay physically strong). He typically does not go home until 9 p.m., after his children have gone to bed. Employees say he is a “total workaholic” who sends emails past midnight and sleeps just a few hours a night.¶ “I have a one-and-a-half year old who sees his Daddy maybe three hours a week,” Darash said. “It’s hard to explain how much sacrifice you make to bring a company from an idea to something real, especially if it’s a company with high-level technology.”¶ He is hands-on about all aspects of the company, from courting new clients to writing code. But lately, Darash has been distracted, spending valuable hours gathering documents and talking to lawyers, instead of running his company. His wife recently flew back to Israel to find housing and a school for their kids in case they have to leave the United States. He describes feeling a range of emotions: anger, fear, frustration. Mostly, though, he is confused. In his homeland of Israel, politicians fight over who can attract more foreign entrepreneurs. The United States, he says, should be rolling out the welcome mat for him, not ushering him out the door.¶ “I could not even comprehend this would become a problem,” he said. “I’m creating a company. I’m creating jobs. There’s nothing bad in what I’m doing and there’s nothing I’m taking away from someone else. The only thing I’m doing is creating more!”¶ “SERIOUS ALARM”¶ Since 2005, the number of immigrant-founded startups in Silicon Valley has declined from 52 percent to 44 percent, according to Wadhwa, who argues this drop is cause for “serious alarm” because America needs to attract immigrant entrepreneurs for its economy to recover.¶ “The United States risks losing a key growth engine right at the moment when it’s economy is stuck in a deep ditch, growing slowly and struggling to create jobs,” Wadhwa wrote in his new book, The Immigrant Exodus.¶ Their recent decline could be linked to entrepreneurs finding better business prospects abroad, especially in countries with growing economies like India and China. But advocates say a major reason why immigrants are launching fewer startups in the United States is because they are struggling to secure visas to remain in the country.

#### It will escalate to nuclear war

Merlini 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even **involving the use of nuclear weapons**. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular **rational approach would be sidestepped** by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

#### High skilled workers key to biotech

**Mowad 7.** [Michelle, Doctor, “Cap on Visas for Skilled Foreign Workers Stifling Biotech, Tech”, San Diego Business Journal, 4-23, http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/immigration-law-passports-visas-employment/10582800-1.html]

The local biotechnology and technology industries, highly dependent on very highly skilled workers, are waiting to see if their foreign job applicants have been awarded work visas. U.S. immigration officials received twice the maximum number of applications for H-1B visas given to foreign individuals holding advanced degrees on the first day of the application process. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services opened the application process on April 2 for granting visas for the new fiscal year that starts Oct. 1. Because the "cap" was exceeded the first day, the USCIS will hold a lottery to select from the applicants who applied on the first and second days. There are enormous economic and health benefits to opening up employment to international candidates, said Kristie Ford with Biocom, a life sciences industry association representing 530-plus member companies in Southern California. "Biotech is an industry that is going to continue to boom, and we need a work force that fits the industry needs," she said. Domestic businesses use the H-1B program so they can hire foreign workers In occupations that require theoretical or technical expertise in specialized fields, such as accounting, architecture, education, engineering, law, mathematics, medicine and health, physics, social sciences and theology. Kevin Carroll, executive director of the San Diego chapter of the American Electronics Association, said technology businesses have a history of welcoming the best and brightest workers. He said there is a need to raise the cap. "We need more (H-1B visas) and we need them now," said Carroll, whose AeA chapter consists of 150 technology-based member businesses. He said that demand for technology employers is extremely high. The unemployment rate for engineers is significantly low at 2 percent, according to Carroll. "This has an impact on the ability of San Diego to stay competitive," he said. Carroll added that a limited number of work visas forces companies to go to extraordinary lengths for recruiting. Each year, the USCIS processes 65,000 H-1B visas. This year, the agency received 124,000 applications in the first two days. In addition, the USCIS will issue an additional 20,000 H-1B visas to foreigners who hold advanced degrees from U.S. universities. USCIS received 13,000 applications for this type of visa within the first two days of the processing period. Individuals who applied for the work visa earlier this month will now have to wait up to four weeks after April 12 before they know if they have been approved or need to leave the country. The wait and importance of H-1B visas to San Diego is at the forefront of many minds. Attorneys from the San Diego office of Duane Morris LLP will host a seminar on the current trends in employment, benefits and immigration law on April 26. Topics to be covered include H-1B visas and the caps being met so early. Lisa Spiegel, an immigration and nationality attorney with Duane Morris, said two years ago applications reached the cap amount in August. Last year, the applications reached the cap amount in May and this year on the first day. "It is a sign of the economy growing," she said. "Companies need more high-tech workers." She said highly skilled jobs in the computer and biotechnology industries are driving the need for a higher cap number. "Companies need employees with a certain level of education and skill set, and they can't find enough in the U.S. so they are willing to hire top talent from around the world, but the problem is that they can't get them into the U.S.," she said. She added that domestic companies often resort to opening foreign satellite offices because it is so difficult to bring professionals here. "The U.S. is losing out on attracting foreign workers and top talent to come here, we are losing their taxes, we are losing the company's tax base and we are losing the ability to make the U.S. a place where the top talent wants to come for graduate school," she said. And if foreigners can't be certain they can obtain a work visa after graduation from a U.S. university, they may be reluctant to attend school here, she said. "These are not people coming in illegally, these are people coming in and contributing to our country," she said. The economy of California will suffer as a result of this cap, said Spiegel. "Companies are losing workers and losing the ability to remain competitive because they cannot get enough people to staff their projects," she said. The San Diego office of Mintz Levin Cohn Ferris Glovsky and Popeo PC hosted an immigration strategies conference April 19 at Estancia La Jolla Hotel & Spa. William L. Coffman, an attorney with Mintz Levin's Boston office, was a speaker at the event. Coffman reviewed alternative visa options for foreigners who may not be awarded an H-1B visa. Biocom offers several programs aimed to attract a local and national work force. The association created a Life Sciences Success program to facilitate student internships, teacher externships and a summer life sciences boot camp to connect students and teachers with leading companies in San Diego's life sciences community. Last year, 34 students attended boot camp, 44 participated in summer internships and 18 educators carried out externships. "Bottom line is that life sciences companies need a skilled work force," said Ford, associate director of Workforce Development for Biocom. "Biocom is trying to help it two ways - we are trying to grow our homegrown work force, but then we also support raising the H-1B visa cap as well." While many companies are not optimistic applicants will receive these coveted H-1B visas, talk of immigration reform has permeated the market. For now, industry associates including Biocom and local businesses are attempting to garner support for reform to make life easier for biotechnology and technology.

#### Extinction

**Trewavas 00** [Anthony, Institute of Cell and Molecular Biology – University of Edinburgh, “GM Is the Best Option We Have”, AgBioWorld, 6-5, http://www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/articles/biotech-art/best\_option.html]

But these are foreign examples; global warming is the problem that requires the UK to develop GM technology. 1998 was the warmest year in the last one thousand years. Many think global warming will simply lead to a wetter climate and be benign. I do not. Excess rainfall in northern seas has been predicted to halt the Gulf Stream. In this situation, average UK temperatures would fall by 5 degrees centigrade and give us Moscow-like winters. There are already worrying signs of salinity changes in the deep oceans. Agriculture would be seriously damaged and necessitate the rapid development of new crop varieties to secure our food supply. We would not have much warning. Recent detailed analyses of arctic ice cores has shown that the climate can switch between stable states in fractions of a decade. Even if the climate is only wetter and warmer new crop pests and rampant disease will be the consequence. GM technology can enable new crops to be constructed in months and to be in the fields within a few years. This is the unique benefit GM offers. The UK populace needs to much more positive about GM or we may pay a very heavy price. In 535A.D. a volcano near the present Krakatoa exploded with the force of 200 million Hiroshima A bombs. The dense cloud of dust so reduced the intensity of the sun that for at least two years thereafter, summer turned to winter and crops here and elsewhere in the Northern hemisphere failed completely. The population survived by hunting a rapidly vanishing population of edible animals. The after-effects continued for a decade and human history was changed irreversibly. But the planet recovered. Such examples of benign nature's wisdom, in full flood as it were, dwarf and make miniscule the tiny modifications we make upon our environment. There are apparently 100 such volcanoes round the world that could at any time unleash forces as great. And even smaller volcanic explosions change our climate and can easily threaten the security of our food supply. Our hold on this planet is tenuous. In the present day an equivalent 535A.D. explosion would **destroy** much of our **civilisation**. Only those with agricultural technology sufficiently advanced would have a chance at **survival**. Colliding asteroids are another problem that requires us to be forward-looking accepting that **technological advance may be the only buffer between us and annihilation**.

### 6

#### The Department of Defense should ensure long-term binding contracts with foreign countries that host forward operating bases that we would follow their restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions.

#### 1AC Horton evidence – solvency advocate

### 7

#### Text – In a relevant test case, the United States Supreme Court should issue a narrow ruling that federal authority over the Department of Defense Environment Conservation Program exceeds the power of the federal government under the 10th Amendment. The supreme court will uphold the Commerce Clause and not change permanent legitimate authority between the states and the federal government by refusing to allow a Congressional strike down and or roll back any legislation implemented as a result of this ruling and by evolving the power back towards the federal government after all necessary means. The fifty states and relevant federal territories should increase acquisition of electricity from wind and/or solar powered microgrid systems for military installations in the United States by prioritizing such electricity for purchase. The fifty states and relevant federal territories should amend their constitutions to extend their balanced budget horizon from one to five years and establish a dedicated funding stream for the aforementioned program. The necessary fifty states and relevant federal territories should issue memorandums to energy producers that

#### Contention 1

#### a. The CP is mutually exclusive – ask for the CP text out of the round, please

#### b. The CP competes through net benefits

#### cp solves all the case and energy federalism

**- Learner ‘8** (Copyright 2008 by Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. Northwestern University Law Review Vol. 102, No. 2 649 RESTRAINING FEDERAL PREEMPTION WHEN THERE IS AN “EMERGING CONSENSUS” OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND POLICIES Howard A. Learner\* INTRODUCTION, President and Executive Director, Environmental Law and Policy Center; Adjunct Professor, Northwestern University School of Law)

The model of cooperative federalism, which engages both the federal and state governments in setting and meeting environmental goals, has dominated the environmental regulatory field since the 1970s. It integrates national policies and interstate environmental pollution reduction goals with the sensibilities and flexibility of locally tailored actions. Recent trends in federalism jurisprudence, however, have circumscribed both federal and state power to regulate in the environmental arena. Courts’ applications of federalism principles to constrict both federal and state solutions can impede the stronger environmental protection that the public is increasingly demanding. At the same time, Congress and the executive branch have failed to advance key public environmental goals. For example, the federal government has failed both to address global climate change threats and to move aggressively forward on clean energy development solutions. Federal actions to reduce mercury pollution from coal plants and various pollutants from cars and trucks have widely been criticized as too little, too late. The political will for environmental leadership at the federal level has stagnated in the early part of the twenty-first century. The **states** are serving as Justice Brandeis’s fifty laboratories of democracy**.**1 They are stepping up to fill this environmental law and policy gap as federal actions have been viewed as insufficient or, in some cases, counterproductive. For example, more than a dozen states have enacted new statutes or regulatory standards directed at reducing more mercury pollution from coal plants and sooner than the federal standards require.2 Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have enacted renewable energy standards requiring utilities to provide an increasing percentage of the power supplied to consumers from wind power, solar energy, and other relatively cleaner “alternative” energy sources.3 Sixteen states are following California in adopting “clean car” standards, designed to reduce carbon dioxide pollution from cars over the next decade,4 and close to twenty states are enacting various forms of legislation, regulations, and executive actions designed to reduce greenhouse gas pollution in order to help solve climate change problems.5 While state governments are exerting greater responsibility for environmental protection in these and other related ways, the federal courts have sometimes applied the Supremacy Clause, federal preemption principles, and dormant commerce clause principles to strike down state laws that are held to conflict with federal law6 or place an undue burden on interstate commerce.7 The balance of federal and state power in the environmental context is being disrupted. State environmental policies can and should be more than merely stronger stop-gap measures. Often these policies are carefully designed and tailored to meet the goals, needs, values, and circumstances of each state. Furthermore, state policies can create significant environmental benefits and experience, particularly when, as now, a large number of states step up to act, producing both cumulative impacts and comparative experiences. A key question moving forward is how best to preserve the most significant benefits of these state policies over the long term. How and when should the courts and Congress create space for states to act more strongly in the interests of the environment and of their citizens? Moreover, if and when Congress does eventually act on these pressing environmental issues, such as global climate change solutions, how can new federal legislation ensure the integrity of a national regulatory scheme while retaining the strongest elements of existing state measures? Should it matter how many states have stepped up to act when the federal government has not? This Article focuses on one key point for consideration. When there is an emerging consensus of state legislative actions moving in the same general direction in a particular environmental field, should that influence a reviewing court’s application of federal preemption principles? In short, in the federal-state cooperative framework of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and other major environmental laws, should it be a relevant factor for judicial adjudication and determination that a growing number of states are stepping up to act along common lines to provide stronger environmental protections? This Article argues yes: an emerging **state consensus** **should**, indeed, make a difference. This principle would support a **better balance** of federal and state powers for environmental laws. In such cases, courts should apply the Supremacy Clause with more restraint and should not imply congressional intent to preempt state environmental laws absent a clear statement of preemptory language or a very clear and fundamental conflict between federal and state laws. If Congress is firmly convinced that adoption of a particular environmental policy by a growing number of states would undermine the efficacy of a national regulatory scheme, then Congress should clearly state its intention to preempt state action. Otherwise, implied preemption should be applied narrowly in the environmental policy context in order to recognize the states’ traditional police powers over public health and safety and regulation of land uses.8 This clear statement rule is advocated by many constitutional law scholars,9 and it is supported by the traditional presumption against preemption. Some courts, however, have begun to deviate from that presumption.10 The clear statement rule should apply with even greater force, though, when there is an emerging consensus of state policy actions moving in a largely consistent direction. This makes sense for several reasons. It will enhance **cooperative federalism** by allowing **states to fill gaps** when the **federal government fails to act**. It will **restore consistency to federalism** jurisprudence in cases involving areas of traditional state concern. It will help courts apply preemption doctrine without having to “guess” at Congress’s intent. Overall, it is simply good policy to provide room for state creativity in addressing today’s challenging environmental problems while maintaining a strong federal floor of environmental protection. To illustrate, there is a clear trend of states enacting renewable energy portfolio standards (RPS), which require utilities and other energy suppliers to provide a specified percentage of electricity from renewable and other clean energy sources.11 The goals of state RPS statutes are: to avoid greenhouse gases and other air pollution, water pollution, and highly radioactive wastes from coal, oil, and nuclear power plants; and to improve electric supply reliability by increasing the diversity of power supply resources. Illinois’s RPS, for example, requires that the new Illinois Power Agency and the investor-owned distribution utilities provide a specified percentage of renewable energy at an annually increasing rate: in 2008, renewable energy must constitute 2% of each utility’s total supply to eligible customers; in 2009, the required renewable energy is 4%; and the requirement then ramps up by 1% each year up to 10% by 2015.12 Thereafter, between 2015 and 2025, the required renewable energy increases 1.5% each year up to 25% by the year 2025.13 The statute specifies the types of renewable energy resources that are eligible to meet this standard: “wind, solar thermal energy, photovoltaic cells and panels, biodiesel, crops and untreated and unadulterated organic waste biomass, trees and tree trimmings, hydropower that does not involve new construction or significant expansion of hydropower dams, [landfill gas,] and other alternative sources of environmentally preferable energy.”14 The other state RPS statutes move in the same policy direction, but dictate varying percentage targets, timelines, and eligible renewable energy resources. For example, state renewable energy production targets range from Maryland’s modest 9.5% by 202215 to California’s 20% by 201016 and New York’s 25% by 2013.17 Maine already uses more than 30% renewable energy and has acted to increase new renewable energy production capacity by 10% by 2017.18 Within these percentage goals, some states tier eligible renewable energy sources and establish separate goals for each tier or class. The variations in percentage targets, timelines, and eligible power resources often reflect different clean energy opportunities in the states (e.g., wind power in Illinois and hydropower in Maine), different environmental values and power mixes, and different energy structures among the states. The Supreme Court has held that power need, feasibility, services, and economics, including retail energy pricing, are areas of traditional state regulation.19 What is fundamental here is that many states are taking **energy** and environmental policy **actions** that move in the same direction and along a consistent trend line. Part I of this Article explains the importance of preserving a balance of power that allows room for both state and federal actions to achieve stronger environmental protection goals. Part II presents a brief overview of preemption doctrine and explores the value of a clear statement rule when there is an emerging consensus of state environmental policy actions in similar directions. I. SETTING THE STAGE: STATE AND FEDERAL POWER IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION The Supreme Court moved to constrict the scope of Congress’s room to act under the Commerce Clause in the United States v. Morrison and United States v. Lopez decisions and other related cases.20 That has led to considerable concern that the Court will find insufficient Commerce Clause authority for such bedrock federal environmental laws as the Clean Water Act21 and the Endangered Species Act.22 Some litigants have also relied on the **Tenth Amendment to argue that federal environmental regulation impinges on areas of traditional state** and local **authority** 23 and on the Eleventh Amendment to limit the ability of citizens to sue a state agency for violations of federal environmental law.

#### Expanding the Balanced Budget horizon from one to five years solves state budget shortfalls

Ruffini 9 (Patrick, Republican online strategist, “The Solution to the state fiscal crisis: a five year balanced budget?”, Next Right, 2/22/09, <http://www.thenextright.com/patrick-ruffini/the-solution-to-the-state-fiscal-crisis-a-five-year-balanced-budget>)

Back in the Contract with America days, a Balanced Budget Amendment was a major tenet of Republican policy, and a couple of times, it came close enough to passing Congress to inspire furious lobbying and vitriolic sky-is-falling claims from the Democrats. A balanced budget requirement isn't some radical pie-in-the-sky idea. 49 out of 50 states have it. The good news is that it works -- those states are actually forced to balance their budget. The bad news is that it's often ugly, with drastic spending cuts and tax increases in many states in the current budget year. Albeit more responsible than rampant deficit spending at the federal level, the states aren't any less short term in their thinking than the feds. In good years, state governments rush to spend the surplus only to **abruptly cancel programs** in a recession -- because there's no real incentive to bank surpluses against a downturn or use state rainy day funds. A budget $5 billion in surplus is just as balanced as one with $0 in surplus, so the politicians might as well spend the money currying favor with voters. The only way I can think of to stop this problem is to **extend the horizon** of the balanced budget from one year to five years. Essentially, the budget would have to be in balance over the course of 5 years, covering most recessions with 2 or 3 years of recovery. **In bad times, states could deficit spend** -- by no more than the surpluses of the previous four years. **In good times, states would be forced to bank surpluses** -- particularly if the past few years were economically tough. One downside is that politicians use it to recreate the present, with budgets just barely in balance across the board, but more likely than not, the politically convenient thing to do would be to slip into a deficit for one or two years, thus kicking off a virtuous circle where subsequent years' budgets would not only have to be in balance, but the extra debt accumulated during a recession would have to be paid off. This could head off irresponsible spending binges in good times and keep state budgets on more of an even keel. It's true that budgets wouldn't have to be balanced every year -- though the overall fiscal impact is the same -- but it sure beats the farce of Washington needing to bail out the states when they run off the rails.

### 8

#### Energy production policy is deeply gendered and racialized – The plans economic rationality co-opts alternatives, creates ideological blindspots in energy decision-making and accelerates an unsustainable system of global inequality

**Holleman 12** (Hannah, Assistant professor of sociology at Amherst, PhD in sociology from the University of Oregon, Sociology dissertation, University of Oregon, “Energy justice and foundations for a sustainable sociology of energy, ” https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1794/12419/Holleman\_oregon\_0171A\_10410.pdf?sequence=1)

As Marilyn Waring noted twenty years ago, under this system, when there is an ¶ environmental catastrophe, like the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska, or the current BP oil ¶ spill in the Gulf, companies make an enormous profit cleaning up, or at least professing ¶ to do so. GDP goes up. If someone is sick, if they die a long, drawn-out death from ¶ cancer, there is profit to be made. There is no money to be made in human and ecological ¶ health and well-being. If communities grow their own food, the global food market ¶ significantly decreases; if people walk rather than drive, the oil and car companies don’t ¶ make money. If education is free, who benefits? Maybe most people, and the society at ¶ large, maybe even the environment, but not necessarily the shareholders. Therefore, it is ¶ much more economically efficient to let the market shape education. Today students take ¶ out larger and larger loans to buy more expensive books, to get less education engendered ¶ by fewer teachers. This is capitalist efficiency. The surplus is efficiently transferred from ¶ one segment of the population to another, those at the top. The same goes for letting the ¶ market shape energy policy. Those arguing today for **market intervention** in the climate ¶ crisis often fail to mention that it is absolutely already the **market shaping energy policy**. ¶ This is precisely the problem. It is very efficient for the market to extract oil at bargain ¶ prices from countries without militaries to stop them. It is very efficient, in terms of ¶ profit, to have the most vulnerable in society pay the costs of energy production, and to ¶ keep polluting, all the while terrifying people that new energy developments might be ¶ their only chance of economic survival. Nevermind where the real money goes and what ¶ happens with the boom goes bust. The current version of capitalist ideology, which **absorbs energy scholars** (and ¶ even environmental socialists) often unwittingly, was consciously shaped to co-opt the ¶ language of social movements seeking freedom from the yolk of capitalism and ¶ imperialism. It is no surprise that the market would co-opt **green rhetoric** today. ¶ Economists having the greatest ideological influence on political debates and social ¶ science today, the architects of neoliberal ideology, have sought to **re-write** the **history** of ¶ capitalist development as “the constitution of liberty,” and the basis of free society ¶ (Hayek 1960; Friedman 1962; Van Horn, Mirowski, and Stapleford, eds. 2011). There ¶ can be no acknowledgement of slavery, racism, sexism, or ecological destruction among ¶ other issues, because all of these undermine the basic thesis neoliberal writers actively ¶ promote as political ideology. To make their argument, these writers must present ¶ capitalism as raising all boats, color-blind, gender-neutral, and free of class coercion, the ¶ globalization of which results in a “flat,” happy world, even if it is hot (Friedman 2005, ¶ 2008). Unfortunately, these ideas dominate the political sphere, and contemporary ¶ notions of organizational, community, and national development. In academia, many ¶ “theorists celebrate the alleged leveling of social differences owing to globalization”¶ (Pellow 2007, 41). The blinders imposed by this view continue to infect energy studies¶ despite the work of critical energy scholars. Spreading capitalism thus becomes the solution for poverty associated with ¶ inequalities caused by oppression based on race, class, gender, and position in the world ¶ system, as well as the solution to environmental and energy crises. This is the basic ¶ modernization thesis. The Ecological Modernization Reader (Mol, Sonnenfeld, and ¶ Spaargaren 2009) presents these systematized views regarding the environmental crisis, ¶ which are increasingly influential in environmental sociology. York and Rosa (2003) and ¶ Foster (2012) have pointed out the empirical, theoretical, and philosophical roots of, and ¶ problems associated with this perspective as a basis for understanding ecological and ¶ social crises and solutions. But, we can expect this view to persist as long as social ¶ relations remain intact because the logic of modernization is seductive precisely because ¶ it is the logic of capitalism (Foster 1999b, 2002, 2009, 2012). The processes of ¶ capitalism, including its ideological developments, are the “background conditions” in ¶ which those integrated into the market economy live, as fish swim in water, they are the ¶ “social gravity” we might naturally feel is right, but don’t necessarily see, as much a part ¶ of our lives as the air we breathe (York and Clark 2006). In contrast to the modernization thesis, environmental justice scholars, among ¶ other critical theorists and activists have sought to expose the **mythological basis** of ¶ neoliberalism and transcend the system. The work of environmental justice scholars, ¶ **feminist ecologists**, and ecological rift theorists, marshaling the **empirical evidence**, ¶ represent powerful critiques of the modernization thesis. Taken together with the insights ¶ in existing critical work on energy, they provide an **alternative approach** to energy that¶ belies the notion that **“there is no alternative**.” They share a common commitment, as ¶ social scientists and activists, to reality. Part of this reality is that “actual class and racial ¶ **inequalities** around the **global and between North and South have** only **worsened** in the ¶ past half-century—the same period during which the late modern state of capitalism took ¶ hold” (Pellow 2007, 41). Despite views that we live in a post-racial society, (or one ¶ where “men are finished and women are taking over” [Sohn 2011]), in fact economic ¶ globalization has “seriously undermined the gains of the civil rights and labor movement ¶ and the general antiracist struggle in the United States and undercut the global benefits of ¶ the anticolonial struggles occurring throughout the global South” (Pellow 2007, 43). ¶ Moreover, economic globalization and the intensified spread of ecological destruction ¶ “are intimately linked because the TNCs [transnational corporations] themselves were¶ the ones creating and pushing both globalization and toxins on the world markets, ¶ facilitating greater control over nations, communities, human bodies, and the natural ¶ world itself”(43). Today, **neoliberal mythology** has severely **hindered** the development of a wider ¶ **environmental justice consciousness** in the broader public, and amongst activists and ¶ academics. In **energy studies** this view is especially pronounced in the **focus on ¶ technology**, carbon markets, voluntary certification schemes, and **alternative energies** that ¶ basically allow business to continue as usual (Foster 2002, 9-25; Rogers 2010; Holleman ¶ 2012). The critical literature emerging from what I call an energy justice perspective in ¶ ecological rift theory, systems ecology, **feminist** and critical human **ecology**, and ¶ environmental justice scholarship has drawn out the social and ecological crises of the ¶ current energy regime. This is **in contrast** to too many well-intentioned scholars and ¶ activists who buy into the main tenets of the modernization thesis, and thus are reluctant ¶ to break with capitalism as a system, or worse, they promote it, ignoring or ignorant of ¶ the enormous costs. This has led to the view that our task as environmentalists is getting ¶ economics to “**internalize the externalities**,” to bring under the pricing system the work of ¶ natural systems and human services (labor). For energy this means carbon markets and ¶ trade in other forms of pollution and raising energy prices. While it is clear that as long as ¶ we have this system, goals should include wealth redistribution and businesses ¶ shouldering the costs of their polluting practices, long-term, internalizing more of the ¶ world in the market system is a total death strategy. The logic of the market is clear. An ¶ energy justice movement, with the intention of healing the ecological rift and ¶ transcending social injustice, on the other hand has as its base the goal of “externalizing ¶ the internalities.” This is an ecological and social imperative. Understanding the nature of the current system, Daniel Yergin’s worse-than-nothing approach to energy is the logical response of capital. Carbon markets and the ¶ new biotech boom also make sense. If the point is accumulation, sources of profit must ¶ be found at every turn and crises represent especially ripe opportunities (Klein 2007). The ¶ problem today is not capitalism’s lack of response to the climate crisis, capital was never ¶ developed as a system geared toward ecological reproduction or meeting human needs. It ¶ is a system geared toward profit at all cost and can have no rational response. The ¶ problem is that capitalism organizes so many of our productive activities in the first ¶ place. The sooner this is recognized, the sooner we can start thinking of real alternatives, ¶ and understand ourselves as subjects, not merely objects of the system, as protagonists of ¶ our own future. We can move beyond playing the passive consumers of the next product¶ capitalism has on offer, green or otherwise, packaged as a solution to energy crises. ¶ Examples like the carbon market schemes, or Daniel Yergin’s view of what constitutes ¶ energy revolution, make clear “that there’s no way we can just subcontract our ¶ environmental conscience to the new breed of green marketers” (McKibben 2010). Energy and social inequality, the challenges of our generation The social and ecological costs of our energy regime today are clear, though the ¶ ways these are both the result of and exacerbate social inequality and oppression are often ¶ misunderstood or ignored. While the future is unwritten, projections, if business ¶ continues as usual, indicate environmental and social **catastrophe** with much of the ¶ **damage irreversible**. Without significant social change, we should prepare for, among ¶ other depredations, **increased warfare** to secure energy resources to meet increased ¶ demand. The most recent British Ministry of Defence Strategic Trends report suggests ¶ that nations will increasingly use energy security “to challenge conventional ¶ interpretations on the legality of the use of force” (108). Environmentally and socially ¶ destructive energy sectors are projected to grow the next thirty years, such as nuclear ¶ energy and biofuel, while expected fossil fuel demand also goes only one way, up: ¶ Global Energy use has approximately doubled over the last ¶ 30 years and, by 2040, demand is likely to grow by more ¶ than half again. Despite concerns over climate change, ¶ demand is likely to remain positively correlated to ¶ economic growth with fossil fuels, meeting more than 80% ¶ of this increase. Urban areas will be responsible for over ¶ 75% of total demand. (Strategic Trends, 106) ¶ Even a U.S. government official has recognized publicly that “our patterns of energy use ¶ create geopolitical instability. The ways we use energy are disrupting the climate system ¶ and threaten terrifying disruptions in decades to come” (Sandalow 2009). These realities only partially illustrate energy’s extensive contribution to what K. ¶ William Kapp (1950) referred to as capitalism’s systemic “unpaid costs.” As Anderson ¶ (1976) put it: “the growth society operates as if it had tunnel vision and nearsightedness; ¶ the accumulation of capital is pursued without regard for the side-effects or for longrange consequences, leaving to nature and the larger community these uncalculated ¶ costs” (140). Prefiguring contemporary discussions and movement framing, Anderson ¶ referred to these accumulated unpaid costs, or externalities as “the ecological debt,” the ¶ result of the exploitation of both nature and humans for the sake of economic growth at ¶ all costs (142-43), undermining the natural and social conditions of production. As indicated previously, with energy demand expected only to increase as the ¶ economy expands, the “unpaid costs” associated with its extraction and use will continue ¶ to accumulate, but on a scale heretofore unseen. The science is clear that if we do not ¶ severely curtail energy use, we will cross critical **thresholds in the biosphere**’s ability to ¶ recycle waste and regulate the earth’s temperature. The consequences of crossing such ¶ planetary boundaries will be **irreversible** (Hansen 2009; Solomon, et al. 2009; Cullen ¶ 2010; Foster 2011). This is a new juncture in humanity’s relation to the rest of nature. However, the ¶ costs of climate change, among other environmental crises generated by energy ¶ production and use, which is driven largely by economic growth, already are visited upon ¶ communities and other social groups in a dramatically unequal way––this we may ¶ understand as a defining feature of energy injustice. This social inequality, indeed, is a ¶ necessary feature of capitalism, making human exploitation and the assault on the ¶ environment possible, and energy injustice inevitable in the current system: “Environmental deterioration will continue so long as there is a class system, since the ¶ profits of environmental neglect accrue primarily to one class whereas the costs are borne ¶ primarily by another” (Anderson 1976, 139). Scholars studying the ecological and social ¶ rift of capitalism, including those working on environmental racism and **feminist ecology**, ¶ have expanded the understanding of how these processes are **gendered and racialized**. ¶ Work on unequal ecological exchange amply has demonstrated that inequality between ¶ nations and regions also increases the burdens of environmental injustice. Studies from ¶ all of these perspectives have drawn out inequalities embedded in our current patterns of ¶ energy decision-making, extraction, use, and waste disposal, documenting energy ¶ injustice through various theoretical lenses.

#### Economic rationality causes extinction – you can’t trust the knowledge production of the 1AC – rejection is key to mapping new strategies to avert biosphere collapse

Plumwood 2 (Val, Prof of Women’s Studies, Australian Research Council Fellow at the Australian National University, *Environmental Culture The ecological crisis of reason*, p. 1-3)

The Titanic is a story of technological hubris and decision-making disaster in the face of risk which surely derives some of its continuing fascination for us in the parallel it presents to our contemporary ecological situation. In the ecological parallel to the **Titanic** story, we have reached the stage in the narrative where we have received the iceberg warning, and have made the remarkable decision to double the engine speed to Full Speed Ahead and go below to get a good night’s rest. A change of course might be bad for business, we might have to slow down, lose time. Nothing, not even the ultimate risk of the death of nature, can be allowed to hold back the triumphant progress of the ship of rational fools. But then not much about our behaviour in relation to the ecological crisis has been rational, if we are careful and critical about the meaning of that term. The **failure** of dominant national and international political institutions to meet the situation of ecological crisis could not be more clear, a course likely to ensure our demise even if the world were not overhung by the shadow of continuing warfare. The often-invoked term ‘sustainability’ tends to obscure the seriousness of the situation; clearly no culture which **sets in motion** **massive processes of biospheric degradation** which it has **normalised**, and which it cannot respond to or correct can hope to survive for very long. We hear of the failure and permanent endangerment of many of the world’s oldest and greatest fisheries, the continuing destruction of its tropical forests and the loss of much of its agricultural land and up to half its species within the next thirty years. Although the long-term portent of such processes potentially disruptive to survival as deforestation, global warming and ocean degradation, is not yet fully grasped, and **devastating** forms of **positive-feedback** are a real possibility, a low priority is being accorded the attempt to deal with them. This is not a rational course, and if we are told it is, we need to look more carefully at what is meant by ‘rational’. It is a common observation that the necessary social change which might begin to reduce this impact and begin the construction of a society capable of surviving has not been occurring. We are mostly going **backwards** in the key area of containing **energy consumption**, and are facing growing pollution of land, air and water, growing problems of the destruction of the forests, the ozone layer, global warming, acid rain, the disposal of toxic wastes, as well as the multiple crises of rationalist agriculture. Our failure to situate dominant forms of human society ecologically is matched by our failure to situate non-humans ethically, as the plight of non-human species continues to worsen. Rationalised intensive agriculture not only inflicts intolerable living conditions on animals, but increasingly requires massive slaughtering events to stem the disease outbreaks its conditions foster. On the wild side too, primate researchers speak of an ‘animal holocaust’: we hear of the massive displacement of orang-utans, the slaughter of African gorillas, ivory is once again on the world trade menu, and there is a move- ment to resume the full-scale slaughter of whales. If even the largest and most closely related animal species are not spared extinction in the wild, what ultimate hope is there for the rest of nature? All metaphors have their limitations, but those limitations can often tell us something. The Titanic myth is liberal-democratic, maintaining a story of equality of consequences, of elite heroism and self-sacrifice, of million- aires and other men standing back while women and children were saved. But in the real ecological world on which we are passengers, unlike the Titanic , the millionaires don’t go down with the ship, and it’s certainly not women and children first. So to understand fully the irrationality of the kind of decision-making that guides our collective course, we must look carefully at **where the decisions come from** and at the class composition of the passenger lists, at who will perish and who will thrive, and at who is in a position to make good decisions. Above all we need to look self-critically at why bad decisions are made, and under what dominant illusions. Such a scrutiny of the structure of current decision-making in relation to the global ecological crisis is far from reassuring. If, as I argue in Chapters 1 and 2, a hubristic and **sado-dispassionate** form of economic and scientific reason is in charge that is **exclusionary** in focus and **acts for a narrow range of interests**, our ship has set a bad course, and we need to change our concepts and strategies of rationality. If, as I argue in Chapters 3 and 4, the major decision roles in most polities go to those groups who profit most from the destructive processes that are threatening the biosphere, and who are least likely to be aware of and motivated to take corrective action to halt them, the conclusion must be that we have so far failed to find a good captain – to devise ecologically rational forms of polity that are adequate to respond to the crisis and guide us safely home. And if, as I argue in Chapters 5 and 6, **rational hubris** is part of culture-wide **blindspots** associated with anthropocentrism that foster **illusions of invincibility** and hide our real danger, we should become sufficiently sceptical about the dominant directions of travel to oust the mad captain, get out the maps and begin to chart a new course. In doing the latter, we may be helped by some experienced counter-hegemonic piloting, which is the subject of Chapters 7–10, exploring some aspects of a partnership model for healing the dysfunc- tional ecological and ethical relationships we have created with nature.

#### **Reject the gendered economic rationality of the 1AC – Endorse the alt to open space for an ethics of interdependence that avoids destructive forms of rationality – The ballot should foreground a method of process oriented thinking to expose the false neutrality of the aff**

Plumwood 2 (Val, Prof of Women’s Studies, Australian Research Council Fellow at the Australian National University, *Environmental Culture The ecological crisis of reason*, p. 32-37)

Neo-liberalism has succeeded in **passing itself off as rational** largely because it plays a tough **rationalistic gender game**. The implicitly androcentric structuring of the rationalist economy appears in the fundamental motivating form of rationality it assumes, the rational egoism of the selfcontained and self-maximising individual or separative self, as pursued by its rational master subject.28 Rational Economic Man has in an extreme form features conventionally associated with masculinity, such as egoism, rational and calculative capacities. This rational egoist master subject hails from a more abstract planet than our own; he does not need to take the concrete, locatable earthian form of a particular individual or class of individuals, such as the top-hatted, cigar-smoking millionaire of popular past insurgent imagination. Much of the development of modernity has involved encoding the rationality and properties of this master subject into apparently impersonal, bureaucratic mechanisms and institutions expressive of the general machinery of hegemonic, and especially **economic, rationality**. That’s why they **can** so easily **appear neutral** and impartial, **and** thus **‘rational’**. Androcentrism has been merged into the rules of the game, and the processes for selecting those who can play. Androcentrism is written into the roles of master subjects of the property formation and corporate systems, the Man of Property and Business Man. That’s why women own so little of the earth. Many of the same rules that exclude women are used to exclude non-humans, ensuring that they don’t get their fair share of the earth either, and that the system is anthropocentric in the same way that it is androcentric. Among the characteristic gendered dualisms economic rationalist culture relies on to naturalise its exclusions as rational are those of private versus public. The defining features of an economic rationalist order created via the naturalisation and universalisation of the model of rational egoism are a ‘double dualism’ of public and private which radically separates the economic (public) sphere from the sphere of the household on the one hand and the economic (private) from the (public) sphere of politics on the other.29 In these contrasts, concepts of public and private play a dual role. The ‘productive’ and ‘public’ economic sphere is defined against the ‘private’ or domestic sphere of the household as the domain of reproductivity, ‘provisioning’, care for the ecologically-situated body, and also, most importantly, the sphere of emotional attachment, altruism and ethics. Prudential-egoist strategies and modes are sharply distinguished from supposedly ‘ethical’ and altruist ones, coding the former as rational in contrast to the second as irrational, and naturalising the disengaged separative self as the ultimate rational actor. This means that it is not only women’s reproductive and caring work that is excluded from ‘public’ and economic rationality, but also much of the area of the ethical and the ecological, taken to be represented by and confined to the ‘private-domestic’. On the other side, the economic (‘private’) is defined, in a double disembedment, against the political (‘public’), taken to be a sphere of dialogue and negotiation with those who make up the political community. Whether ethics is conceived as purely individual and private, handed over to women and the household as guardians of ethics as in the Victorian period, or located wholly or partially as part of the public/political sphere, the outcome of these divisions is the concept of ‘the economy’ or ‘business’ as a male sphere of rational competition completely unconstrained by ethics and excluding sentiments of compassion or sympathy. This means that rationality is held to be primarily economic, egoist, and atomistic. Supplementing this double dualistic construction is **a narrow definition of rationality** in terms of a calculus of maximising self-interest. This urges us to privilege the domain in which self-interest operates over other domains of human life, as ultimately the most rational form and arbiter of other forms. Prudential-egoist virtues and goals are sharply opposed to ‘ethical’ altruist ones and only the former conform to these concepts and ideals of rationality. Before long these ideals of rationality spill over into other parts of life; egoist maximisations of monetary values become the normal model, even in regions where they are irrational, destructive of trust or go against important cooperative or altruist traditions, such as in social infrastructure provision, medical practice and the helping professions. Those self-maximising and monological forms of rationality built on the model of the self as an isolated, atomistic self-contained individual, the separative self, are not only unethical but also irrational and prudentially hazardous. They are especially hazardous and **self-destructive** when applied in what are really **contexts of interdependency** and of self-in-relationship – the normal real-life context. Here they encourage inappropriate strategies of maximisation and competition that harm the self (or One) because they do not take account of its connections to the Other. In these contexts of interrelationship, not monological but different dialogical strategies aimed not at self-maximisation but at negotiation and mutual flourishing are rational. But a dialogical model requires a basic level of **mutuality and equality**, give and take, response and feedback, that is not available in monological systems. Dialogical logics assist **conflict resolution**, conversation, and fair exchange. It is significant that these dialogical systems are not the kind of formal reasoning systems the intellectual life of the west has made pre-eminent, but rather monological logics that impose a centricallyconceived One upon a passive Other.30 A strategy can seem rational when applied in a hypothetical context of hyperseparation but be **completely irrational** when applied in a **real-world context of interrelationship**. The monological denials of dependency and interconnectedness are major sources of the irrationality of rational egoism and the rationalist economics based on it in the context of real, ecologically embodied life. The hyperbolised autonomy assumed in economic theory lies behind some of the current world order’s ugliest and most destructive acts as well as its most irrational ones, since it universalises competitive and self-maximising economic behaviour. Rationality as maximising the separative self is interpreted as driving the hardest bargain against the Other, squeezing the most out of the Other that is the ‘resource’, licensing ruthlessness. It maximises ‘efficiency’, ‘competition’ and the corporate bottom line, dictating that the battery chicken cannot have an extra inch of cage space, or that fishcatching technology be designed to take the biggest catch, whatever the cost to non-target species. Its economic rationality proposes the superior wisdom of feeding diseased animal carcases to confined herbivores, discounting predictable risks in crossing species barriers, as well as potentials for creating new diseases and moving them through the food chain. It proposed the same sort of thing for fish meal and fish farms, and now it is proposing it again for genetic engineering.31 The proposition that such monological strategies are rational can only seem plausible to people remote from their operations and concrete effects, because the illusion that they are rational cannot easily be maintained in the local and immediate worlds where concrete relationships of embodiment and interconnectedness are harder to discount and ignore. Gendered forms and metaphors are used to support person/property and related respect/use and subject/object dualisms that provide the ethical foundations for these denials and for the commodification of nature. These metaphors reinforce monological and mechanistic symbolism depicting the non-human sphere as a ‘mindless body’, passive, manipulable, and wanting in rational agency, at the same time as they promote the privileging of their own hyper-rational masculinist forms. Hegemonic conceptions of human agency that deny all these others, women, the colonised, the ‘hired hands’, and nature, are linked to denials of dependency, which are in turn linked to the application of inappropriate strategies and forms of rationality that aim to maximise the share of the ‘isolated’ self and neglect the need to promote mutual flourishing. Thus supposedly rational economic subjects are able to assume the contribution of nature in the form of a continuing support base for production, accumulation and renewal, but also to deny it in failing to recognise and allow for nature’s reproduction and continuation.32 Such systems conspire to conceal from us our dependency on nature, to overestimate our autonomy and manipulative ability, to claim invincibility so we believe we know no limits, and so devise Promethean projects like growing indefinitely on earth, taming space and terraforming Mars. According to its story, nature has no agency or autonomy of its own and imposes no real limits on us. Ideally, nature is to be rationally ordered through a system in which it is property, for sale to the highest human bidders. Hegemonic constructions of agency that justify appropriation are especially encouraged in the culture/nature dualism typical of western thinking because its systems of appropriation are based on the idea of the separative self applying labour to ‘pure’ nature, as in Locke’s argument. The process opens the way for enrichment, but its other side is that the blinkered vision involved is a problem for prudence as well as for justice in the case where the One is in fact dependent on this Other, for the One can gain an illusory and over-comfortable sense of their own ontological independence and ecological autonomy. It is just such a sense that seems to pervade the dominant culture’s contemporary disastrous misperceptions of its economic and ecological relationships. Countering this denial requires recognition, but ‘recognition’ here must mean much more than just ‘remember’ (as in the case of Mother’s Day) – recognition means, at least, incorporating that knowledge of their agency into economic institutions and distribution of social resources and rewards. As we have seen, among the main sources of irrationality in the rationalist economy are hyperbolised concepts of individual ‘autonomy’ and hegemonic constructions of agency that legitimate unjust appropriation and denials of dependency on others, including nature, and forms of reason/emotion and public/private dualism that present disengagement and egoism as rationality and marginalise ethics and emotionality, including care for human others and for nature. Many feminists have critiqued these, emphasising as alternatives care perspectives that stress emotional and dispositional forms of care for nature, as a more-than-instrumental basis of concern. As feminist theorists of care have pointed out, in the service of the opposition rationalism presupposes between emotion and reason, between ethics and economics, women have been denigrated as only half-ethical beings, while our civilisation is driven by conceptions of both reason and ethics which exclude or denigrate what women have been taken to stand for.33 In a rationalist economy which defines its hardness in opposition to the symbolic woman, as Other, and which increasingly invades every corner of our lives, we should not be surprised to find that care and compassion for others are increasingly inexpressible in the public ‘rational context’, a context that is defined against the domestic sphere in which care has been confined. Ethics has long been individualised, ethe realised and disempowered by confinement to the sphere of women and the household and its exclusion from state-political and economic life.34 The global economic rationalist economy intensifies that split to catastrophic levels. The double ethical disembedment of the global market economy means that it is stripped of both the ethics of the public sphere, that of public probity and collective good, and also the ethics of the private sphere, of care, compassion and personal relationship. Its status as an ethics-free zone, one that cannot even be imagined as caring and compassionate, testifies to its essentially sado-dispassionate character. An ethics-free market, as I will presently show, is as much a hazard as a rudderless engine, and especially dangerous when it is permitted to control so many spheres of life. As the ethics-free rationality of the economic sphere colonises other spheres of life, the rationalist machinery of the sado-dispassionate economy is coming for us too – it has already constructed our work and much of our own lives in the same oppressive terms that demand that we leave emotional expression, self-direction and creativity, along with love and communication, in the carefully limited and shrinking zone marked ‘personal’. It has long discarded care for both human and non-human others as inefficient in the relentless drive for economic competition. Emotional experiences can still be shared with household members, but the public and economic spheres are increasingly occupied by a narrow egoism and by work structures that are more insecure, less expressive and creative and more and more like those of factory-farmed animals. Recipes for escaping our situation are explored in the rest of the book, and include the development of critical forms of rationality that are able to undertake the critique of maladapted forms. We must replace **sado-dispassionate stances of rationality** with **caring** and **life-affirming** ones that can work to realise a **harmonious** and joyful **co-existence** with our planetary partners. Among our objectives should be the **development of a culture** that can create **alternative strategies** and concepts to the **oppressive rationalist** and dualistic **structures** that make oppression pervasive in everyday life under globalisation. At the level of economy, an integrative struggle against the systemic excision of ethics and ecology from our economic lives would aim beyond the dualisms of the rationalist imaginary for ‘a cultural reconnection of home, workplace and polity that recognises the reproductive, productive and political aspects of most human activities’.35 The growing exclusion of justice, care and ecological responsibility from the economic sphere in the interests of global competition affects all of us in different ways, but these different ways can still bring us together into the larger struggle for ecological and ethical forms of rationality as they affect both human and non-human spheres. This defines the project for a **new re-embedment** of economic life within ethical, social and ecological life as a struggle to defeat the **global rationalist machinery** that is making nearly all of us into Others to ourselves, into less than we could be.

### Solvency

**renewables fail**

Charles Barton 11, founder of the Nuclear Green Revolution blog, MA in philosophy, “Future storm damage to the grid may carry unacceptable costs”, April 30, <http://nucleargreen.blogspot.com/2011_04_01_archive.html>

Amory Lovins has long argued that the traditional grid is vulnerable to this sort of damage. Lovins proposed a paradigm shift from centralized to distributed generation and from fossil fuels and nuclear power to renewable based micro-generation. Critics have pointed to flaws in Lovins model. Renewable generation systems are unreliable and their output varies from locality to locality, as well as from day to day, and hour to hour. In order to bring greater stability and predictability to the grid, electrical engineers have proposed expanding the electrical transmission system with thousands of new miles of transmission cables to be added to bring electricity from high wind and high sunshine areas, to consumers. This would lead, if anything, to greater grid vulnerability to storm damage in a high renewable penetration situation. Thus Lovins renewables/distributed generation model breaks down in the face of renewables limitations. Renewables penetration, will increase the distance between electrical generation facilities and customer homes and businesses, increasing the grid vulnerable to large scale damage, rather than enhancing reliability. Unfortunately Lovins failed to note that the distributed generation model actually worked much better with small nuclear power plants than with renewable generated electricity. Small nuclear plants could be located much closer to customer's homes, decreasing the probability of storm damage to transmission lines. At the very worst, small NPPs would stop the slide toward increased grid expansion. Small reactors have been proposed as electrical sources for isolated communities that are too remote for grid hookups. If the cost of small reactors can be lowered sufficiently it might be possible for many and perhaps even most communities to unhook from the grid while maintaining a reliable electrical supply. It is likely that electrical power will play an even more central role in a post-carbon energy era. Increased electrical dependency requires increased electrical reliability, and grid vulnerabilities limit electrical reliability. Storm damage can disrupt electrical service for days and even weeks. In a future, electricity dependent economy, grid damage can actually impede storm recovery efforts, making large scale grid damage semi-self perpetuating. Such grid unreliability becomes a threat to public health and safety. Thus grid reliability will be a more pressing future issue, than it has been. It is clear that renewable energy sources will worsen grid reliability, Some renewable advocates have suggested that the so called "smart grid" will prevent grid outages. Yet the grid will never be smart enough to repair its own damaged power lines. In addition the "smart grid" will be venerable to hackers, and would be a handy target to statures. A smart grid would be an easy target for a Stuxnet type virus attack. Not only does the "smart grid" not solve the problem posed by grid vulnerability to storm damage, but efficiency, another energy approach thought to be a panacea for electrical supply problems would be equally useless. Thus, decentralized electrical generation through the use of small nuclear power plants offers real potential for increasing electrical reliability, but successful use of renewable electrical generation approaches may worsen rather than improved grid reliability.

**Empirics**

**Andres and Breetz 11**

Richard Andres, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a Senior Fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University, and Hanna Breetz, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactorsfor Military Installations:Capabilities, Costs, andTechnological Implications, [www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/StrForum/SF-262.pdf)

In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has become increasingly interested in the potential of small (less than 300 megawatts electric [MWe]) nuclear reactors for military use.1 DOD’s attention to small reactors stems mainly from two critical vulnerabilities it has identified in its infrastructure and operations: the dependence of U.S. military bases on the fragile civilian electrical grid, and the challenge of safely and reliably supplying energy to troops in forward operating locations. DOD has responded to these challenges with an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels. Unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, **these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas**. The purpose of this paper is to explore the prospects for addressing these critical vulnerabilities through small-scale nuclear plants.

**Intermittency and land**

**Loudermilk 11**

Micah J. Loudermilk, Research Associate for the Energy & Environmental Security Policy program with the Institute for National Strategic Studies at National Defense University, 5/31/11, Small Nuclear Reactors and US Energy Security: Concepts, Capabilities, and Costs, www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=314:small-nuclear-reactors-and-us-energy-security-concepts-capabilities-and-costs&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375

When discussing the energy security contributions offered by small nuclear reactors, it is not enough to simply compare them with existing nuclear technology, but also to examine how they measure up against other electricity generation alternatives—renewable energy technologies and fossil fuels. Coal, natural gas, and oil currently account for 45%, 23% and 1% respectively of US electricity generation sources. Hydroelectric power accounts for 7%, and other renewable power sources for 4%. These ratios are critical to remember because idealistic visions of providing for US energy security are not as useful as realistic ones balancing the role played by fossil fuels, nuclear power, and renewable energy sources. Limitations of renewables Renewable energy technologies have made great strides forward during the last decade. In an increasingly carbon emissions and greenhouse gas (GHG) aware global commons, the appeal of solar, wind, and other alternative energy sources is strong, and many countries are moving to increase their renewable electricity generation. However, despite massive expansion on this front, renewable sources struggle to keep pace with increasing demand, to say nothing of decreasing the amount of energy obtained from other sources. The continual problem with solar and wind power is that, lacking efficient energy storage mechanisms, it is difficult to contribute to baseload power demands. Due to the intermittent nature of their energy production, which often does not line up with peak demand usage, electricity grids can only handle a limited amount of renewable energy sources—a situation which Germany is now encountering. Simply put, nuclear power provides virtually carbon-free baseload power generation, and renewable options are unable to replicate this, especially not on the scale required by expanding global energy demands. Small nuclear reactors, however, like renewable sources, can provide enhanced, distributed, and localized power generation. As the US moves towards embracing smart grid technologies, power production at this level becomes a critical piece of the puzzle. Especially since renewable sources, due to sprawl, are of limited utility near crowded population centers, small reactors may in fact prove instrumental to enabling the smart grid to become a reality.

### Advantage 1

**No risk of cyber war**

**Clark ’12** (MA candidate – Intelligence Studies @ American Military University, senior analyst – Chenega Federal Systems, 4/28/’12 (Paul, “The Risk of Disruption or Destruction of Critical U.S. Infrastructure by an Offensive Cyber Attack,” American Military University)

The Department of Homeland Security worries that our critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) may be exposed, both directly and indirectly, to multiple threats because of CIKR reliance on the global cyber infrastructure, an infrastructure that is under routine cyberattack by a “spectrum of malicious actors” (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). CIKR in the extremely large and complex U.S. economy spans multiple sectors including agricultural, finance and banking, dams and water resources, public health and emergency services, military and defense, transportation and shipping, and energy (National Infrastructure Protection Plan 2009). The disruption and destruction of public and private infrastructure is part of warfare, without this infrastructure conflict cannot be sustained (Geers 2011). Cyber-attacks are desirable because they are considered to be a relatively “low cost and long range” weapon (Lewis 2010), but prior to the creation of Stuxnet, the first cyber-weapon, the ability to disrupt and destroy critical infrastructure through cyber-attack was theoretical. The movement of an offensive cyber-weapon from conceptual to actual has forced the United States to question whether offensive cyber-attacks are a significant threat that are able to disrupt or destroy CIKR to the level that national security is seriously degraded. It is important to understand the risk posed to national security by cyber-attacks to ensure that government responses are appropriate to the threat and balance security with privacy and civil liberty concerns. The risk posed to CIKR from cyber-attack can be evaluated by measuring the threat from cyber-attack against the vulnerability of a CIKR target and the consequences of CIKR disruption. As the only known cyber-weapon, Stuxnet has been **thoroughly analyzed** and **used as a model** for predicting future cyber-weapons. The U.S. electrical grid, a key component in the CIKR energy sector, is a target that has been analyzed for vulnerabilities and the consequences of disruption predicted – the electrical grid has been used in multiple attack scenarios including a classified scenario provided to the U.S. Congress in 2012 (Rohde 2012). Stuxnet will serve as the weapon and the U.S. electrical grid will serve as the target in this risk analysis that concludes that there is a low risk of disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure from a an offensive cyber-weapon because of the complexity of the attack path, the limited capability of non-state adversaries to develop cyber-weapons, and the existence of multiple methods of mitigating the cyber-attacks. To evaluate the threat posed by a Stuxnet-like cyber-weapon, the complexity of the weapon, the available attack vectors for the weapon, and the resilience of the weapon must be understood. The complexity – how difficult and expensive it was to create the weapon – identifies the relative cost and availability of the weapon; inexpensive and simple to build will be more prevalent than expensive and difficult to build. Attack vectors are the available methods of attack; the larger the number, the more severe the threat. For example, attack vectors for a cyberweapon may be email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, websites, and infected USB devices or compact discs. Finally, the resilience of the weapon determines its availability and affects its usefulness. A useful weapon is one that is resistant to disruption (resilient) and is therefore available and reliable. These concepts are seen in the AK-47 assault rifle – a simple, inexpensive, reliable and effective weapon – and carry over to information technology structures (Weitz 2012). The evaluation of Stuxnet identified malware that is “unusually complex and large” and required code written in multiple languages (Chen 2010) in order to complete a variety of specific functions contained in a “vast array” of components – **it is one of the most complex threats ever analyzed by Symantec** (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). To be successful, Stuxnet required a **high** **level of technical knowledge across multiple disciplines**, a laboratory with the target equipment configured for testing, and a foreign intelligence capability to collect information on the target network and attack vectors (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The malware also needed careful monitoring and maintenance because it could be easily disrupted; as a result Stuxnet was developed with a high degree of configurability and was upgraded multiple times in less than one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Once introduced into the network, the cyber-weapon then had to utilize four known vulnerabilities and four unknown vulnerabilities, known as zero-day exploits, in order to install itself and propagate across the target network (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Zero-day exploits are **incredibly difficult to find** and fewer than twelve out of the 12,000,000 pieces of malware discovered each year utilize zero-day exploits and this rarity makes them valuable, zero-days can fetch $50,000 to $500,000 each on the black market (Zetter 2011). The use of four rare exploits in a single piece of malware is “unprecedented” (Chen 2010). Along with the use of four unpublished exploits, Stuxnet also used the “first ever” programmable logic controller rootkit, a Windows rootkit, antivirus evasion techniques, intricate process injection routines, and other complex interfaces (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) all **wrapped up in “layers of encryption** like Russian nesting dolls” (Zetter 2011) – including custom encryption algorithms (Karnouskos 2011). As the malware spread across the now-infected network it had to utilize additional vulnerabilities in proprietary Siemens industrial control software (ICS) and hardware used to control the equipment it was designed to sabotage. Some of these ICS vulnerabilities were published but some were unknown and **required such a high degree of inside knowledge** that there was speculation that a Siemens employee had been involved in the malware design (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). The unprecedented technical complexity of the Stuxnet cyber-weapon, along with the extensive technical and financial resources and foreign intelligence capabilities required for its development and deployment, indicates that the malware was likely developed by a nation-state (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Stuxnet had very limited attack vectors. When a computer system is connected to the public Internet a host of attack vectors are available to the cyber-attacker (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Web browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities, cross-site scripting attacks, compromised email attachments, peer-to-peer applications, operating system and other application vulnerabilities are all vectors for the introduction of malware into an Internetconnected computer system. **Networks that are not connected to the public internet are “air gapped**,” a technical colloquialism to identify a physical separation between networks. Physical separation from the public Internet is a common safeguard **for sensitive networks** including classified U.S. government networks. If the target network is air gapped, infection can only occur through physical means – an infected disk or USB device that **must be physically introduced** into a possibly access controlled environment and connected to the air gapped network. The first step of the Stuxnet cyber-attack was to initially infect the target networks, a difficult task given the probable disconnected and well secured nature of the Iranian nuclear facilities. Stuxnet was introduced via a USB device to the target network, a method that suggests that the attackers were familiar with the configuration of the network and knew it was not connected to the public Internet (Chen 2010). This assessment is supported by two rare features in Stuxnet – having all necessary functionality for industrial sabotage fully embedded in the malware executable along with the ability to self-propagate and upgrade through a peer-to-peer method (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Developing an understanding of the target network configuration was a significant and daunting task based on Symantec’s assessment that Stuxnet repeatedly targeted a total of five different organizations over nearly one year (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) with physical introduction via USB drive being the only available attack vector. The final factor in assessing the threat of a cyber-weapon is the resilience of the weapon. There are two primary factors that make Stuxnet non-resilient: the complexity of the weapon and the complexity of the target. Stuxnet was highly customized for sabotaging specific industrial systems (Karnouskos 2011) and needed a large number of very complex components and routines in order to increase its chance of success (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). The malware required eight vulnerabilities in the Windows operating system to succeed and therefore would have failed if those vulnerabilities had been properly patched; four of the eight vulnerabilities were known to Microsoft and subject to elimination (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011). Stuxnet also required that two drivers be installed and required two stolen security certificates for installation (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011); driver installation would have failed if the stolen certificates had been revoked and marked as invalid. Finally, the configuration of systems is ever-changing as components are upgraded or replaced. There is no guarantee that the network that was mapped for vulnerabilities had not changed in the months, or years, it took to craft Stuxnet and successfully infect the target network. Had specific components of the target hardware changed – the targeted Siemens software or programmable logic controller – the attack would have failed. Threats are less of a threat when identified; this is why zero-day exploits are so valuable. Stuxnet went to great lengths to hide its existence from the target and utilized multiple rootkits, data manipulation routines, and virus avoidance techniques to stay undetected. The malware’s actions occurred only in memory to avoid leaving traces on disk, it masked its activities by running under legal programs, employed layers of encryption and code obfuscation, and uninstalled itself after a set period of time, all efforts to avoid detection because its authors knew that detection meant failure. As a result of the complexity of the malware, the changeable nature of the target network, and the chance of discovery, Stuxnet is not a resilient system. It is a fragile weapon that required an investment of time and money to constantly monitor, reconfigure, test and deploy over the course of a year. There is concern, with Stuxnet developed and available publicly, that the world is on the brink of a storm of highly sophisticated Stuxnet-derived cyber-weapons which can be used by hackers, organized criminals and terrorists (Chen 2010). As former counterterrorism advisor Richard Clarke describes it, there is concern that the technical brilliance of the United States “has created millions of potential monsters all over the world” (Rosenbaum 2012). Hyperbole aside, technical knowledge spreads. The techniques behind cyber-attacks are “constantly evolving and making use of lessons learned over time” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002) and the publication of the Stuxnet code may make it easier to copy the weapon (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). **However**, this is something of a zero-sum game because **knowledge works both ways** and cyber-security techniques are also evolving, and “understanding attack techniques more clearly is the first step toward increasing security” (Institute for Security Technology Studies 2002). Vulnerabilities are discovered and patched, intrusion detection and malware signatures are expanded and updated, and monitoring and analysis processes and methodologies are expanded and honed. Once the element of surprise is lost, weapons and tactics are less useful, this is the core of the argument that “uniquely surprising” **stratagems like Stuxnet are single-use**, like Pearl Harbor and the Trojan Horse, the “very success [of these attacks] precludes their repetition” (Mueller 2012). This paradigm has already been seen in the “son of Stuxnet” malware – named Duqu by its discoverers – that is based on the same modular code platform that created Stuxnet (Ragan 2011). With the techniques used by Stuxnet now known, other variants such as Duqu are being discovered and countered by security researchers (Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security 2011). It is obvious that the effort required to create, deploy, and maintain Stuxnet and its variants is massive and it is not clear that the rewards are worth the risk and effort. Given the location of initial infection and the number of infected systems in Iran (Falliere, Murchu and Chien 2011) it is believed that Iranian nuclear facilities were the target of the Stuxnet weapon. A significant amount of money and effort was invested in creating Stuxnet but yet the expected result – assuming that this was an attack that expected to damage production – was minimal at best. Iran claimed that Stuxnet caused only minor damage, probably at the Natanz enrichment facility, the Russian contractor Atomstroyeksport reported that no damage had occurred at the Bushehr facility, and an unidentified “senior diplomat” suggested that Iran was forced to shut down its centrifuge facility “for a few days” (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010). Even the most optimistic estimates believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment program was only delayed by months, or perhaps years (Rosenbaum 2012). The actual damage done by Stuxnet is not clear (Kerr, Rollins and Theohary 2010) and the primary damage appears to be to a higher number than average replacement of centrifuges at the Iran enrichment facility (Zetter 2011). Different targets may produce different results. The Iranian nuclear facility was a difficult target with limited attack vectors because of its isolation from the public Internet and restricted access to its facilities. What is the probability of a successful attack against the U.S. electrical grid and what are the potential consequences should this critical infrastructure be disrupted or destroyed? An attack against the electrical grid is a reasonable threat scenario since power systems are “a high priority target for military and insurgents” and there has been a trend towards utilizing commercial software and integrating utilities into the public Internet that has “increased vulnerability across the board” (Lewis 2010). Yet the increased vulnerabilities are mitigated by an increased detection and deterrent capability that has been “honed over many years of practical application” now that power systems are using standard, rather than proprietary and specialized, applications and components (Leita and Dacier 2012). The security of the electrical grid is also enhanced by increased awareness after a smart-grid hacking demonstration in 2009 and the identification of the Stuxnet malware in 2010; as a result the public and private sector are working together in an “unprecedented effort” to establish robust security guidelines and cyber security measures (Gohn and Wheelock 2010).

**No risk of cyberattack and no impact if it does happen**

Birch, 12 – former foreign correspondent for the Associated Press and the Baltimore Sun who has written extensively on technology and public policy (Douglas, “Forget Revolution.” Foreign Policy. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/01/forget\_revolution?page=full)

"That's a good example of what some kind of attacks would be like," he said. "You don't want to overestimate the risks. You don't want somebody to be able to do this whenever they felt like it, which is the situation now. But this is not the end of the world." The question of how seriously to take the threat of a cyber attack on critical infrastructure surfaced recently, after Congress rejected a White House measure to require businesses to adopt stringent­ new regulations to protect their computer networks from intrusions. The bill would have required industries to report cyber security breaches, toughen criminal penalties against hacking and granted legal immunity to companies cooperating with government investigations. Critics worried about regulatory overreach. But the potential cost to industry also seems to be a major factor in the bill's rejection. A January study by Bloomberg reported that banks, utilities, and phone carriers would have to increase their spending on cyber security by a factor of nine, to $45.3 billion a year, in order to protect themselves against 95 percent of cyber intrusions. Likewise, some of the bill's advocates suspect that in the aftermath of a truly successful cyber attack, the government would have to bail the utilities out anyway. Joe Weiss, a cyber security professional and an authority on industrial control systems like those used in the electric grid, argued that a well-prepared, sophisticated cyber attack could have far more serious consequences than this summer's blackouts. "The reason we are so concerned is that cyber could take out the grid for nine to 18 months," he said. "This isn't a one to five day outage. We're prepared for that. We can handle that." But pulling off a cyber assault on that scale is no easy feat. Weiss agreed that hackers intent on inflicting this kind of long-term interruption of power would need to use a tool capable of inflicting physical damage. And so far, the world has seen only one such weapon: Stuxnet, which is believed to have been a joint military project of Israel and the United States. Ralph Langner, a German expert on industrial-control system security, was among the first to discover that Stuxnet was specifically designed to attack the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system (SCADA) at a single site: Iran's Natanz uranium-enrichment plant. The computer worm's sophisticated programs, which infected the plant in 2009, caused about 1,000 of Natanz's 5,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges to self-destruct by accelerating their precision rotors beyond the speeds at which they were designed to operate. Professionals like Weiss and others warned that Stuxnet was opening a Pandora's Box: Once it was unleashed on the world, they feared, it would become available to hostile states, criminals, and terrorists who could adapt the code for their own nefarious purposes. But two years after the discovery of Stuxnet, there are no reports of similar attacks against the United States. What has prevented the emergence of such copycat viruses? A 2009 paper published by the University of California, Berkeley, may offer the answer. The report, which was released a year before Stuxnet surfaced, found that in order to create a cyber weapon capable of crippling a specific control system ­­-- like the ones operating the U.S. electric grid -- six coders might have to work for up to six months to reverse engineer the targeted center's SCADA system. Even then, the report says, hackers likely would need the help of someone with inside knowledge of how the network's machines were wired together to plan an effective attack. "Every SCADA control center is configured differently, with different devices, running different software/protocols," wrote Rose Tsang, the report's author. Professional hackers are in it for the money -- and it's a lot more cost-efficient to search out vulnerabilities in widely-used computer programs like the Windows operating system, used by banks and other affluent targets, than in one-of-a-kind SCADA systems linked to generators and switches. According to Pollard, only the world's industrial nations have the means to use the Internet to attack utilities and major industries. But given the integrated global economy, there is little incentive, short of armed conflict, for them to do so. "If you're a state that has a number of U.S. T-bills in your treasury, you have an economic interest in the United States," he said. "You're not going to have an interest in mucking about with our infrastructure." There is also the threat of retaliation. Last year, the U.S. government reportedly issued a classified report on cyber strategy that said it could respond to a devastating digital assault with traditional military force. The idea was that if a cyber attack caused death and destruction on the scale of a military assault, the United States would reserve the right to respond with what the Pentagon likes to call "kinetic" weapons: missiles, bombs, and bullets. An unnamed Pentagon official, speaking to the Wall Street Journal, summed up the policy in less diplomatic terms: "If you shut down our power grid, maybe we will put a missile down one of your smokestacks." Deterrence is sometimes dismissed as a toothless strategy against cyber attacks because hackers have such an easy time hiding in the anonymity of the Web. But investigators typically come up with key suspects, if not smoking guns, following cyber intrusions and assaults -- the way suspicions quickly focused on the United States and Israel after Stuxnet was discovered. And with the U.S. military's global reach, even terror groups have to factor in potential retaliation when planning their operations.

Cyberattacks nearly impossible – empirics and defenses solve

**Rid 12** (Thomas Rid, reader in war studies at King's College London, is author of "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" and co-author of "Cyber-Weapons.", March/April 2012, “Think Again: Cyberwar”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=full)

"Cyberwar Is Already Upon Us." No way. "Cyberwar is coming!" John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt predicted in a celebrated Rand paper back in 1993. Since then, it seems to have arrived -- at least by the account of the U.S. military establishment, which is busy competing over who should get what share of the fight. Cyberspace is "a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights," Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne claimed in 2006. By 2012, William J. Lynn III, the deputy defense secretary at the time, was writing that cyberwar is "just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space." In January, the Defense Department vowed to equip the U.S. armed forces for "conducting a combined arms campaign across all domains -- land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace." Meanwhile, growing piles of books and articles explore the threats of cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and how to survive them. Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. No one died, according to Thomas Reed, a U.S. National Security Council aide at the time who revealed the incident in his 2004 book, At the Abyss; the only harm came to the Soviet economy. But did it really happen? After Reed's account came out, Vasily Pchelintsev, a former KGB head of the Tyumen region, where the alleged explosion supposedly took place, denied the story. There are also no media reports from 1982 that confirm such an explosion, though accidents and pipeline explosions in the Soviet Union were regularly reported in the early 1980s. Something likely did happen, but Reed's book is the only public mention of the incident and his account relied on a single document. Even after the CIA declassified a redacted version of Reed's source, a note on the so-called Farewell Dossier that describes the effort to provide the Soviet Union with defective technology, the agency did not confirm that such an explosion occurred. The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath. "Cyberattacks Are Becoming Easier." Just the opposite. U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper warned last year that the volume of malicious software on American networks had more than tripled since 2009 and that more than 60,000 pieces of malware are now discovered every day. The United States, he said, is undergoing "a phenomenon known as 'convergence,' which amplifies the opportunity for disruptive cyberattacks, including against physical infrastructures." ("Digital convergence" is a snazzy term for a simple thing: more and more devices able to talk to each other, and formerly separate industries and activities able to work together.) Just because there's more malware, however, doesn't mean that attacks are becoming easier. In fact, potentially damaging or life-threatening cyberattacks should be more difficult to pull off. Why? Sensitive systems generally have built-in redundancy and safety systems, meaning an attacker's likely objective will not be to shut down a system, since merely forcing the shutdown of one control system, say a power plant, could trigger a backup and cause operators to start looking for the bug. To work as an effective weapon, malware would have to influence an active process -- but not bring it to a screeching halt. If the malicious activity extends over a lengthy period, it has to remain stealthy. That's a more difficult trick than hitting the virtual off-button. Take Stuxnet, the worm that sabotaged Iran's nuclear program in 2010. It didn't just crudely shut down the centrifuges at the Natanz nuclear facility; rather, the worm subtly manipulated the system. Stuxnet stealthily infiltrated the plant's networks, then hopped onto the protected control systems, intercepted input values from sensors, recorded these data, and then provided the legitimate controller code with pre-recorded fake input signals, according to researchers who have studied the worm. Its objective was not just to fool operators in a control room, but also to circumvent digital safety and monitoring systems so it could secretly manipulate the actual processes. Building and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous cyberweapons. Yes, "convergence," standardization, and sloppy defense of control-systems software could increase the risk of generic attacks, but the same trend has also caused defenses against the most coveted targets to improve steadily and has made reprogramming highly specific installations on legacy systems more complex, not less.

**No impact to cyberwar - it's all hype - it's technically impossible and won't escalate**

**Rid 12** (Thomas, PhD, Reader in War Studies @ King's College London, Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, "Think Again: Cyberwar," March/April, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0,

Time for a reality check: Cyberwar is still more hype than hazard. Consider the definition of an act of war: It has to be potentially violent, it has to be purposeful, and it has to be political. The cyberattacks we've seen so far, from Estonia to the Stuxnet virus, simply don't meet these criteria. Take the dubious story of a Soviet pipeline explosion back in 1982, much cited by cyberwar's true believers as the most destructive cyberattack ever. The account goes like this: In June 1982, a Siberian pipeline that the CIA had virtually booby-trapped with a so-called "logic bomb" exploded in a monumental fireball that could be seen from space. The U.S. Air Force estimated the explosion at 3 kilotons, equivalent to a small nuclear device. Targeting a Soviet pipeline linking gas fields in Siberia to European markets, the operation sabotaged the pipeline's control systems with software from a Canadian firm that the CIA had doctored with malicious code. 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The available evidence on the Siberian pipeline blast is so thin that it shouldn't be counted as a proven case of a successful cyberattack. Most other commonly cited cases of cyberwar are even less remarkable. Take the attacks on Estonia in April 2007, which came in response to the controversial relocation of a Soviet war memorial, the Bronze Soldier. The well-wired country found itself at the receiving end of a massive distributed denial-of-service attack that emanated from up to 85,000 hijacked computers and lasted three weeks. The attacks reached a peak on May 9, when 58 Estonian websites were attacked at once and the online services of Estonia's largest bank were taken down. "What's the difference between a blockade of harbors or airports of sovereign states and the blockade of government institutions and newspaper websites?" asked Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip. Despite his analogies, the attack was no act of war. It was certainly a nuisance and an emotional strike on the country, but the bank's actual network was not even penetrated; it went down for 90 minutes one day and two hours the next. The attack was not violent, it wasn't purposefully aimed at changing Estonia's behavior, and no political entity took credit for it. The same is true for the vast majority of cyberattacks on record. Indeed, there is no known cyberattack that has caused the loss of human life. No cyberoffense has ever injured a person or damaged a building. And if an act is not at least potentially violent, it's not an act of war. Separating war from physical violence makes it a metaphorical notion; it would mean that there is no way to distinguish between World War II, say, and the "wars" on obesity and cancer. Yet those ailments, unlike past examples of cyber "war," actually do kill people. "A Digital Pearl Harbor Is Only a Matter of Time." Keep waiting. U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta delivered a stark warning last summer: "We could face a cyberattack that could be the equivalent of Pearl Harbor." Such alarmist predictions have been ricocheting inside the Beltway for the past two decades, and some scaremongers have even upped the ante by raising the alarm about a cyber 9/11. In his 2010 book, Cyber War, former White House counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke invokes the specter of nationwide power blackouts, planes falling out of the sky, trains derailing, refineries burning, pipelines exploding, poisonous gas clouds wafting, and satellites spinning out of orbit -- events that would make the 2001 attacks pale in comparison. But the empirical record is less hair-raising, even by the standards of the most drastic example available. Gen. Keith Alexander, head of U.S. Cyber Command (established in 2010 and now boasting a budget of more than $3 billion), shared his worst fears in an April 2011 speech at the University of Rhode Island: "What I'm concerned about are destructive attacks," Alexander said, "those that are coming." He then invoked a remarkable accident at Russia's Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric plant to highlight the kind of damage a cyberattack might be able to cause. Shortly after midnight on Aug. 17, 2009, a 900-ton turbine was ripped out of its seat by a so-called "water hammer," a sudden surge in water pressure that then caused a transformer explosion. The turbine's unusually high vibrations had worn down the bolts that kept its cover in place, and an offline sensor failed to detect the malfunction. Seventy-five people died in the accident, energy prices in Russia rose, and rebuilding the plant is slated to cost $1.3 billion. Tough luck for the Russians, but here's what the head of Cyber Command didn't say: The ill-fated turbine had been malfunctioning for some time, and the plant's management was notoriously poor. On top of that, the key event that ultimately triggered the catastrophe seems to have been a fire at Bratsk power station, about 500 miles away. Because the energy supply from Bratsk dropped, authorities remotely increased the burden on the Sayano-Shushenskaya plant. The sudden spike overwhelmed the turbine, which was two months shy of reaching the end of its 30-year life cycle, sparking the catastrophe. If anything, the Sayano-Shushenskaya incident highlights how difficult a devastating attack would be to mount. The plant's washout was an accident at the end of a complicated and unique chain of events. Anticipating such vulnerabilities in advance is extraordinarily difficult even for insiders; creating comparable coincidences from cyberspace would be a daunting challenge at best for outsiders. If this is the most drastic incident Cyber Command can conjure up, perhaps it's time for everyone to take a deep breath.

**Their evidence is flawed and should be rejected**

**Rahman ’10** (Arifeen Rahman, SEA National Security Intern, Scientist and Engineers for America, “Bringing Cybersecurity Back to Reality”, <http://www.sefora.org/2010/08/11/rahman_0811/>, August 11, 2010, LEQ)

The controversy over “cyber-rhetoric” is often reduced to a debate over the devastating magnitude of such possible scenarios versus the risks of framing them in such language. However, the truths in both positions do not inherently contradict each other, and can be reconciled. The great equalizer of these theories, therefore, lies in an analysis of predictions. The extent to which we can, or arguably should, take pre-emptive action to prevent cyber-attacks has its foundations in the determining the probability of these events. **Recent trends in the cyber security discussion have forgone an assessment of probability for a “possibilistic” worst case assessment. Most studies tend to sensationalize** the **threats** which cyberspace presents, **forecasting imminent scenarios of destruction. Not only have these predictions been categorically proven false over the last ten years, but have also brought into question the reliability of these assessments overall.**  Black Swan theory, coined by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, explains how **major catastrophes are low probability**, high impact scenarios which were impossible to predict, but seem inevitable when looked at retrospectively. Viewing cyber security through this lens allows for a separation of policy from threat inflation. Black Swan theory proves that **obsession over specific scenarios of cyber attack remain futile.** The scenario which is never considered, which is most unexpected, will occur. Therefore, the only logical way to maintain cyber security is to preserve defensive protection of critical infrastructure, and avoid hyping up new threats. […] Cyber security will remain a critical issue for the current and all following administrations. In order to create a safe and secure environment, critical vulnerabilities must be addressed without creating an atmosphere of fear and paranoia. **The “cyber-Armageddon” is not coming.** It’s time for the federal government to get its head out its science fiction novel, and get back to reality.

**Zero risk of cyber attack- new studies**

**Leyden ’11** (The ill-informed leading the ill-informed... By [John Leyden](http://forms.theregister.co.uk/mail_author/?story_url=/2011/01/17/cyberwar_hype_oecd_study/) • [Get more from this author](http://search.theregister.co.uk/?author=John%20Leyden) Posted in [Government](http://www.theregister.co.uk/public_sector/government/), [17th January 2011 11:23 GMT](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/01/17/)

**Cyberwar hype is inhibiting government attempts to develop an appropriate response to cybersecurity threats, say computer scientists. A heavyweight study by UK computer scientists** **for the** Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (**OECD) concludes that it is "highly unlikely" there will ever be a "pure cyber war”,** comparable with recent conflicts in Afghanistan or the Balkans. **Suggestions to the contrary are down to "heavy lobbying" by suppliers**, the report's authors – Professor Peter Sommer of the London School of Economics and Dr Ian Brown of the Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford – conclude. It is unlikely that there will ever be a true cyberwar**. The reasons are: many critical computer systems are protected against known exploits and malware so that designers of new cyberweapons have to identify new weaknesses and exploits; the effects of cyberattacks are difficult to predict** **– on the one hand they may be less powerful than hoped but may also have more extensive outcomes arising from the interconnectedness of systems, resulting in unwanted damage to perpetrators and their allies**. More importantly, there is no strategic reason why any aggressor would limit themselves to only one class of weaponry.

**At worst the impact will be contained**

**Rid 12** (Thomas, PhD, Reader in War Studies @ King's College London, Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, "Think Again: Cyberwar," March/April, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0,

"Cyberweapons Can Create Massive Collateral Damage." Very unlikely. When news of Stuxnet broke, the New York Times reported that the most striking aspect of the new weapon was the "collateral damage" it created. The malicious program was "splattered on thousands of computer systems around the world, and much of its impact has been on those systems, rather than on what appears to have been its intended target, Iranian equipment," the Times reported. Such descriptions encouraged the view that computer viruses are akin to highly contagious biological viruses that, once unleashed from the lab, will turn against all vulnerable systems, not just their intended targets. But this metaphor is deeply flawed. As the destructive potential of a cyberweapon grows, the likelihood that it could do far-reaching damage across many systems shrinks. Stuxnet did infect more than 100,000 computers -- mainly in Iran, Indonesia, and India, though also in Europe and the United States. But it was so specifically programmed that it didn't actually damage those machines, afflicting only Iran's centrifuges at Natanz. The worm's aggressive infection strategy was designed to maximize the likelihood that it would reach its intended target. Because that final target was not networked, "all the functionality required to sabotage a system was embedded directly in the Stuxnet executable," the security software company Symantec observed in its analysis of the worm's code. So yes, Stuxnet was "splattered" far and wide, but it only executed its damaging payload where it was supposed to. Collateral infection, in short, is not necessarily collateral damage. A sophisticated piece of malware may aggressively infect many systems, but if there is an intended target, the infection will likely have a distinct payload that will be harmless to most computers. Especially in the context of more sophisticated cyberweapons, the image of inadvertent collateral damage doesn't hold up. They're more like a flu virus that only makes one family sick.

**Defensive measures overwhelm**

**Rid 12** (Thomas, PhD, Reader in War Studies @ King's College London, Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations in the School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, "Think Again: Cyberwar," March/April, Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/27/cyberwar?page=0,0,

"In Cyberspace, Offense Dominates Defense." Wrong again. The information age has "offense-dominant attributes," Arquilla and Ronfeldt wrote in their influential 1996 book, The Advent of Netwar. This view has spread through the American defense establishment like, well, a virus. A 2011 Pentagon report on cyberspace stressed "the advantage currently enjoyed by the offense in cyberwarfare." The intelligence community stressed the same point in its annual threat report to Congress last year, arguing that offensive tactics -- known as vulnerability discovery and exploitation -- are evolving more rapidly than the federal government and industry can adapt their defensive best practices. The conclusion seemed obvious: Cyberattackers have the advantage over cyberdefenders, "with the trend likely getting worse over the next five years." A closer examination of the record, however, reveals three factors that put the offense at a disadvantage. First is the high cost of developing a cyberweapon, in terms of time, talent, and target intelligence needed. Stuxnet, experts speculate, took a superb team and a lot of time. Second, the potential for generic offensive weapons may be far smaller than assumed for the same reasons, and significant investments in highly specific attack programs may be deployable only against a very limited target set. Third, once developed, an offensive tool is likely to have a far shorter half-life than the defensive measures put in place against it. Even worse, a weapon may only be able to strike a single time; once the exploits of a specialized piece of malware are discovered, the most critical systems will likely be patched and fixed quickly. And a weapon, even a potent one, is not much of a weapon if an attack cannot be repeated. Any political threat relies on the credible threat to attack or to replicate a successful attack. If that were in doubt, the coercive power of a cyberattack would be drastically reduced.

**Air power not key -**to overall power or deterrence – their evidence is biased  
**Axe ‘9** (David, military correspondent, regular contributor to The Washington Times, C-SPAN, and Wired, 3/30/9, http://www.warisboring.com/2009/03/30/f-22s-versus-russias-rusting-ramshackle-air-force/)

Analyst Gregory Martin, a retired Air Force general, said the erosion of world influence is largely the result of weak public support for the F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, which are built by Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. “If you can’t afford that [mix], then your national objectives have to be scaled back,” Martin said. In other words, stealth fighters equal national power. And the absence of stealth fighters equals weakness. Hogwash. The economic crisis is having an effect on every country, unevenly. Arguably, the U.S. is faring better than most as investors flee to the comparative safety of the dollar. **Power** in the world **is** a **relative** thing: if everyone else gets much weaker, and we stay the same or only grow a little weak, then we are, in fact, more powerful than we were before. Get it? The global recession, alone, does not mean we are losing influence. In fact, the recession might even boost our influence, by underscoring just how much the world depends on America as a consumer market. But more importantly, American national power does not hinge on fighter jets. **We could retire every single fighter** in the U.S. Air Force, **tomorrow, and still remain the most powerful nation** in the world, **by far**. National power is a complex and shifting thing, comprising military force, financial and cultural influence, leadership in international coalitions and organizations and even language. Every country in the world teaches American English to its business students, aviators and sea captains. Does that have anything to do with the F-22? Do some of our biggest exports — music, movies and television — depend on a squadron of F-35s flying orbits over North Dakota? Ignore the noise coming out of Washington’s punditocracy as the Obama Administration shapes its first defense budget. And when that budget is published, and it (inevitably) includes cuts to Air Force fighter programs, take a deep breath before panicking and consider: **Nearly everyone telling you we must buy** a given quantity of stealth **fighters, or lose global influence, has a financial stake** in advocating such purchases. Of the speakers at the Wednesday confab: \* Loren Thompson, from the Lexington Institute, runs a private consultancy for the defense industry, with clients including Lockheed Martin \* Thompson’s colleague, Rebecca Grant, also runs her own consultancy for the defense industry \* Gregory Martin has been a Northrop Grumman consultant The U.S. Air Force is in deep trouble, but it’s trouble of its own making. And **it’s testimony to just how overwhelming, and sustainable, is America’s military, cultural, linguistic and financial dominance in the world that our primary military air service can commit slow, institutional suicide without alarming too many peopl**e, aside from a few hardware nerds like me and the consultants who get rich gabbing about certain pointy airplanes on behalf of wealthy corporate clients.

**Air power high and no impact to declines**

**Friedman and Preble ‘10** (Benjamin Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, Christopher Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Budgetary Savings from Military Restraint, September 22, 2010 Cato Policy Analysis No. 667 September 23, 2010 <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA667.pdf>)

We would also eliminate **six fighter wing** equivalents from the Air Force. There are three justifications for this cut. First, the Navy already provides **enough airpower** from the sea to deal with **most wars**.14 Second, the Air Force **lacks enemies that challenge its air superiority**. Third, advancements in weapons guidance **greatly increased the destructive power** of each airframe. These factors mean that the fighter capability **we maintain is more than what is** needed to support likely ground conflicts or conduct bombing raids. Because we want an offshore posture rather than a forward defense, we retain our current bomber and refueling tanker procurement plans. We also maintain the Air Force’s spending on unmanned aerial vehicles, given their flexibility and low cost relative to manned aircraft.

**Economics trump—competition won’t escalate**

**IISS ’12**, (International institute for Strategic Studies, 11/28/12, Russia in the Arctic: Economic Interests Trump Military Ambitions, www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/11/28/russia\_in\_the\_arctic\_economic\_interests\_trump\_military\_ambitions\_100373-2.html)

A recent mission by a Russian nuclear submarine to the floor of the Arctic Ocean has threatened to reignite the media narrative that regional disputes over the right to unlock the economic potential of the Arctic could result in military confrontation. **But it is their mutual economic interests** that mean that the five Arctic coastal **states are motivated to pursue legal and diplomatic avenues** to achieve their aspirations, and **have no desire to jeopardise the status quo.** During the Russian operation, known as Arktika-2012, geological material was collected from one of the two underwater mountain ranges that extend from the Russian landmass towards the North Pole. Russia wants to prove that the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges are extensions of Russia's continental shelf and part of the Eurasian plate, which, according to the current legal framework, would allow Russia exclusive rights to any potential future resources under the seabed. The details of the project were intended to remain secret, but in November 2012 several news stories about the submarine appeared, citing a Russian defence ministry source. Despite efforts to build good regional relations among Arctic countries, Russia's neighbours do have concerns about its increasing military presence in the Arctic and its sometimes assertive, anti-Western rhetoric. However, considered in the wider context of Russia's post-Cold War military re-development, its Arctic positioning is not as confrontational as it may seem. The Arctic is a key part of Russia's reassertion of what it sees as its rightful place in international affairs, and it has far greater territory, presence and capability in the Arctic than its neighbours. Rich in hydrocarbons, the region was highlighted in Moscow's Arctic policy of 2008 as the country's primary source of energy for the twenty-first century: approximately 15% of the country's GDP and 25% of its exports come from there, while 80% of the gas in the Arctic lies within Russia's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There are major on-shore gas installations, and plans to further develop off-shore drilling, though these have met with some logistical difficulties with international partners. Along with hydrocarbons, maritime transport is a major economic development priority. The Northern Sea Route, the new shipping route most likely to become commercially viable in the coming decades as the summer ice recedes, and promises to connect Europe and Asia, runs through Russia's territorial waters or EEZ. However, the lack of infrastructure along the route will hold back the development of commercial shipping. Arktika-2012 The planting of a titanium Russian flag on the floor of the Arctic Ocean during a previous mission, Arktika-2007, created a powerful image, but it had no legal significance. It did, however, pique international interest in the Arctic and encouraged a media narrative about competition over the region's territory and resources. The objective of Russia's latest mission, Arktika-2012, was to prove that its landmass extends to the North Pole by drilling into the sea floor to collect rock samples for scientific analysis. In September, the Kalitka, a Losharik-class nuclear-powered auxiliary submarine, was used to guide the Kapitan Dranitsyn and Dickson ice breakers in drilling three boreholes at two different sites on the Mendeleev ridge, collecting over 500kg of rock samples. This was the first known mission for the Kalitka. Equipped with space-station-grade air and water regeneration systems, the submarine can remain submerged for months. During this operation, it remained 2.5-3 kilometres below the surface for 20 days. (Though the battery-powered civilian Mir stations used in the Arktika-2007 expedition can also operate at such depths, they can only stay submerged for 72 hours.) It was mounted to the underside of a larger nuclear-powered auxiliary submarine (the Orenburg, a redesigned Kalmar or Delta III stretch) to transport it to the drilling site and was supported by the larger boat during the operation. Continental-shelf claims and maritime borders In collecting the geological samples, Russia was responding to a request by the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that it submit supporting evidence for its claim to a broad continental shelf that extends beyond its landmass under the Arctic Ocean. The five Arctic coastal states - Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway and Denmark - in 2008 issued a joint statement, known as the Ilulissat Declaration, committing to settling territorial claims diplomatically, using existing legal mechanisms. The primary legal body for maritime border delimitation in the Arctic is the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which rules that maritime countries' EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from their shore. The CLCS covers continental-shelf claims beyond that zone, up to a maximum of 350nm. hould it be determined that the claimed portion of the ocean floor has the same geological makeup as the Russian continental landmass, then the CLCS will rule that it is an extension of Russia's continental shelf, granting Russia sovereign rights to resources under the seabed up to 350nm from its shoreline. In a submission to CLCS in 2001, Russia claimed the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges, as well as the seabed below the North Pole. If this claim is verified, Russia's continental shelf would be extended by 1.2 million square kilometres, and give Russia exclusive rights to the resources below the seabed. Russia's Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment tested the samples and found that they did match the make-up of its landmass. Its next submission to CLCS will likely be ready by the end of 2013, to be submitted in 2014. (The CLCS's ruling will be final and binding.) Following Russia's lead, all Arctic countries are preparing to submit claims to the CLCS: Norway's is already complete, while the United States is going ahead with its preparations even though it has not yet ratified UNCLOS and is, therefore, not a party to its adjudication. There is considerable support for acceding to UNCLOS within the US State Department and Department of Defense, and the claim is being put together in anticipation of eventual ratification. Further sources of friction between Arctic nations on the issue of maritime border delimitation include bilateral disagreements between the US and Canada, and between Denmark and Canada, and a trilateral dispute between Russia, Canada and Denmark. The 2,000km-long Lomonosov ridge, meanwhile, is particularly contentious: Canada claims that the ridge is an underwater extension of Ellesmere Island, while Denmark argues that it is an extension of Greenland's landmass. The US, in turn, has stated that Lomonosov is an oceanic ridge and thus cannot be an extension of any country's continental shelf. However, joint efforts to map the seabed in more detail are under way. In 2011, the US and Canada concluded a five-year mapping operation of their continental shelf, and Canada and Denmark conducted a seismic exploration in 2007. In September 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin called for the creation of a joint scientific council with Canada to allow potentially overlapping continental-shelf claims to be discussed, and Canada responded positively. In addition to the joint surveys, scientists and officials from Arctic nations have met annually since 2007 to discuss issues related to their continental shelves, which may overlap. Of the known oil and gas deposits in the region, 97% lie within the Arctic states' EEZs, meaning there is not much competition between states for access to them. Most of these deposits may not be recoverable in the near term, due to the difficulties of hydrocarbon extraction in remote, harsh and ecologically sensitive environments. But in making maximal continental-shelf claims, Arctic states are hedging that there may be new discoveries or technological developments that will make these deposits more accessible in future. The area that the Russian Federation is claiming is not thought to be rich in hydrocarbons, but does include the North Pole, which has symbolic value. Receive email alerts International Institute for Strategic Studies Arctic Russia Cooperation likely to produce best results Though the CLCS will rule on the extent of the continental shelf in the Arctic, it will not draw the boundaries within the area designated as continental shelf. It is for the countries concerned to come to an agreement on the division of that continental shelf, and the outer boundaries of their national claims, as Russia and Norway did over their Barents Sea border in 2010. However, the CLCS requires that conflicting claims be resolved before it makes its recommendation on the boundary between international oceanic space and national jurisdiction. Differences of opinion among Arctic states over the extent of their shelves could be resolved by discussing CLCS claims before they are submitted, reaching mutually agreeable findings and submitting parallel or joint applications. Each country submits its data to the CLCS confidentially, and its meetings are held in private. UNCLOS scholars believe that Russia has been in communication with Canada and possibly Denmark on the division of their respective claims to the Lomonosov ridge, but there is no information in the public domain about these negotiations. Potential joint submissions are likewise not being prepared openly. Military activity in the Arctic Apart from its economic potential, the strategic importance of the Arctic is not lost on any regional state and all of them have increased the number and complexity of their military exercises there. After a long period of stagnation, Russia is devoting considerable resources to rebuilding and streamlining its military forces. Military exercises have increased for all of the Russian military, including the Northern Fleet, which is based on Russia's northwest coast, inside the Arctic Circle, and is the main locus of its sea-based nuclear deterrent. Its air assets include long-range bombers and maritime reconnaissance aircraft. On the ground, its capabilities include naval infantry and an army brigade on the Kola Peninsula. In 2009, Russia announced its plans to develop further specialised forces to protect its Arctic territory. Russia expressed its unease about the further militarisation of the region in 2009, when Norway moved its armed forces' headquarters to Reitan, in the north of the country. It considered Cold Response - a 15-country exercise that took place in northern Norway and Sweden in March 2012 and involved 16,300 troops - a provocation, and reacted with an exercise involving its 200th motor rifle brigade from Murmansk, including T-80 tanks with gas-turbine engines suited for the Arctic climate. However, Russia has also undertaken joint exercises with both Norway and the US. Confidence-building measures such as these, as well as forums to openly address security matters, have been considered constructive. Moscow's 2008 Arctic policy placed its emphasis not on a military build-up but on maritime law enforcement duties. It also focused on enforcing shipping and fishing regulations, and providing search-and-rescue capabilities. Russia's northern border includes almost 40,000km of coastline, which is becoming more exposed as summer sea ice retreats and economic activity increases. Though Russia has a coastal border guard, only a few of its ships are suitable for Arctic operations, and its ability to monitor its coast and EEZ, and enforce regulations, is limited. As with other Arctic countries, meeting its constabulary requirements is a more immediate and pressing challenge than rebuilding military structures to tackle comparatively notional security threats. Mutual economic interest Despite the signs of heightened military activity in the region, the greatest stabilising factor in the region is mutual economic interest, and the **points of friction** around border delimitation and military activity **are unlikely to override this.** Russia, in particular, is eager to open up the Northern Sea Route for trade purposes, as it perceives great potential for commerce along its otherwise remote northern coast and the possibility of imposing transit fees for shipping through the route. Russia's relations with NATO and the US will have a major impact on levels of cooperation or mistrust in the Arctic. Rebuilding its decaying infrastructure and managing the Northern Sea Route that can connect Europe and Asia will advance Russia's strategic goals in the region more effectively than an unnecessary military build-up.

**No arctic conflict**

**-**cooperation increasing

**Fries ‘12** (Tom Fries, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Arctic Institute, “Perspective Correction: How We Misinterpret Arctic Conflict,” <http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/04/perspective-correction-how-we.html>, April 18, 2012)

War and conflict sell papers -- the prospect of war, current wars, remembrance of wars past. Accordingly, a growing cottage industry devotes itself to writing about the prospect of conflict among the Arctic nations and between those nations and non-Arctic states, which is mostly code for “China.” As a follower of Arctic news, I see this every day, all the time: eight articles last week, five more already this week from the Moscow Times, Scientific American or what-have-you. Sometimes this future conflict is portrayed as a political battle, sometimes military, but the portrayals of the states involved are cartoonish, Cold-War-ish...it’s all good guys and bad guys. I’m convinced that this is nonsense, and I feel vindicated when I see the extent to which these countries' militaries collaborate in the high North. From last week's meeting of all eight Arctic nations' military top brass (excepting only the US; we were represented by General Charles Jacoby, head of NORAD and USNORTHCOM) to Russia-Norway collaboration on search & rescue; from US-Canada joint military exercises to US-Russia shared research in the Barents...no matter where you look, the arc of this relationship bends towards cooperation.

**Arctic cooperation even if military build ups**

**Rogers, ’12**

(Will, Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “New Study Highlights Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” CNAS, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2012/04/new-study-highlights-military-capabilities-arctic.html.)

A [new report](http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=442) from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) finds that the build-up of Arctic military capabilities is limited, with **few indications that conflict is looming**. According to the study, all five Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – have increased their military capabilities in the Arctic in recent years in response to growing accessibly to the region owed largely to climate change.¶ Some of the increased military activity is likely a response to the changing geostrategic environment that will make military capabilities increasingly important for power projection that states need to maintain in order to secure access to lucrative natural resources and other national interests. According to the SIPRI study, for example, “Russia’s Arctic policy underlines the importance of the Arctic as a principal source of natural resources by 2020,” and “Denmark’s defence policy underlines the changing geostrategic significance of the Arctic.”¶ **Despite** the **increased deployment of military assets**, **Arctic states are continuing to pursue** new avenues of **cooperation**, mollifying concerns – at least for the time being – that tensions will worsen as the region becomes more accessible. Last year, the Arctic Council – an intergovernmental forum for Arctic states to address challenges in the High North – hosted a high-level forum that led to an agreement for countries in the region to increase search-and-rescue cooperation given the growing concerns surrounding increased eco-tourism and commercial shipping that could portend future law enforcement challenges. Some states’ newly deployed military assets are intended for **search-and-rescue purposes**, according to the SIPRI study. Canada, for example, will replace older C-130s and other aging aircraft with 17 new search-and-rescue aircraft in the next several years.

**No Arctic war**

**Young ’11** (Professor – Institutional and International Governance, Environmental Institutions @ UCSB, Arctic expert, PhD – Yale, **‘11** (Oran R, “The future of the Arctic: cauldron of conflict or zone of peace?” *International Affairs* 87:1, p. 185-193)

Popular accounts of the Arctic’s jurisdictional issues are regularly couched in terms of provocative phrases like the afore-mentioned ‘who owns the Arctic’ or ‘use it or lose it’. **But these** phrases **turn out to be highly misleading** in this context. **There are virtually no disputes in the Arctic regarding sovereignty** over northern lands; no one has expressed a desire to redraw the map of the Arctic with regard to the terrestrial boundaries of the Arctic states. Most of the disagreements are to do with jurisdiction over marine areas where the idea of ownership in the ordinary sense is irrelevant. While some of these disagreements are of long standing and feature relatively entrenched positions, they are not about establishing ownership, and they do not indicate that some level of ‘use’ is required to avoid the erosion of sovereignty. **There is little prospect that these disputes will spawn armed clashes.** As both Michael Byers and Shelagh Grant make clear in their excellent analyses of Arctic sovereignty, recent efforts to address matters involving sovereignty in the Arctic are marked by a spirit of rule-based problem-solving, rather than an escalating spiral of politically charged claims and counterclaims. The process of delineating jurisdictional boundaries regarding the seabed beyond the limits of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is taking place in conformity with the rules and procedures set forth in Article 76 of UNCLOS. Norway and Russia have **signed an international treaty** resolving their differences regarding jurisdictional boundaries in the Barents Sea. There are signs that Canada and the United States are interested **in a similar approach** with regard to the Beaufort Sea. The Russians, whose much ballyhooed 2007 initiative to plant the Russian flag on the seabed at the North Pole is widely discussed in the books under review, have acted in conformity with the relevant rules of international law in addressing jurisdictional matters and repeatedly expressed their readiness to move forward in a cooperative manner in this realm. There are, of course, significant sensitivities regarding the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and especially the Northwest Passage. But given that commercial traffic on these routes is likely to be limited during the near future, and that the use of these routes will require the active cooperation of the coastal states, regardless of their formal legal status, opportunities arise for devising pragmatic arrangements governing the use of these waterways. The progress now being made regarding the development of a mandatory Polar Code covering Arctic shipping is good news. The fact that ‘hot spots’ in the search for oil and gas in the Arctic are located, for the most part, in areas that are not subject to jurisdictional disputes is also helpful. Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the Arctic states are living up to their promises to deal with jurisdictional issues in the region in a peaceful manner.

**All studies prove**

**IN ‘9** (Ice News – Iceland national news source, 11/29/’9 (“Military dispute over Arctic resources unlikely,” <http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2009/12/29/military-dispute-over-arctic-resources-unlikely/>)

The natural resources of the Arctic region are unlikely to lead to any military conflict in the region according to new research by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) of Norway. The study further found that a diplomatic solution to any dispute resolution is **far likelier and more rational** than armed action. In a statement posted on their website, FNI downplays the threat of lawlessness in the Arctic. “Contrary to the general picture drawn by the media and some commentators over the last couple of years, the Arctic region does not suffer under a state of virtual anarchy. The era when states could claim rights to territory and resources by simply planting their flag is long gone,” the statement reads. International law largely regulates any issues in the Arctic region that have been dubbed “security policy challenges” in the past, SikuNews reports, while adding that the report claims that regional states prefer an observation-based approach over any desire for military conflict. Those issues which arise that are not clearly governed by international law in respect to resolution procedures are generally only minor, say researchers. The focus of the majority of the case studies contained in the findings was on relations in the Barents Sea, between Russia and Norway. These included the management of ocean resources, the status of the continental shelf and waters around Svalbard and the delimitation of unresolved boundaries. These case studies collectively **found little or no threat of armed dispute** likely and concluded that the Arctic region has little rationale or legal space for military conflict resolution.

**NATO fails and EU solves the impacts better**

**Hockenos ‘9** (03/09/2009 RETHINKING US-EUROPE RELATIONS Is the EU Better for Obama than NATO? By Paul Hockenos Paul Hockenos is editor of Internationale Politik-Global Edition. His most recent book is "Joschka Fischer andthe Making of the Berlin Republic: An Alternative History o fPostwar Germany".

**The new American administration would be well served to rethink the United States’ relationship** to Europe: It should move toward a strategic partnership of equals with the European Union and entertain the possibility of new fora to address global security threats. In the long-term, a close, respectful working relationship with the European Union would enhance America’s own security and enable it to engage much more effectively in a multipolar world. America’s long-standing preference for NATO as the transatlantic institution of choice has several explanations. For one, it arguably had—at least until Afghanistan—a record of success. It helped the West win the Cold War without firing a shot. NATO’s job, as British secretary-general Lord Ismay famously put it in 1967, was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” But rather than close up shop with “mission accomplished” in the early 1990s, the 1949-founded pact sought a new purpose. Because the Europeans lacked the military hardware necessary to wage war against the Serb nationalists, NATO led the humanitarian interventions in Bosnia in 1995 and the armed campaign against Milosevic’s Serbia in 1999. That same year, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became the first former-Warsaw pact countries to join NATO, over Russia’s stiff objections. In the years to follow, the Baltic states and Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania also joined. Although the United States and Great Britain circumvented NATO to topple the Taliban government in late 2001, two years later NATO took its operations outside of Europe for the first time in the form of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Today the NATO-led force includes 50,000 troops from 40 countries, including all 27 of the NATO allies. Given the East-West stalemate, during the postwar decades it was possible for NATO allies to work together in the name of collective defense, despite the many differences of opinion within the pact. Leaving aside the question of the nature of the Soviet threat (archives in Moscow turned up no plans for an invasion), the United States and the Western Europeans concurred that the Soviet Union was the enemy. Although the United States set the agenda and the Europeans were effectively junior partners, the principle of collective decision-making was formally respected. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Cold War there were no obvious alternatives to keep the United States and Europe close once American troops withdrew and the nuclear umbrella became irrelevant. Creating something new was beyond the imagination of Washington’s foreign policy makers at the time. Lastly, because it was and would remain primarily a military organization, NATO was one institution that the United States, with its nuclear arsenal and vast military superiority, would be certain to continue to dominate. Yet **by transforming the alliance into an agency for addressing international crises of all kinds, NATO’s advocates have only called greater attention to its inadequacy for the 21st century**. NATO’s new “comprehensive approach” to security endows it with a catch-all mandate that changes as new threats or missions arise and has grown to include responsibilities that go far beyond the exercise of military force. **But while its mandate has changed, its tools and thinking have lagged behind.** There is no better example than NATO’s flagship mission in Afghanistan, where the alliance is confronted with civilian, policing, and humanitarian duties that it cannot possibly carry out. Most of the European NATO member states in Afghanistan argue that stability is only going to be achieved through a strategy that combines education, rule of law programs, economic aid, and infrastructure projects. They underscore that the purpose of the international mission is to facilitate a hand over to the Afghans and to create conditions for reconstruction. Germany and Spain point out, for example, that Afghan poppy production—and Afghanistan’s bumper crops—cannot be checked by bombing campaigns, and that air strikes on poor Afghan farmers could well backfire, costing the force even more good will. But “counter-narcotics” is yet another category that has been added to NATO’s to-do list. There is growing consensus that the Afghanistan mission is make-or-break for NATO and that, at the moment, the latter cannot be ruled out. The war in Afghanistan is only the most egregious example of NATO’s dilemma. Whether it is cyberwar, peacekeeping, international terrorism, or energy security, NATO is invoked by Atlanticists as the go-to institution, overburdening it with new responsibilities. In late January, NATO’s secretary general even proposed an alliance presence in the Arctic as global warming melts the northern ice cap and major powers scramble to lay claim to its energy resources. Others see NATO patrolling Gaza’s borders in a new Israel-Palestine peace deal. **As** **the Dutch political scientist Peter van Ham argues, “NATO’s instruments have become blunt and outdated in** the light of today’s non-traditional security challenges and techniques.” Yet, he notes, contrary to expectations its portfolio has only expanded: “Whereas not too long ago the main question was how the European Union could use NATO’s military tools...the debate is now how should NATO draw upon the resources of the European Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, as well as non-governmental organizations.” But this has not caused US foreign policy makers to consider new fora or mechanisms to address the new threats. Nor have the Europeans been enterprising or ingenuous with new ideas. For them this is the path of least resistance: by putting these complex challenges in NATO’s hands, they appear to have addressed the problems without actually doing so. There is also a lingering question of whether NATO is up to the job of keeping the peace in the North Atlantic area, its original raison d'etre. Today, the threats to European security are strikingly different from those of the Cold War years. They include ethnic conflict on Europe's frontiers, mass migration and refugee flows, energy crises, nuclear proliferation, and transnational terrorism. Particularly in Europe, many experts see security challenges in global warming, international trafficking, resource scarcity, and failing states. A recent EU study concluded that increased tensions over falling water supplies in the Middle East will affect the continent's energy security and economic interests. In addition, global warming will exacerbate poverty and spur mass migration from Africa. **Neither NATO's instruments nor its framework is right for these kinds of problems.** Under the Bush administration this did not matter -- it saw NATO's role exclusively as part of the war on terrorism. The August 2008 conflict in Georgia, however, underscored that there are still threats to Europe's security within and on its borders that the continent's powers will have to respond to with instruments other than pure force. It is no secret that Russia feels deeply threatened by the alliance's expansion eastward, which it has consistently protested since the early 1990s. Moscow perceives as hostile the advance to its borders of a foreign military alliance that was designed to resist the Soviet Union and still sees Russia as a competitor. Although not solely accountable for Russia's authoritarian turn, **NATO's expansion into East Central Europe --contrary to US and German promises to Gorbachev in 1989 -- has expedited the aggressive nationalism and assertiveness of Putin-era Russia**. **It has fueled a new arms race and aggravated a security threat in Europe** that has far-reaching implications for the Europeans. Likewise, the further eastward enlargement of NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia, which Obama specifically advocated in his July 2008 Berlin address, will not engender greater security -- neither for Western Europe nor for Georgia and Ukraine. Admitting Georgia could draw NATO into a direct confrontation with Russia. Would the alliance really risk war with Russia over Georgia's breakaway enclaves in the Caucasus? Unlikely. The Georgians should have no illusions: they have already paid a high price for the false sense of security that American advisors gave to them prior to the recent conflict. The European Union in the World As great as the gap across the Atlantic has been in recent years, the United States still has much more in common with the Europeans than it does with new powers China or Russia. Europe could and should be America's closest partner in world affairs. But this relationship would be immensely different than the current one. It must be a partnership of equals across the Atlantic and this will require real compromises from the United States as well as the Europeans. To make this possible, the Obama administration must begin to think anew about the European Union. For one, the Union is not teetering on the brink of disintegration, regardless of how some American commentators interpret its disunity on many issues and the recent failures to pass a constitution. Though institutional reform is absolutely necessary, **even in its current condition the European Union is healthy**, admired by the overwhelming majority of Europeans, and will continue to perform as it has in the recent past -- but no better than that until a constitution or new reform treaty is approved. The European Union is already a major, capable power in world affairs. It has global interests and a sense of responsibility that goes beyond narrow self-interest. Its size and international economic might alone make it globally relevant, especially since much of the Union's power comes from its conditionally linked trade policies. The single market includes 450 million people, and ranks as the world's largest exporter of goods and the second leading importer worldwide behind the United States. When the ongoing financial crisis peaked this fall, President Bush's first call of help abroad was to the European Union. The Europeans also contribute over half the world's foreign aid to developing countries, including €300 million a year to the Palestinian Authority, triple the resources the United States provides. Diplomatically**, the European Union has led international negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program since 2003. In** 2004 European diplomacy helped bring about a peaceful resolution to Ukraine's Orange Revolution and, more recently, European negotiators brokered a peace in Georgia **that sent peacekeeping troops and monitors to the Caucasus. Its greatest success by far has been to stabilize the Western Balkans in the aftermath of the wars of the 1990s**. **Thus, even though European Union foreign policies are in their infancy, they already make a significant contribution to global security**. Although the European Union in its various incarnations has long been involved in matters beyond its borders, this took new form in 1992 with the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since then, its ability to engage in the wider world was boosted significantly, first with the 1999 European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and then with the 2003 adoption of the European Security Strategy. ESDP endowed the European Union with military capabilities, enabling it to launch its first mission in Macedonia in March 2003.

**NATO is resilient**

**RIA 6** (Regulatory Intelligence Agency, 12-21, Lexis)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21, 2006 - The **N**orth **A**tlantic **T**reaty **O**rganization **is healthy and its best years lie ahead**, Marine Gen. James L. Jones said today at the Europe Atlantic Council here. Jones stepped down as NATO's supreme allied commander earlier this month. While some aspects of the alliance may need work, Jones said that, **on the whole, it is an "incredibly healthy organization**." Jones assumed his office in January 2003 after serving as the commandant of the Marine Corps. During his time in the position, the alliance has changed dramatically. "Perhaps the highlight of the last four years was witnessing the accession of seven new nations into the alliance in 2004," he said. "It was a very emotional moment for seven former Warsaw Pact countries." Membership in NATO meant acceptance in the free world to the former communist countries, Jones said. "There was a sort of palpable enthusiasm for freedom, democracy, rule of law and just the vast potential for those people that had been unleashed," he said. "You feel every day their enthusiasm from these new members." During Jones' tenure, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan grew from a force providing security in and around the Afghan capital of Kabul, to providing security for the entire country. The NATO commander in Afghanistan now commands 32,000 troops from 32 different countries, Jones said. **The NATO mission in Afghanistan and NATO training mission in Iraq are just two operations that show the term "out of area operations" is obsolete**, he said. During the Cold War, NATO's job was to defend Western Europe from the menace of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There were no "out-of-area operations, nor was the possibility even really contemplated," he said. "It is a given that NATO is operating today on three different continents with more than 50,000 troops committed to NATO missions," he said. **Troops under NATO command operate in Asia, Africa and Europe, and** Jones said **the alliance is also embracing change**. "Nowhere was that more in evidence than in establishing the NATO Response Force," he said. The force - 25,000 personnel ready to deploy at a moment's notice - is now fully operational and capable. The general said the force is NATO's greatest commitment to transformation. The force is ready to "take on missions at a strategic distance, but in an expeditionary manner," he said. The NATO Response Force's first real deployment - to Pakistan to help with humanitarian relief following the earthquakes in January 2005 - is a prime example of this, Jones said. The fact that the force's first mission was a humanitarian operation has also caused some reassessment in NATO, he said. **"NATO is reinventing itself** and re-explaining itself because in this world NATO is thought of, correctly, as principally a warfighting organization," he said. "This transformation of NATO - going from a reactive 20th-century force, which it needed to be, to a 21st-century more expeditionary and agile force - brings with a whole lot of things" that countries didn't realize when they signed up for the process in 2002. "It has caused a lot of pain because it gets you into such things as multinational logistics (and) organic intelligence, which NATO has never had," he said. Other transformational aspects during Jones' command included eliminating duplicate NATO headquarters, disestablishing the Alled Command Atlantic and replacing it with the Allied Command Transformation and placing all operations under Allied Command Europe. This is not to say there are not problems that NATO must address, Jones said. First and foremost is money. The per capita share of many countries has actually gone down since the Prague Summit in 2002. NATO nations agreed during that summit to spend roughly 3 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Another problem is national caveats, Jones said. This is where troops assigned to a mission has such stringent restrictions placed on them, that commanders can hardly use them. But **the alliance is remarkably adaptable and resilient**, Jones said. "**The other** bit of **evidence that the alliance is healthy is that I know of no countries that are trying to leave the alliance,"** Jones said. "And I know **quite a few** that **are trying to** queue up and measure up to **become members by** as early as **2008**."

**Too many alt causes to NATO**

**Jankowski ’11** (10/31 (Domink, expert analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and is pursuing a doctorate at the Warsaw School of Economics, "A Post-Libya NATO Assessment," <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/post-libya-nato-assessment-6016?page=1>)

From the NATO perspective, two worrisome trends have emerged. First, despite the political backing for operation “Unified Protector,” fewer than one-third of NATO allies actually participated in strike missions, and fewer than half contributed contingents. That raises a question: Why so few? Some countries, especially the more recent entrants, have been extensively engaged in other NATO operations (Afghanistan, Kosovo). They may believe a contribution to another mission would overstretch their capabilities. Others lack the necessary air and naval assets that would mesh operationally with those of their allies. Both situations reveal, however, another pan-European weakness: the decline in defense spending. The financial crisis has become the new normal. It changed the logic of international relations, ushering in a new era marked by intensifying “zero-sum” geopolitical rivalries. Thus, only four European countries are meeting the minimum threshold of 2 percent GDP expenditures on national defense. From the EU perspective, **the situation seems even worse**. One of the recent issues of the prestigious European magazine *Europe’s World* contained an eye-catching advertisement for NATO: “Question: Which organization adopted a new vision of its geopolitical role in Lisbon? Hint: It wasn’t the European Union!” The ad’s not so subtle jibe has been borne out by the Libyan crisis, which caught the EU by surprise. In fact, there is a growing sense of ambiguity about the real outcome of the EU’s crisis-management policy. Despite being the subject of occasional good news, it is hardly an unalloyed success. That is in part because of two main operational obstacles the EU continues to face. First and foremost, the EU still lacks adequate civilian and military capabilities. The second obstacle is inherent in the EU’s institutional structure and how it works. The bureaucracies responsible for foreign and security policy—including the European External Action Service, the EU’s diplomatic corps—are still essentially under construction.

**No impact**

**Conry 95** (Barbara, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato, Cato Policy Analysis, “The Western European Union as NATO’s Successor”, 9-18, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-239.html)

Europe **after NATO: Bogus Nightmare Scenarios** **It is inaccurate to suggest,** as NATO partisans often do, **that the** only **alternative to Atlanticism is** a return to the **dark ages** of the interwar era: nationalized European defenses, American isolationism, xenophobia, demagoguery, and the other evils associated with the rise of Hitler and World War II. Former U.S. senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) warns that weakening NATO will have dire consequences. "As we have thrice before in this dreadful century, [we will] set in motion an instability that can only lead to war, shed blood, and lost treasure. Pray that we are wiser."(4) Lawrence di Rita of the Heritage Foundation similarly defends NATO as an "insurance policy" against a future world war. "If keeping 65,000 young Americans in Europe will prevent 10 times that many new headstones in Arlington cemetery once the Europeans turn on themselves again--as they have twice this century--then it's a small price to pay."(5) **Such alarmism underestimates the significance of 50 years of economic and political cooperation among the West European powers and the role of pan-European institutions** such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. **It** also **ignores** **the fact that a viable institutional alternative to NATO--the Western European Union--already exists. With the proper resources** and recognition on the part of Washington and the Europeans that an independent European defense is essential in the post-Cold War era, **the WEU is a promising alternative** to Atlanticism. **Far from being a lame second choice to NATO** or defense on the cheap**, a robust WEU would be superior to NATO** in many ways, **better suited** in the long run **to protecting European and**, indirectly, **American interests**.

**NATO is irrelevent**

**Schake** **12/26** (Kori, fellow at the Hoover Institution and an associate professor at the U.S. Military Academy, "NATO After Libya: Why the Alliance Is Worth Saving," http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/25/nato-after-libya-why-the-alliance-is-worth-saving.htmlhttp://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/12/25/nato-after-libya-why-the-alliance-is-worth-saving.html)

But Libya was also a warning: NATO remains **utterly dependent** on American air power and munitions to beat even a third-rate enemy like Gaddafi. How much longer will U.S. lawmakers and taxpayers continue to provide that support? Why should they underwrite the performance of European militaries when Europe’s own taxpayers refuse to do so? In a farewell speech this past June in Brussels, then–U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates gave a **dismal** assessment of the alliance’s Libyan performance, warning that NATO had shown itself to be at risk of “collective military **irrelevance**.” NATO’s membership has more than doubled to 28 countries since its inception in 1949, but its basic principle remains the same: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Only once in NATO’s 62-year history has its mutual-defense clause been invoked: after the Sept. 11 attacks on America. More than 10 years later, NATO allies continue to fight America’s fight, with 40,000 non-U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan. That’s loyalty. Imagine how hard it would be for an American president to sustain involvement in someone else’s war after 10 years. Yet NATO has been a good deal for the Europeans and Canadians: for the past six decades the world’s strongest military has been committed to their defense. Nearly 80,000 U.S. military personnel are currently stationed in Europe, working closely and routinely under NATO’s integrated military command, sharing expertise, plans, equipment, and training. In fact, Europeans have more influence over U.S. policies in NATO than in any other forum. Its rules, originally drawn up for Western Europe’s defense, give the European allies so much leverage that Washington insisted that its treaty obligations be limited to “Europe or America,” carefully excluding the Europeans’ colonial possessions in Asia and Africa. (Times do change—in recent years the United States has been the leading proponent of NATO’s security responsibilities around the world.) The allies can count on America to step in whenever they lack the required capabilities. The British and the French may have flown most of the missions during Operation Unified Protector, but it was U.S. personnel and equipment that destroyed Libya’s air defenses at the outset, firing more than 100 Tomahawk cruise missiles on the first day. As the intervention continued, the Americans provided 80 percent of the necessary intelligence; dispatched targeting specialists to make up for a shortage of qualified European technicians; and supplied additional munitions to the other allies when they ran short. And it was practically inevitable that they would run short. Minus the United States, NATO’s members spend roughly $150 billion a year on defense, a figure that’s not even close to the U.S. expenditure—excluding war costs—of around $560 billion. That’s fully half the world’s total. Russia and China each spend about $100 billion (although it’s hard to be sure about China, because its reporting is so opaque). Libya itself spent $1 billion in the year before Gaddafi’s overthrow. All told, the alliance has nearly 2 million military members, including battle-hardened veterans of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Seven of the world’s 10 best militaries are European members of NATO. Even without U.S. participation, the Europeans should be able to defeat any potential enemy. The trouble is, they no longer believe they can. Britain openly admits its dependence on the United States. Since 1997, the United Kingdom has predicated its defense planning on the assumption that it will not fight a war without American assistance. While Eurochauvinists may harbor notions of independence, the **truth** is that **few of them are willing to fight** unless America is at their side, no matter now noble the cause may be.

**No Korea war** – its all posturing and international powers check escalation – history proves

**Fisher ‘3-12**

[Max, the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage for TheAtlantic.com, The Washington Post, “ Why North Korea loves to threaten World War III (but probably won’t follow through)”

But is North Korea really an irrational nation on the brink of launching “all-out war,” a mad dog of East Asia? Is Pyongyang ready to sacrifice it all? Probably not. The North Korean regime, for all its cruelty, has also shown itself to be shrewd, calculating, and single-mindedly obsessed with its own self-preservation. The regime’s past behavior suggests pretty strongly that these threats are empty. But they still matter. For years, North Korea has threatened the worst and, despite all of its apparent readiness, never gone through with it. So why does it keep going through these macabre performances? We can’t read Kim Jong Eun’s mind, but the most plausible explanation has to do with internal North Korean politics, with trying to set the tone for regional politics, and with forcing other countries (including the United States) to bear the costs of preventing its outbursts from sparking an unwanted war. Starting World War III or a second Korean War would not serve any of Pyongyang’s interests. Whether or not it deploys its small but legitimately scary nuclear arsenal, North Korea could indeed cause substantial mayhem in the South, whose capital is mere miles from the border. But the North Korean military is antiquated and inferior; it wouldn’t last long against a U.S.-led counterattack. No matter how badly such a war would go for South Korea or the United States, it would almost certainly end with the regime’s total destruction. Still, provocations and threats do serve Pyongyang’s interests, even if no one takes those threats very seriously. It helps to rally North Koreans, particularly the all-important military, behind the leader who has done so much to impoverish them. It also helps Pyongyang to control the regional politics that should otherwise be so hostile to its interests. Howard French, a former New York Times bureau chief for Northeast Asia whom I had the pleasure of editing at The Atlantic, explained on Kim Jong Il’s death that Kim had made up for North Korea’s weakness with canny belligerence: The shtick of apparent madness flowed from his country’s fundamental weakness as he, like a master poker player, resolved to bluff and bluff big. Kim adopted a game of brinkmanship with the South, threatening repeatedly to turn Seoul into a “sea of flames.” And while this may have sharply raised the threat of war, for the North, it steadily won concessions: fuel oil deliveries, food aid, nuclear reactor construction, hard cash-earning tourist enclaves and investment zones. At the risk of insulting Kim Jong Eun, it helps to think of North Korea’s provocations as somewhat akin to a child throwing a temper tantrum. He might do lots of shouting, make some over-the-top declarations (“I hate my sister,” “I’m never going back to school again”) and even throw a punch or two. Still, you give the child the attention he craves and maybe even a toy, not because you think the threats are real or because he deserves it, but because you want the tantrum to stop. The big problem here is not that North Korea will intentionally start World War III or a second Korean War, because it probably won’t. So you can rest easy about that. The big problem is that North Korea’s threats and provocations, however empty, significantly raise the risk of an unwanted war. The United States, South Korea and yes Pyongyang’s all-important ally, China, all have much more to lose in a regional war than does North Korea. It falls to those countries, then, to keep the Korean peninsula from spiraling out of control. Even if they don’t ultimately offer Pyongyang concessions to calm it down, as they have in the past, they’ve still got an interest in preventing future outbursts. Like parents straining to manage a child’s tantrum, it’s a power dynamic that oddly favors the weak and misbehaving.

**No korean war—it’s all rhetoric**

**Kang ‘10** (David Kang, professor of international relations and business and director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California. His latest book is East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (Columbia University Press, 2010). 12/31/2010]

However, despite dueling artillery barrages and the sinking of a warship, pledges of “enormous retaliation,” in-your-face joint military exercises and urgent calls for talks, the risk of all-out war on the Korean peninsula is less than it has been at anytime in the past four decades. North Korea didn’t blink, because it had no intention of actually starting a major war. Rather than signifying a new round of escalating tension between North and South Korea, the events of the past year point to something else—a new cold war between the two sides. In fact, one of my pet peeves is the analogies we use to describe the situation between South and North Korea. We often call the situation a “powder keg” or a “tinderbox,” implying a very unstable situation in which one small spark could lead to a huge explosion. But the evidence actually leads to the opposite conclusion: we have gone sixty years without a major war, despite numerous “sparks” such as the skirmishing and shows of force that occurred over the past month. If one believes the situation is a tinderbox, the only explanation for six decades without a major war is that we have been extraordinarily lucky. I prefer the opposite explanation: deterrence is quite stable because both sides know the costs of a major war, and both sides—rhetoric and muscle-flexing aside—keep smaller incidents in their proper perspective.

**Major powers will deescalate**—proves no conflict and no draw-in

**Zhijiang ’12** (Kim Jong-un’s regime: facing up to domestic challenges, China and the US January 26th, 2012 Author: Wei Zhijiang, Sun Yat-sen University Wei Zhijiang is Professor and Director of the Institute of South Korea Studies at the School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Sun Yat-sen University.

With regard to the role of outside powers, China and US share common strategic interests in avoiding chaos and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. After the death of Kim Jong-il, ROK-US summit telephone talks declared that the US has no intention to interfere in the succession process. This indicates that the US will not put pressure on North Korea to promote its collapse and hopes to avoid conflict on the peninsula and to achieve peace and stability. The US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, visited China recently in order to further exchange views with China concerning the situation in the DPRK and to coordinate policies toward North Korea. China’s strategy has been to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula, and to build a harmonious and stable strategic environment in Northeast Asia conducive to national development. Kim’s death has not changed the basic strategy of China toward the Korean Peninsula. The main basis of China’s Korean Peninsula policy is to comprehensively strengthen and support Kim Jong-un’s new North Korean regime. The main purpose of the US’ ‘return to Asia’ strategy is to strengthen its strategic influence in the Asia Pacific region, including the Korean Peninsula. It also includes preventing military provocation or possible war in the East Asia region through the strengthening of US-ROK, US-Japan and US-Australia military alliances, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Therefore, China and the US have common strategic interests on the Korean Peninsula issue. They do not want chaos in the North Korean situation, the collapse of the regime, or a large-scale military conflict between the North and South. In resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, the missile crisis and other issues, there is a wide range of cooperative space that China and the US can utilise. The two parties should strengthen their strategic coordination and communication with the DPRK in order to cope with any future crises and deal with the current challenges concerning the Korean Peninsula, and act to safeguard the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.

**Zero risk of Korean conflict**

Rowland ’10 (Ashley Rowland, Stars and Stripes, “Despite threats, war not likely in Korea, experts say,” <http://www.stripes.com/news/despite-threats-war-not-likely-in-korea-experts-say-1.127344?localLinksEnabled=false>, December 3, 2010)

Despite increasingly belligerent threats to respond swiftly and strongly to military attacks, analysts say there is one thing both North Korea and South Korea want to avoid: an escalation into war. The latest promise to retaliate with violence came Friday, when South Korea’s defense minister-to-be said during a confirmation hearing that he supports airstrikes against North Korea in the case of future provocations from the communist country. “In case the enemy attacks our territory and people again, we will thoroughly retaliate to ensure that the enemy cannot provoke again,” Kim Kwan-jin said, according to The Associated Press. The hearing was a formality because South Korea’s National Assembly does not have the power to reject South Korean president Lee Myung-bak’s appointment. Kim’s comments came 10 days after North Korea bombarded South Korea’s Yeonpyeong island near the maritime border, killing two marines and two civilians — the first North Korean attack against civilians since the Korean War. South Korea responded by firing 80 rounds, less than half of the 170 fired by North Korea. It was the second deadly provocation from the North this year. In March, a North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean warship Cheonan, killing 46 sailors, although North Korea has denied involvement in the incident. The South launched a series of military exercises, some with U.S. participation, intended to show its military strength following the attack. John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, said South Korea is using “textbook posturing” to deter another attack by emphasizing that it is tough and firm. But it’s hard to predict how the South would respond to another attack. The country usually errs on the side of restraint, he said. “I think they’re trying to send a very clear signal to North Korea: Don’t push us again,” Delury said. “For all of the criticism of the initial South Korean response that it was too weak, in the end I think people don’t want another hot conflict. I think the strategy is to rattle the sabers a bit to prevent another incident.” Meanwhile, Yonhap News reported Friday that North Korea recently added multiple-launch rockets that are capable of hitting Seoul, located about 31 miles from the border. The report was based on comments from an unnamed South Korean military source who said the North now has 5,200 multiple-launch rockets. A spokesman for South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff would not comment on the accuracy of the report because of the sensitivity of the information. Experts say it is a question of when — not if — North Korea will launch another attack. But those experts doubt the situation will escalate into full-scale war. “I think that it’s certainly possible, but I think that what North Korea wants, as well as South Korea, is to contain this,” said Bruce Bechtol, author of “Defiant Failed State: The North Korean Threat to International Security” and an associate professor of political science at Angelo State University in Texas. He said North Korea typically launches small, surprise attacks that can be contained — not ones that are likely to escalate. Delury said both Koreas want to avoid war, and North Korea’s leaders have a particular interest in avoiding conflict — they know the first people to be hit in a full-scale fight would be the elites.

**Trade is strong and resilient**

**Ikenson, 9** [Daniel, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, “ A Protectionism Fling: Why Tariff Hikes and Other Trade Barriers Will Be Short-Lived,” March 12, 2009, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=10651]

Although some governments will dabble in some degree of protectionism, the combination of a sturdy rules-based system of trade and the economic self interest in being open to participation in the global economy **will limit** the risk of **a protectionist pandemic**. According to recent estimates from the International Food Policy Research Institute, if all WTO members were to raise all of their applied tariffs to the maximum bound rates, the average global rate of duty would double and the value of global **trade would decline by 7.7 perce**nt over five years.8 That would be a substantial decline relative to the 5.5 percent annual rate of trade growth experienced this decade.9 But, to put that 7.7 percent decline in historical perspective, the value of global trade declined by **66 percent** between 1929 and 1934, a period mostly in the wake of Smoot Hawley's passage in 1930.10 So the potential downside today from what Bergsten calls "legal protectionism" is actually **not** that "**massive**," even if all WTO members raised all of their tariffs to the highest permissible rates. If most developing countries raised their tariffs to their bound rates, there would be an adverse impact on the countries that raise barriers and on their most important trade partners. But most developing countries **that have room to backslide** (i.e., not China) **are not major importers**, and thus the impact on global trade flows would not be that significant. OECD countries and China account for the top twothirds of global import value.11 Backsliding from India, Indonesia, and Argentina (who collectively account for 2.4 percent of global imports) is not going to be the spark that ignites **a global trade war**. Nevertheless, governments are keenly aware of the events that transpired in the 1930s, and have made various pledges to **avoid protectionist measures** in combating the current economic situation. In the United States, after President Obama publicly registered his concern that the "Buy American" provision in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act might be perceived as protectionist or could incite a trade war, Congress agreed to revise the legislation to stipulate that the Buy American provision "be applied in a manner consistent with United States obligations under international agreements." In early February, China's vice commerce minister, Jiang Zengwei, announced that China would not include "Buy China" provisions in its own $586 billion stimulus bill.12 But even more promising than pledges to avoid trade provocations **are actions** taken **to reduce** existing **trade barriers**. In an effort to "reduce business operating costs, attract and retain foreign investment, raise business productivity, and provide consumers a greater variety and better quality of goods and services at competitive prices," the Mexican government initiated a plan in January to unilaterally reduce tariffs on about 70 percent of the items on its tariff schedule. Those 8,000 items, comprising 20 different industrial sectors, accounted for about half of all Mexican import value in 2007. When the final phase of the plan is implemented on January 1, 2013, the average industrial tariff rate in Mexico will have fallen from 10.4 percent to 4.3 percent.13v And Mexico is not alone. In February, the Brazilian government suspended tariffs entirely on some capital goods imports and reduced to 2 percent duties on a wide variety of machinery and other capital equipment, and on communications and information technology products.14 That decision came on the heels of late-January decision in Brazil to scrap plans for an import licensing program that would have affected 60 percent of the county's imports.15 Meanwhile, on February 27, a new free trade agreement was signed between Australia, New Zealand, and the 10 member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate tariffs on 96 percent of all goods by 2020. While the media and members of the trade policy community fixate on how various protectionist measures around the world might foreshadow a plunge into the abyss, there is plenty of evidence that governments **remain interested in removing barriers to trade**. Despite the occasional temptation to indulge discredited policies, there is a growing body of institutional knowledge that when people are free to engage in commerce with one another as they choose, regardless of the nationality or location of the other parties, they can leverage that freedom to accomplish economic outcomes far more impressive than when governments attempt to limit choices through policy constraints.

**No trade war impact**

**Fletcher 11** Ian Fletcher is Senior Economist of the Coalition for a Prosperous America, former Research Fellow at the U.S. Business and Industry Council M.A. and B.A. from Columbia and U Chicago, "Avoid Trade War? We're Already In One!" August 29 2011 [www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre\_b\_939967.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-fletcher/avoid-trade-war-were-alre_b_939967.html)

The curious thing about the concept of trade war is that, unlike actual shooting war, it has no historical precedent. In fact, there has never been a significant trade war, "significant" in the sense of having done serious economic damage. All history records are minor skirmishes at best.¶ Go ahead. Try and name a trade war. The Great Trade War of 1834? Nope. The Great Trade War of 1921? Nope Again. There isn't one.¶ The standard example free traders give is that America's Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 either caused the Great Depression or made it spread around the world. But this canard does not survive serious examination, and has actually been denied by almost every economist who has actually researched the question in depth -- a group ranging from Paul Krugman on the left to Milton Friedman on the right.¶ The Depression's cause was monetary. The Fed allowed the money supply to balloon during the late 1920s, piling up in the stock market as a bubble. It then panicked, miscalculated, and let it collapse by a third by 1933, depriving the economy of the liquidity it needed to breathe. Trade had nothing to do with it.¶ As for the charge that Smoot caused the Depression to spread worldwide: it was too small a change to have plausibly so large an effect. For a start, it only applied to about one-third of America's trade: about 1.3 percent of our GDP. Our average tariff on dutiable goods went from 44.6 to 53.2 percent -- not a terribly big jump. Tariffs were higher in almost every year from 1821 to 1914. Our tariff went up in 1861, 1864, 1890, and 1922 without producing global depressions, and the recessions of 1873 and 1893 managed to spread worldwide without tariff increases.¶ As the economic historian (and free trader!) William Bernstein puts it in his book A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World,¶ Between 1929 and 1932, real GDP fell 17 percent worldwide, and by 26 percent in the United States, but most economic historians now believe that only a miniscule part of that huge loss of both world GDP and the United States' GDP can be ascribed to the tariff wars. .. At the time of Smoot-Hawley's passage, trade volume accounted for only about 9 percent of world economic output. Had all international trade been eliminated, and had no domestic use for the previously exported goods been found, world GDP would have fallen by the same amount -- 9 percent. Between 1930 and 1933, worldwide trade volume fell off by one-third to one-half. Depending on how the falloff is measured, this computes to 3 to 5 percent of world GDP, and these losses were partially made up by more expensive domestic goods. Thus, the damage done could not possibly have exceeded 1 or 2 percent of world GDP -- nowhere near the 17 percent falloff seen during the Great Depression... The inescapable conclusion: contrary to public perception, Smoot-Hawley did not cause, or even significantly deepen, the Great Depression.¶ The oft-bandied idea that Smoot-Hawley started a global trade war of endless cycles of tit-for-tat retaliation is also mythical. According to the official State Department report on this very question in 1931:¶ With the exception of discriminations in France, the extent of discrimination against American commerce is very slight...By far the largest number of countries do not discriminate against the commerce of the United States in any way.¶ That is to say, foreign nations did indeed raise their tariffs after the passage of Smoot, but this was a broad-brush response to the Depression itself, aimed at all other foreign nations without distinction, not a retaliation against the U.S. for its own tariff. The doom-loop of spiraling tit-for-tat retaliation between trading partners that paralyzes free traders with fear today simply did not happen.¶ "Notorious" Smoot-Hawley is a deliberately fabricated myth, plain and simple. We should not allow this myth to paralyze our policy-making in the present day.¶ There is a basic unresolved paradox at the bottom of the very concept of trade war. If, as free traders insist, free trade is beneficial whether or not one's trading partners reciprocate, then why would any rational nation start one, no matter how provoked? The only way to explain this is to assume that major national governments like the Chinese and the U.S. -- governments which, whatever bad things they may have done, have managed to hold nuclear weapons for decades without nuking each other over trivial spats -- are not players of realpolitik, but schoolchildren.¶ When the moneymen in Beijing, Tokyo, Berlin, and the other nations currently running trade surpluses against the U.S. start to ponder the financial realpolitik of exaggerated retaliation against the U.S. for any measures we may employ to bring our trade back into balance, they will discover the advantage is with us, not them. Because they are the ones with trade surpluses to lose, not us.¶ So our present position of weakness is, paradoxically, actually a position of strength.¶ Likewise, China can supposedly suddenly stop buying our Treasury Debt if we rock the boat. But this would immediately reduce the value of the trillion or so they already hold -- not to mention destroying, by making their hostility overt, the fragile (and desperately-tended) delusion in the U.S. that America and China are still benign economic "partners" in a win-win economic relationship.¶ At the end of the day, China cannot force us to do anything economically that we don't choose to. America is still a nuclear power. We can -- an irresponsible but not impossible scenario -- repudiate our debt to them (or stop paying the interest) as the ultimate counter-move to anything they might contemplate. More plausibly, we might simply restore the tax on the interest on foreign-held bonds that was repealed in 1984 thanks to Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.¶ Thus a certain amount of back-and-forth token retaliation (and loud squealing) is indeed likely if America starts defending its interests in trade as diligently as our trading partners have been defending theirs, but that's it. The rest of the world engages in these struggles all the time without doing much harm; it will be no different if we join the party.

**No correlation between trade and peace**

**MARTIN, et al ‘8 (**Phillipe, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, and Centre for Economic Policy Research; Thierry MAYER, University of Paris 1 Pantheon—Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CEPII, and Centre for Economic Policy Research, Mathias THOENIG, University of Geneva and Paris School of Economics, The Review of Economic Studies 75)

Does globalization pacify international relations? The “liberal” view in political science argues that increasing trade flows and the spread of free markets and democracy should limit the incentive to use military force in interstate relations. This vision, which can partly be traced back to Kant’s Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795), has been very influential: The main objective of the European trade integration process was to prevent the killing and destruction of the two World Wars from ever happening again.1 Figure 1 suggests2 however, that during the 1870–2001 period, the correlation between trade openness and military **conflicts is not** a **clear** cut one. The first era of globalization, at the end of the 19th century, was a period of rising **trade openness and multiple military conflicts**, **culminating with World War I**. Then, the interwar period was characterized by a simultaneous collapse of world trade and conflicts. After World War II, world trade increased rapidly, while the number of conflicts decreased (although the risk of a global conflict was obviously high). **There is no** clear **evidence that** the 1990s, during which **trade flows** **increased dramatically, was a period of lower** prevalence of military **conflicts**, even taking into account the increase in the number of sovereign states.

**Trade wars don’t escalate**

**Ikenson, 12** [March 5th, Daniel, [Daniel Ikenson](http://www.cato.org/people/daniel-ikenson) is director of the Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute,

<http://www.cato.org/publications/free-trade-bulletin/trade-policy-priority-one-averting-uschina-trade-war>]

. Nature of the U.S.-China Trade War It should not be surprising that the increasing number of commercial exchanges between entities in the world's largest and second largest economies produce frictions on occasion. But the U.S.-China economic relationship **has not descended into an existential call to arms.** Rather, both governments have taken protectionist actions that are **legally defensible** or plausibly justifiable within the rules of global trade. That is not to say that those measures have been advisable or that they would withstand closer legal scrutiny, but to make the distinction that, unlike the free-for-all that erupted in the 1930s, these trade "skirmishes" have been prosecuted in a manner that **speaks to a** mutual **recognition of the** primacy of — if not respect for — the **rules-based system** of trade. And that suggests that the **kerfuffle is containable and the recent trend reversible.1**

### Advantage 2

**Military power doesn’t solve conflict – Neg’s ev is correlation by transition**

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” 173-75)

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. **If no pacific normative shift had occurred** among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then **no amount of** international constabulary **work** by the United States **could maintain stability**. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply **coincidental**. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have **suggests** that there is **little connection between** the relative level of U.S. **activism and** international **stability**. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. **To** internationalists, defense hawks, and other **believers in hegemonic stability this** irresponsible "peace dividend" **endangered** both national and **global security "**No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful** while the United States cut its forces. **No state** **seemed to believe** that its **security was endangered** by a less-capable Pentagon, **or** at least none **took any action** that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; **no** **security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are **unrelated** to U.S. military spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite **effectively without the presence of a global policeman**. **Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

**Can’t solve environmental leadership –alt causes**

**Victor 8** - law professor at Stanford's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

(David G., "The next U.S. President won't be green", 5-1-08 <http://www.newsweek.com/id/135073/>)

The U.S. record on international environmental issues is highly uneven for reasons that have little to do with George W. Bush's leadership. His administration has been tarred across the planet for reckless leadership on international environmental issues. (Its actual record, while dreadful, is not a uniform failure. It has done useful things in a few areas, such as a thoughtful initiative to help conserve forests in the Congo Basin.) But the signature of Bush's reckless foreign policy in this area, his decision to withdraw from the Kyoto treaty barely three months after taking office, actually has its roots in the Clinton administration. Clinton was highly committed to environmental issues and his vice president, Al Gore, was an even more passionate leader. Their zealous diplomats negotiated a treaty that was larded with commitments that the United States never could have honored. The promise to cut U.S. emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels is a good example. Because actual emissions were rising steadily, it would have been impractical to turn them around in time to meet the 2012 Kyoto deadline. The U.S. Congress never could have passed the requisite legislation, and no leader in the White House could have changed that voting arithmetic. The U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was inevitable. What does this mean for America's credibility in the world? When the American president promises, should anyone listen? Increasingly, other countries are learning that the answer is no—because American leaders have a habit of promising a lot more than they can deliver. Environmental issues are particularly prone to overpromising, and not just by the United States. Europe, too, is fresh with unrealistic claims by political leaders. The European Union, for example, has launched negotiations for the post-Kyoto agreement by claiming that Europeans will cut greenhouse-gas emissions 20 percent to 30 percent by 2020—an outrageous goal considering that most of Europe (with the exception mainly of Britain and Germany) will fail to meet their existing targets, and emissions are actually rising. Europe as a whole would blow through its Kyoto targets if not for its generous use of a scheme that lets them take credit for overseas investment in low-carbon technologies—despite mounting evidence that many of those overseas credits don't actually deliver real reductions in emissions. Smart politicians know that the benefits lie mainly in the promising today and not in the delivery long in the future. Ironically, the more enthusiastic the leader, the less credibility he or she has. While the Clinton administration was busy negotiating the Kyoto treaty, the U.S. Senate was passing a resolution, 95 to 0, to signal that it would reject any treaty that didn't contain specific commitments by developing countries to control their effluent of greenhouse gases. Since the developing countries had already rejected that outcome the Clinton administration had little room to maneuver. The great reversal in U.S. "leadership" on global warming over the last year—signaled by President Bush's speech three weeks ago embracing the need for limits on greenhouse gases—came from the people rather than top leaders. Public concern about global warming is rising (though it will be checked by the even more acute worries on the economy and war). The Bush speech was more a recognition that serious efforts to develop climate legislation are already well underway without his stamp. Many states are already planning to regulate greenhouse gases. The Senate has a serious bill on this subject scheduled for floor debate starting June 2. Its sponsors are Joe Lieberman (the former running mate of Al Gore but now alienated from the Democratic Party for his overly independent views) and John Warner (a Republican who has no former track record on global warming). These are ideal leaders for this issue because often it takes the fresh faces focused on building bipartisan majorities to get things done in America. Perhaps the most interesting signal that American presidents are losing the ability to lead is an effort to rewrite the rules that would govern environmental treaties under American law. Committed environmentalists have rightly noted that America's Constitution requires a two-thirds vote for treaties in the Senate. That standard is nearly impossible to meet because one third of the Senate is usually opposed to anything interesting. Serious efforts are now underway to reinterpret environmental "treaties" as agreements between Congress and the president, which would require only a majority vote. Most trade agreements, for example, travel under this more lax standard and also have special voting rules that require Congress to approve the agreement as a whole package rather than pick it apart piece by piece. Rebranding and changing voting rules makes it easier to approve agreements, boosting the credibility of the president to negotiate agreements that serve the country's interest.

**And, the plan can’t solve leadership – not taken seriously**

**Business Times Singapore ‘7** [Can Bush follow through on his green policy?, lexis]

¶ WHO looks to President George Bush for leadership on global warming? When he announced his intention last week to set the United States on to the path of reducing greenhouse gases, the world reacted with scepticism.The sceptics see it as presidential grandstanding which in effect is intended to stall the Group of Eight nations' talks in Germany this week. That conclave aims to adopt a unified stand on the post-Kyoto round discussions ahead of a global in Bali later this year.¶ Similar scepticism was heard about the president's announcement last month about setting up an interdepartmental study on vehicle emissions in the US. Indeed, the Bush administration had to be hauled to the US Supreme Court and its federal Environmental Protection Agency had to be directed to use its power to rein in emissions. ¶ So, President Bush finds himself in a situation of being damned if you do and damned if you don't. After having spurned the Kyoto Protocol, the main global treaty for cutting emissions, and questioning the very science involved in global warming, Mr Bush has a hard time convincing the world that he is for real changes on emissions.¶ Earlier, there were sound bites like 'America is addicted to oil' and there was a tantalising proposal for cellulosic ethanol for the future and with funding increased for research to support technology-backed solutions to greenhouse gas emissions. But at the same time, immediate action to require more miles from vehicles was shunned. Nor has he abandoned his opposition to the cap and trade system to control emissions, a central plank of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Obama won’t be an environmental leader and Congress would block it anyway**

**McDermott, 11** - edits the Business and Energy sections of TreeHugger, as well as writing about resource consumption, animal welfare issues, and the response of religious communities to our current environmental problems, also a goddamned hippie (Mat, “President Obama Continues Squandering Opportunities to Show Environmental Leadership” 1/26, <http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/president-obama-continues-squandering-opportunities-to-show-environmental-leadership.html>)

By now you're likely well aware that despite talking about clean energy and jobs, President Obama made no mention of climate change or environmental issues as such during yesterday's State of the Union address. Which somehow makes it an even more important time to highlight comments that scientist-activist Dr James Hansen once wrote to Obama in advice. Obama Apparently Hasn't Listened to Hansen New York Times has the entire letter--we don't know if it was ever actually read--but here are some of the highlights, which I personally find important and resonant: The President should use his ascendancy to the most powerful position on the planet to help set a new sensible course for the planet and humanity. It would have required being blunt and honest about the situation and what was needed to break our addiction and avoid the tremendous inter-generational injustice that the present path will bring to pass. The path to a clean energy future would not be painful for the public, but it requires standing up to special interests who benefit from business-as-usual. It is both a moral issue and a question of where the United States will stand in the future. Our economic standing is going to become second class this century if we do not move smartly toward a clean energy future. Further along: The other thing not mentioned above is that the most fundamental problem, which I keep repeating, is this: as long as fossil fuels are the cheapest energy, somebody will keep burning them -- implication, we must put a rising price on carbon. (Not cap-and-trade! A simple, honest approach -- collect a fee from fossil fuel companies at first sale, distribute that money, 100 percent, to the public.) Nevertheless, the easiest thing that he could do, and perhaps the best that we can hope for, is for him to give a strong boost to nuclear power. Unfortunately, he seems to fall prey to Democratic politics on this, rather than being a responsible leader. Nuclear Energy May Help Greenhouse Gas Emissions, But Not Environment The reference to nuclear power is something that Hansen brought up earlier in the letter--he called it a "huge mistake" that the Carter and Clinton administrations didn't more support the development of advanced reactor designs. Personally I'm not sure nuclear power is any better solution to our greater environmental problems than continued reliance on other non-renewable fuels--even if it does address greenhouse gas emissions. And to be fair, President Obama continues to show strong support for clean energy, even if implementation isn't as robust as it could be or is needed to be. President's Clean Energy Approach Neglects Why It's Important But the part that is really lacking right now, linking together two things that Hansen advised as symbols of this lack, is President Obama showing or even hinting at moral leadership in establishing Hansen's "sensible course for the planet and humanity" and breaking away from business-as-usual thinking. Pushing for 80% of US electricity coming from clean energy sources by 2035 is somewhat stepping away from that path, breaking away from the pack of polluters desperately trying to retain their profitable place in the world, but it is simply not enough. The failure of President Obama to mention climate change, and the utter fingers-in-ears approach of Congress in even acknowledging that climate change is happening (on one side of the aisle) and in even attempting to push forward something that will effectively address it (on the other), just makes Hansen's words about intergenerational injustice all the more poignant.

**U.S can’t solve warming**

**Grose ‘3-15**

(Thomas K., National Geographic News Writer, “As U.S. Cleans Its Energy Mix, It Ships Coal Problems Abroad”

Ready for some good news about the environment? Emissions of carbon dioxide in the United States are declining. But don't celebrate just yet. A major side effect of that cleaner air in the U.S. has been the further darkening of skies over Europe and Asia. The United States essentially is exporting a share of its greenhouse gas emissions in the form of coal, data show. If the trend continues, the dramatic changes in energy use in the United States—in particular, the switch from coal to newly abundant natural gas for generating electricity—will have only a modest impact on global warming, observers warn. The Earth's atmosphere will continue to absorb heat-trapping CO2, with a similar contribution from U.S. coal. It will simply be burned overseas instead of at home. "Switching from coal to gas only saves carbon if the coal stays in the ground," said John Broderick, lead author of a study on the issue by the Tyndall Center for Climate Change Research at England's Manchester University. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) released data this week showing that United States coal exports hit a record 126 million short tons in 2012, a 17 percent increase over the previous year. Overseas shipments surpassed the previous high mark set in 1981 by 12 percent. The United States clearly is using less coal: Domestic consumption fell by about 114 million tons, or 11 percent, largely due to a decline in the use of coal for electricity. But U.S. coal production fell just 7 percent. The United States, with the world's largest coal reserves, continued to churn out the most carbon-intensive fuel, producing 1 billion tons of coal from its mines in 2012. Emissions Sink The EIA estimates that due largely to the drop in coal-fired electricity, U.S. carbon emissions from burning fossil fuel declined 3.4 percent in 2012. If the numbers hold up, it will extend the downward trend that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) outlined last month in its annual greenhouse gas inventory, which found greenhouse gas emissions in 2011 had fallen 8 percent from their 2007 peak to 6,703 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent (a number that includes sources other than energy, like methane emissions from agriculture). In fact, if you don't count the recession year of 2009, U.S. emissions in 2011 dropped to their lowest level since 1995. President Barack Obama counted the trend among his environmental accomplishments in his State of the Union address last month: "Over the last four years, our emissions of the dangerous carbon pollution that threatens our planet have actually fallen." The reason is clear: Coal, which in 2005 generated 50 percent of U.S. electricity, saw its share erode to 37.4 percent in 2012, according to EIA's new short-term energy outlook. An increase in U.S. renewable energy certainly played a role; renewables climbed in those seven years from 8.7 percent to 13 percent of the energy mix, about half of it hydropower. But the big gain came from natural gas, which climbed from 19 percent to 30.4 percent of U.S. electricity during that time frame, primarily because of abundant supply and low prices made possible by hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. The trend appears on track to continue, with U.S. coal-fired plants being retired at a record pace. But U.S. coal producers haven't been standing still as their domestic market has evaporated. They've been shipping their fuel to energy-hungry markets overseas, from the ports of Norfolk, Baltimore, and New Orleans. Although demand is growing rapidly in Asia—U.S. coal exports to China were on track to double last year—Europe was the biggest customer, importing more U.S. coal last year than all other countries combined. The Netherlands, with Europe's largest port, Rotterdam, accepted the most shipments, on pace for a 24 jump in U.S. coal imports in 2012. The United Kingdom, the second largest customer, saw its U.S. coal imports jump more than 70 percent. The hike in European coal consumption would appear to run counter to big government initiatives across the Continent to cut CO2 emissions. But in the European Union, where fracking has made only its initial forays and natural gas is still expensive, American coal is, well, dirt cheap. European utilities are now finding that generating power from coal is a profitable gambit. In the power industry, the profit margin for generating electricity from coal is called the "clean dark spread"; at the end of December in Great Britain, it was going for about $39 per megawatt-hour, according to Argus. By contrast, the profit margin for gas-fired plants—the "clean spark spread"—was about $3. Tomas Wyns, director of the Center for Clean Air Policy-Europe, a nonprofit organization in Brussels, Belgium, said those kinds of spreads are typical across Europe right now. The EU has a cap-and-trade carbon market, the $148 billion, eight-year-old Emissions Trading System (ETS). But it's in the doldrums because of a huge oversupply of permits. That's caused the price of carbon to fall to about 4 euros ($5.23). A plan called "backloading" that would temporarily extract allowances from the market to shore up the price has faltered so far in the European Parliament. "A better carbon price could make a difference" and even out the coal and gas spreads, Wyns said. He estimates a price of between 20 and 40 euros would do the trick. "But a structural change to the Emissions Trading System is not something that will happen very quickly. A solution is years off." The Tyndall Center study estimates that the burning of all that exported coal could erase fully half the gains the United States has made in reducing carbon emissions. For huge reserves of shale gas to help cut CO2 emissions, "displaced fuels must be reduced globally and remain suppressed indefinitely," the report said. Future Emissions It is not clear that the surge in U.S. coal exports will continue. One reason for the uptick in coal-fired generation in Europe has been the looming deadline for the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive, which will require older coal plants to meet lower emission levels by the end of 2015 or be mothballed. Before that phaseout begins, Wyns says, "there is a bit of a binge going on." Also, economic factors are at work. Tyndall's Broderick said American coal companies have been essentially selling surplus fuel overseas at low profit margins, so there is a likelihood that U.S. coal production will decrease further. The U.S. government forecasters at EIA expect that U.S. coal exports will fall back to about 110 million tons per year over the next two years, due to economic weakness in Europe, falling international prices, and competition from other coal-exporting countries. The Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA) calls Europe's "coal renaissance" a temporary phenomenon; it forecasts an increasing use of renewables, shuttering of coal plants, and a better balance between gas and coal prices in the coming years. But IEA does not expect that the global appetite for coal will slacken appreciably. The agency projects that, by 2017, coal will rival oil as the world's primary energy source, mainly because of skyrocketing demand in Asia. U.S. coal producers have made clear that they aim to tap into that growing market.

**They have no effect on CO2**

**Carnegie Institute 12**

Carnegie Institute of Science, February 16, 2012, "Only the lowest CO2 emitting technologies can avoid a hot end-of-century", http://carnegiescience.edu/news/only\_lowest\_co2\_emitting\_technologies\_can\_avoid\_hot\_endofcentury

Washington, D.C.— Could replacing coal-fired electricity plants with generators fueled by natural gas bring global warming to a halt in this century? What about rapid construction of massive numbers of solar or wind farms, hydroelectric dams, or nuclear reactors—or the invention of new technology for capturing the carbon dioxide produced by fossil-fueled power plants and storing it permanently underground? Nathan Myhrvold of Intellectual Ventures teamed up with Carnegie Institution’s Ken Caldeira to calculate the expected climate effects of replacing the world’s supply of electricity from coal plants with any of eight cleaner options. The work was published online by Environmental Research Letters on February 16. When published, it will be available at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/1/014019. In each case, Myhrvold and Caldeira found that to achieve substantial benefit this century, we would need to engage in a rapid transition to the lowest emitting energy technologies such as solar, wind, or nuclear power – as well as conserve energy where possible. The researchers found that it takes much longer to curtail the warming of the Earth than one might expect. And in the case of natural gas—increasingly the power industry’s fuel of choice, because gas reserves have been growing and prices have been falling—the study finds that warming would continue even if over the next 40 years every coal-fired power plant in the world were replaced with a gas-fueled plant. “There is no quick fix to global warming,” Caldeira said. “Shifting from one energy system to another is hard work and a slow process. Plus, it takes several decades for the climate system to fully respond to reductions in emissions. If we expect to see substantial benefits in the second half of this century, we had better get started now.” Researchers have previously conducted studies projecting the long-term climate effects of rolling out a single new energy technology. But this work from Myhrvold and Caldeira is the first to examine all the major candidate technologies for replacing coal power—including conservation—and to examine wide ranges of possible assumptions about both the emissions each technology generates and also the scope and duration of the build-out. “It takes a lot of energy to make new power plants—and it generally takes more energy to make those that use cleaner technology--like nuclear, solar, and wind--than it does to make dirty ones that burn coal and gas,” Myhrvold added. “You have to use the energy system of today to build the new-and-improved energy system of tomorrow, and unfortunately that means creating more emission in the near-term than we would otherwise. So we incur a kind of ‘emissions debt’ in making the transition to a better system, and it can take decades to pay that off. Meanwhile, the temperature keeps rising.” The study used widely accepted models relating emissions to temperature. The two researchers also drew on a rich literature of studies, called life-cycle analyses, that total up all the greenhouse gases produced during the construction and operation of, say, a natural gas plant or a hydroelectric dam or a solar photovoltaic farm. It also examined the potential that technological improvements, such as advances in carbon capture and storage or in solar panel efficiency, could have on outcomes. “It was surprising to us just how long it takes for the benefit of a switch from coal to something better to show up in the climate in the form of a slowdown in global warming,” Caldeira said. “If countries were to start right away and build really fast, so that they installed a trillion watts of gas-fired electricity generation steadily over the next 40 years,” Myhrvold said, “that would still add about half a degree Fahrenheit to the average surface temperature of the Earth in 2112—that’s within a tenth of a degree of the warming that coal-fired plants would produce by that year.”

**Can’t solve warming**

**AP 9** (Associated Press, Six Degree Temperature Rise by 2100 is Inevitable: UNEP, September 24, <http://www.speedy-fit.co.uk/index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=168>)

Earth's **temperature is likely to jump six degrees** between now and the end of the century **even if every country cuts** greenhouse gas **emissions** as proposed, according to a United Nations update. **Scientists looked at emission plans** from 192 nations **and calculated what would happen** to global warming. The projections take into account 80 percent emission cuts from the U.S. and Europe by 2050, which are not sure things. The U.S. figure is based on a bill that passed the House of Representatives but is running into resistance in the Senate, where debate has been delayed by health care reform efforts. Carbon dioxide, mostly from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal and oil, is the main cause of global warming, trapping the sun's energy in the atmosphere. The world's average temperature has already risen 1.4 degrees since the 19th century. Much of projected rise in temperature is because of developing nations, which **aren't talking much about cutting their emissions**, scientists said at a United Nations press conference Thursday. China alone adds nearly **2 degrees** to the projections. "We are headed toward very serious changes in our planet," said Achim Steiner, head of the U.N.'s environment program, which issued the update on Thursday. The review looked at some 400 peer-reviewed papers on climate over the last three years. **Even if the developed world cuts** its emissions by **80 percent and the developing world cuts theirs in half** by 2050, as some experts propose, **the world is** still **facing a 3-degree increase** by the end of the century, said Robert Corell, a prominent U.S. climate scientist who helped oversee the update. Corell said the most likely agreement out of the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December still translates into a nearly 5-degree increase in world temperature by the end of the century. European leaders and the Obama White House have set a goal to limit warming to just a couple degrees. The U.N.'s environment program unveiled the update on peer-reviewed climate change science to tell diplomats how hot the planet is getting. The last big report from the Nobel Prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change came out more than two years ago and is based on science that is at least three to four years old, Steiner said. Global warming is speeding up, especially in the Arctic, and that means that some top-level science projections from 2007 are already out of date and overly optimistic. Corell, who headed an assessment of warming in the Arctic, said global warming "is accelerating in ways that we are not anticipating." Because Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets are melting far faster than thought, it looks like the seas will rise twice as fast as projected just three years ago, Corell said. He said seas should rise about a foot every 20 to 25 years.

**Warming won’t cause extinction**

**Barrett** **‘7** professor of natural resource economics – Columbia University, (Scott, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, introduction)

First, **climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species**.5 If unchecked, it will cause other species to become extinction (though biodiversity is being depleted now due to other reasons). It will alter critical ecosystems (though this is also happening now, and for reasons unrelated to climate change). It will reduce land area as the seas rise, and in the process displace human populations. “Catastrophic” climate change is possible, but not certain. Moreover, and unlike an asteroid collision, large changes (such as sea level rise of, say, ten meters) **will likely take centuries to unfold, giving societies time to adjust.** “Abrupt” climate change is also possible, and will occur more rapidly, perhaps over a decade or two. However, **abrupt climate change** (such as a weakening in the North Atlantic circulation), though potentially very serious, **is unlikely to be ruinous.** Human-induced climate change is an experiment of planetary proportions, and we cannot be sur of its consequences. Even in a worse case scenario, however, global climate change is not the equivalent of the Earth being hit by mega-asteroid. Indeed, if it were as damaging as this, and if we were sure that it would be this harmful, then our incentive to address this threat would be overwhelming. The challenge would still be more difficult than asteroid defense, but we would have done much more about it by now.

**CO2 isn’t key**

**Watts ’12** 25-year climate reporter, works with weather technology, weather stations, and weather data processing systems in the private sector, 7/25/

(Anthony, <http://wattsupwiththat.com/2012/07/25/lindzen-at-sandia-national-labs-climate-models-are-flawed/>)

ALBUQUERQUE, N.M. — Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Richard Lindzen, a global warming skeptic, told about 70 Sandia researchers in June that too much is being made of climate change by researchers seeking government funding. He said their data and their methods did not support their claims. “Despite concerns over the last decades with the greenhouse process, **they oversimplify the effect**,” he said. “Simply cranking up CO2 [carbon dioxide] (as the culprit) is not the answer” to what causes climate change. Lindzen, the ninth speaker in Sandia’s Climate Change and National Security Speaker Series, is Alfred P. Sloan professor of meteorology in MIT’s department of earth, atmospheric and planetary sciences. He has published more than 200 scientific papers and is the lead author of Chapter 7 (“Physical Climate Processes and Feedbacks”) of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Third Assessment Report. He is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Geophysical Union and the American Meteorological Society. For 30 years, **climate scientists have been “locked into a simple-minded identification of climate with greenhouse-gas level**. … That climate should be the function of a single parameter (like CO2) has always seemed implausible. Yet an **obsessive focus on such an obvious oversimplification** has likely set back progress by decades,” Lindzen said. **For major climates of the past, other factors were more important than carbon dioxide.** Orbital variations have been shown to quantitatively account for the cycles of glaciations of the past 700,000 years, he said, and the elimination of the arctic inversion, when the polar caps were ice-free, “is likely to have been **more important than CO2** for the warm episode during the Eocene 50 million years ago.” There is little evidence that changes in climate are producing extreme weather events, he said. “Even the IPCC says there is little if any evidence of this. In fact, there are important physical reasons for doubting such anticipations.” Lindzen’s views run counter to those of almost all major professional societies. For example, the American Physical Society statement of Nov. 18, 2007, read, “The evidence is incontrovertible: Global warming is occurring.” But he doesn’t feel they are necessarily right. “Why did the American Physical Society take a position?” he asked his audience. “Why did they find it compelling? They never answered.” Speaking methodically with flashes of humor — “I always feel that when the conversation turns to weather, people are bored.” — he said a basic problem with current computer climate models that show disastrous increases in temperature is that relatively small increases in atmospheric gases lead to large changes in temperatures in the models. But, he said, “predictions based on high (climate) sensitivity ran well ahead of observations.” Real-world observations do not support IPCC models, he said: “**We’ve already seen** almost the equivalent of **a doubling of CO2** (**in radiative forcing**) **and that has produced very little warming.”** He disparaged proving the worth of models by applying their criteria to the prediction of past climatic events, saying, “The models are no more valuable than answering a test when you have the questions in advance.” Modelers, he said, merely have used aerosols as a kind of fudge factor to make their models come out right. (Aerosols are tiny particles that reflect sunlight. They are put in the air by industrial or volcanic processes and are considered a possible cause of temperature change at Earth’s surface.) Then there is the practical question of what can be done about temperature increases even if they are occurring, he said. “China, India, Korea are not going to go along with IPCC recommendations, so … the only countries punished will be those who go along with the recommendations.” He discounted mainstream opinion that climate change could hurt national security, saying that “historically there is little evidence of natural disasters leading to war, but economic conditions have proven much more serious. Almost all proposed mitigation policies lead to reduced energy availability and higher energy costs. All studies of human benefit and national security perspectives show that increased energy is important.” He showed a graph that demonstrated that more energy consumption leads to higher literacy rate, lower infant mortality and a lower number of children per woman. Given that proposed policies are unlikely to significantly influence climate and that lower energy availability could be considered a significant threat to national security, to continue with a mitigation policy that reduces available energy “would, at the least, appear to be irresponsible,” he argued. Responding to audience questions about rising temperatures, he said **a 0.8 of a degree C change in temperature in 150 years is a small change.** Questioned about five-, seven-, and 17-year averages that seem to show that Earth’s surface temperature is rising, he said temperatures are always fluctuating by tenths of a degree.

**We’ll adapt**

**Kenny 12** [April 9, 2012, Charles, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, and author, most recently, of Getting Better: Why Global Development Is Succeeding and How We Can Improve the World Even More., “Not Too Hot to Handle,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not\_too\_hot\_to\_handle?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full]

But for all international diplomats appear desperate to affirm the self-worth of pessimists and doomsayers worldwide, it is important to put climate change in a broader context. It is a vital global issue -- one that threatens to slow the worldwide march toward improved quality of life. Climate change is already responsible for more extreme weather and an accelerating rate of species extinction -- and may ultimately kill off as many as 40 percent of all living species. But it is also a problem that we know how to tackle, and one to which we have some time to respond before it is likely to completely derail progress. And that's good news, because the fact that it's manageable is the best reason to try to tackle it rather than abandon all hope like a steerage class passenger in the bowels of the Titanic.

Start with the economy. The Stern Review, led by the distinguished British economist Nicholas Stern, is the most comprehensive look to date at the economics of climate change. It suggests that, in terms of income, greenhouse gasses are a threat to global growth, but hardly an immediate or catastrophic one. Take the impact of climate change on the developing world. The most depressing forecast in terms of developing country growth in Stern's paper is the "A2 scenario" -- one of a series of economic and greenhouse gas emissions forecasts created for the U.N.'s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It's a model that predicts slow global growth and income convergence (poor countries catching up to rich countries). But even under this model, Afghanistan's GDP per capita climbs sixfold over the next 90 years, India and China ninefold, and Ethiopia's income increases by a factor of 10. Knock off a third for the most pessimistic simulation of the economic impact of climate change suggested by the Stern report, and people in those countries are still markedly better off -- four times as rich for Afghanistan, a little more than six times as rich for Ethiopia.

It's worth emphasizing that the Stern report suggests that the costs of dramatically reducing greenhouse-gas emissions is closer to 1 (or maybe 2) percent of world GDP -- in the region of $600 billion to $1.2 trillion today. The economic case for responding to climate change by pricing carbon and investing in alternate energy sources is a slam dunk. But for all the likelihood that the world will be a poorer, denuded place than it would be if we responded rapidly to reduce greenhouse gases, the global economy is probably not going to collapse over the next century even if we are idiotic enough to delay our response to climate change by a few years. For all the flooding, the drought, and the skyrocketing bills for air conditioning, the economy would keep on expanding, according to the data that Stern uses.

And what about the impact on global health? Suggestions that malaria has already spread as a result of climate change and that malaria deaths will expand dramatically as a result of warming in the future don't fit the evidence of declining deaths and reduced malarial spread over the last century. The authors of a recent study published in the journal Nature conclude that the forecasted future effects of rising temperatures on malaria "are at least one order of magnitude smaller than the changes observed since about 1900 and about two orders of magnitude smaller than those that can be achieved by the effective scale-up of key control measures." In other words, climate change is and will likely remain a small factor in the toll of malaria deaths into the foreseeable future.

What about other diseases? Christian Zimmermann at the University of Connecticut and Douglas Gollin at Williams evaluate the likely impact of a 3-degree rise in temperatures on tropical diseases like dengue fever, which causes half a million cases of hemorrhagic fever and 22,000 deaths each year. Most of the vectors for such diseases -- mosquitoes, biting flies, and so on -- do poorly in frost. So if the weather stays warmer, these diseases are likely to spread. At the same time, there are existing tools to prevent or treat most tropical diseases, and Zimmerman and Gollin suggest "rather modest improvements in protection efficacy could compensate for the consequences of climate change." We can deal with this one.

It's the same with agriculture. Global warming will have many negative (and a few positive) impacts on food supply, but it is likely that other impacts -- both positive, including technological change, and negative, like the exhaustion of aquifers-- will have far bigger effects. The 2001 IPCC report suggested that climate change over the long term could reduce agricultural yields by as much as 30 percent. Compare that with the 90 percent increase in rice yields in Indonesia between 1970 and 2006, for example.

Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.

Let's also not forget how human psychology works. Too many environmentalists suggest that dealing with climate change will take immediate and radical retooling of the global economy. It won't. It is affordable, practical, and wouldn't take a revolution. Giving out the message that the only path to sustainability will require medieval standards of living only puts everyone else off. And once you've convinced yourself the world is on an inevitable course to disaster if some corner of the U.S. Midwest is fracked once more or India builds another three coal-fueled power plants, the only logical thing to do when the fracking or the building occurs is to sit back, put your Toms shoes on the couch, and drink micro-brewed herbal tea until civilization collapses. Climate change isn't like that -- or at the very least, isn't like that yet.

So, if you're really just looking for a reason to strap on the "end of the world is nigh" placards and go for a walk, you can find better excuses -- like, say, the threat of global thermonuclear war or a rogue asteroid. The fight to curb greenhouse gas emissions is one for the hard-nosed optimist.

----------dumb args below.

**No warming and c02 doesn’t cause it- newest data**

**Taylor ’11** (7/27- senior fellow for environment policy at the Heartland Institute (2011, “New NASA Data Blow Gaping Hole In Global Warming Alarmism,” Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/jamestaylor/2011/07/27/new-nasa-data-blow-gaping-hold-in-global-warming-alarmism/)

**NASA satellite data** from the years 2000 through 2011 show the Earth’s atmosphere is allowing **far more heat to be released** into space than alarmist computer models have predicted, reports a new study in the peer-reviewed science journal Remote Sensing. The study indicates **far** **less** future global warming will occur than United Nations computer **models** have **predicted**, and supports prior studies indicating increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide trap far less heat than alarmists have claimed. Study co-author Dr. Roy Spencer, a principal research scientist at the University of Alabama in Huntsville and U.S. Science Team Leader for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer flying on NASA’s Aqua satellite, reports that real-world data from NASA’s Terra satellite contradict multiple assumptions fed into alarmist computer models. “The satellite observations suggest there is much more energy lost to space during and after warming than the climate models show,” Spencer said in a July 26 University of Alabama press release. “**There is a huge discrepancy between the data and the forecasts** that is especially big over the oceans.” In addition to finding that far less heat is being trapped than alarmist computer models have predicted, the NASA satellite data show the atmosphere **begins shedding heat** into space **long before** United Nations computer models **predicted**. The new findings are extremely important and **should dramatically alter the** global **warming debate**. Scientists on all sides of the global warming debate are in general agreement about how much heat is being directly trapped by human emissions of carbon dioxide (the answer is “not much”). However, the single most important issue in the global warming debate is whether carbon dioxide emissions will indirectly trap far more heat by causing large increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds. Alarmist computer models assume human carbon dioxide emissions indirectly cause substantial increases in atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds (each of which are very effective at trapping heat), but **real-world data have** long **shown that carbon dioxide emissions are not causing** as much **atmospheric humidity** and cirrus clouds as the alarmist computer models have predicted. The new NASA Terra satellite data are consistent with long-term NOAA and NASA data indicating atmospheric humidity and cirrus clouds are not increasing in the manner predicted by alarmist computer models. The Terra satellite data also support data collected by NASA’s ERBS satellite showing far more longwave radiation (and thus, heat) escaped into space between 1985 and 1999 than alarmist computer models had predicted. Together, the NASA ERBS and Terra satellite data show that for 25 years and counting, carbon dioxide emissions have directly and indirectly trapped far less heat than alarmist computer models have predicted. In short, the central premise of alarmist global warming theory is that carbon dioxide emissions should be directly and indirectly trapping a certain amount of heat in the earth’s atmosphere and preventing it from escaping into space. Real-world measurements, however, show far less heat is being trapped in the earth’s atmosphere than the alarmist computer models predict, and far more heat is escaping into space than the alarmist computer models predict. **When objective NASA satellite data, reported in a peer-reviewed scientific journal, show a “huge discrepancy” between alarmist climate models and real-world facts, climate scientists**, the media and our elected officials **would be wise to take notice**. Whether or not they do so will tell us a great deal about how honest the purveyors of global warming alarmism truly are.

**Negative feedbacks solve and no tipping point**

**McShane 8** (Owen, the chairman of the policy panel of the New Zealand Climate Science Coalition and director of the Center for Resource Management Studies, 4-4-8, *The National Business Review (New Zealand)*, “Climate change confirmed but global warming is cancelled”, Lexis)

**Atmospheric scientists generally agree that as carbon dioxide levels increase there is a law of "diminishing returns" - or more properly "diminishing effects"** - and that ongoing increases in CO2 concentration do not generate proportional increases in temperature. The common analogy is painting over window glass. The first layers of paint cut out lots of light but subsequent layers have diminishing impact. So, you might be asking, why the panic? Why does Al Gore talk about temperatures spiraling out of control, causing mass extinctions and catastrophic rises in sea-level, and all his other disastrous outcomes when there is no evidence to support it? The alarmists argue that increased CO2 leads to more water vapour - the main greenhouse gas - and this provides positive feedback and hence makes the overall climate highly sensitive to small increases in the concentration of CO2. Consequently, the IPCC argues that while carbon dioxide may well "run out of puff" the consequent evaporation of water vapour provides the positive feedback loop that will make anthropogenic global warming reach dangerous levels. This assumption that water vapour provides positive feedback lies behind the famous "tipping point," which nourishes Al Gore's dreams of destruction, and indeed all those calls for action now - "before it is too late!" But **no climate models predict such a tipping point**. However, while the absence of hot spots has refuted one important aspect of the IPCC models we lack a mechanism that fully explains these supposed outcomes. Hence the IPCC, and its supporters, have been able to ignore this "refutation." So by the end of last year, we were in a similar situation to the 19th century astronomers, who had figured out that the sun could not be "burning" its fuel - or it would have turned to ashes long ago - but could not explain where the energy was coming from. Then along came Einstein and E=mc2. Hard to explain Similarly, the climate sceptics have had to explain why the hotspots are not where they should be - not just challenge the theory with their observations. This is why I felt so lucky to be in the right place at the right time when I heard Roy Spencer speak at the New York conference on climate change in March. At first I thought this was just another paper setting out observations against the forecasts, further confirming Evans' earlier work. But as the argument unfolded I realised Spencer was drawing on **observations and measurements from the new Aqua satellites to explain the mechanism** behind this anomaly between model forecasts and observation. You may have heard that the IPCC models cannot predict clouds and rain with any accuracy. Their models assume water vapour goes up to the troposphere and hangs around to cook us all in a greenhouse future. However, **there is a mechanism at work that "washes out" the water vapour and returns it to the oceans along with the extra CO2 and thus turns the added water vapour into a NEGATIVE feedback mechanism**. The newly discovered mechanism is a combination of clouds and rain (Spencer's mechanism adds to the mechanism earlier identified by Professor Richard Lindzen **called the Iris effect**). The IPCC models assumed water vapour formed clouds at high altitudes that lead to further warming. The Aqua satellite observations and Spencer's analysis show water vapour actually forms clouds at low altitudes that lead to cooling. Furthermore, Spencer shows the **extra rain that falls from these clouds cools the underlying oceans, providing a second negative feedback to negate the CO2 warming.** Alarmists' quandary This has struck the alarmists like a thunderbolt, especially as **the lead author of the IPCC** chapter **on feedback has written** to Spencer **agreeing** that he is right! There goes the alarmist neighbourhood!

**Natural variability explains warming trends**

**Idso ‘12**, director of envt science – Peabody Energy, PhD Geography – ASU, Idso, professor – Maricopa County Community College, and Idso, PhD botany – ASU,

(Craig, Sherwood, and Keith, “Northern Scandinavian Temperatures: It's a Whole New Ball Game,” CO2 Science Vol. 15, No. 30, July)

**In a game-changing paper** published in the online version of Nature Climate Change, Esper et al. (8 July 2012) provide convincing evidence that both the Medieval and Roman Warm Periods of 1000 and 2000 years ago, respectively, were warmer than the Current Warm Period has been to date, **in spite of the fact that today's** atmospheric **CO2 concentration is** some **40% greater** than it was during those two earlier periods.

In setting the stage for their paradigm-altering work, the twelve researchers - hailing from Finland, Germany, Scotland and Switzerland - write that "solar insolation changes, resulting from long-term oscillations of orbital configurations (Milankovitch, 1941), are an important driver of Holocene climate," referencing the studies of Mayewski et al. (2004) and Wanner et al. (2008). In addition, they state that **this forcing has been "substantial over the past 2000 years**, up to **four times as large as** the 1.6 W/m2 **net anthropogenic forcing** since 1750," as suggested by the work of Berger and Loutre (1991). And on the basis of "numerous high-latitude proxy records," as they describe it, they note that "slow orbital changes have recently been shown to gradually force boreal summer temperature cooling over the common era," citing Kaufman et al. (2009).

Fast-forwarding to the present, Esper et al. describe how they developed "a 2000-year summer temperature reconstruction based on 587 high-precision maximum latewood density (MXD) series from northern Scandinavia," which feat was accomplished "over three years using living and subfossil pine (Pinus sylvestris) trees from 14 lakes and 3 lakeshore sites above 65°N, making it not only longer but also much better replicated than any existing MXD time series." Then, after calibrating the pine MXD series against regional June-July-August mean temperature over the period 1876-2006, they obtained their final summer temperature history for the period stretching from 138 BC to AD 2006, as depicted in the graph below.

As determined from the relationship depicted in the figure above, Esper et al. calculate a long-term cooling trend of -0.31 ± 0.03°C per thousand years, which cooling they say is "missing in published tree-ring proxy records" but is "in line with coupled general circulation models (Zorita et al., 2005; Fischer and Jungclaus, 2011)," which computational results portray, as they describe it: substantial summer cooling over the past two millennia in northern boreal and Arctic latitudes.

"These findings," as the European researchers continue, "together with the missing orbital signature in published dendrochronological records, suggest that large-scale near-surface air temperature reconstructions (Mann et al., 1999; Esper et al., 2002; Frank et al., 2007; Hegerl et al., 2007; Mann et al., 2008) relying on tree-ring data may underestimate pre-instrumental temperatures including warmth during Medieval and Roman times," although they suggest that the impacts of the omitted long-term trend in basic tree-ring data may "diminish towards lower Northern Hemisphere latitudes, as the forcing and radiative feedbacks decrease towards equatorial regions."

And so it is that the question for our day ought to be: **Why was** much of **the CO2-starved** world of **Medieval and Roman times** decidedly **warmer** (by about 0.3 and 0.5°C, respectively) than it was during the peak warmth of the 20th century? Clearly, **the greenhouse effect** of atmospheric CO2 - if it **has** not **been grossly over-estimated** - must currently be being significantly tempered by some unappreciated CO2- and/or warming-induced negative-feedback phenomenon (possibly of biological origin) to the degree that the basic greenhouse effect of earth's rising atmospheric CO2 concentration cannot fully compensate for the decrease in solar insolation experienced over the past two millennia as a result of the "long-term oscillations of orbital configurations" cited by Esper et al. (2012).

**No decline and no challengers**

**Kaplan ‘11**, senior fellow – Center for a New American Security, and Kaplan, frmr. vice chairman – National Intelligence Council, (Robert D and Stephen S, “America Primed,” The National Interest, March/April)

But in spite of the seemingly inevitable and rapid diminution of U.S. eminence, to write America’s great-power obituary is beyond premature. The United States remains a highly capable power. Iraq and Afghanistan, as horrendous as they have proved to be—in a broad historical sense—are still relatively minor events that America can easily overcome. The eventual demise of empires like those of Ming China and late-medieval Venice was brought about by far more pivotal blunders. Think of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857 and 1858. Iraq in particular—ever so frequently touted as our turning point on the road to destruction—looks to some extent eerily similar. At the time, orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure (who wanted to leave traditional India as it was) lost some sway to evangelical and utilitarian reformers (who wanted to modernize and Christianize India—to make it more like England). But the attempt to bring the fruits of Western civilization to the Asian subcontinent was met with a violent revolt against imperial authority. Delhi, Lucknow and other Indian cities were besieged and captured before being retaken by colonial forces. Yet, the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire at all, which continued on and even expanded for another century. Instead, it signaled the transition from more of an ad hoc imperium fired by a proselytizing lust to impose its values on others to a calmer and more pragmatic empire built on international trade and technology.1 There is no reason to believe that the fate of America need follow a more doomed course. Yes, the mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan have been the United States’ own, but, though destructive, they are not fatal. If we withdraw sooner rather than later, the cost to American power can be stemmed. Leaving a stable Afghanistan behind of course requires a helpful Pakistan, but with more pressure Washington might increase Islamabad’s cooperation in relatively short order. In terms of acute threats, Iran is the only state that has exported terrorism and insurgency toward a strategic purpose, yet the country is economically fragile and politically unstable, with behind-the-scenes infighting that would make Washington partisans blanch. Even assuming Iran acquires a few nuclear devices—of uncertain quality with uncertain delivery systems—the long-term outlook for the clerical regime is itself unclear. The administration must only avoid a war with the Islamic Republic. To be sure, America may be in decline in relative terms compared to some other powers, as well as to many countries of the former third world, but in absolute terms, particularly military ones, the United States can easily be the first among equals for decades hence. China, India and Russia are the only major Eurasian states prepared to wield military power of consequence on their peripheries. And each, in turn, faces its own obstacles on the road to some degree of dominance. The Chinese will have a great navy (assuming their economy does not implode) and that will enforce a certain level of bipolarity in the world system. But Beijing will lack the alliance network Washington has, even as China and Russia will always be—because of geography—inherently distrustful of one another. China has much influence, but no credible military allies beyond possibly North Korea, and its authoritarian regime lives in fear of internal disruption if its economic growth rate falters. Furthermore, Chinese naval planners look out from their coastline and see South Korea and a string of islands—Japan, Taiwan and Australia—that are American allies, as are, to a lesser degree, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. To balance a rising China, Washington must only preserve its naval and air assets at their current levels. India, which has its own internal insurgency, is bedeviled by semifailed states on its borders that critically sap energy and attention from its security establishment, and especially from its land forces; in any case, India has become a de facto ally of the United States whose very rise, in and of itself, helps to balance China. Russia will be occupied for years regaining influence in its post-Soviet near abroad, particularly in Ukraine, whose feisty independence constitutes a fundamental challenge to the very idea of the Russian state. China checks Russia in Central Asia, as do Turkey, Iran and the West in the Caucasus. This is to say nothing of Russia’s diminishing population and overwhelming reliance on energy exports. Given the problems of these other states, America remains fortunate indeed. The United States is poised to tread the path of postmutiny Britain. America might not be an empire in the formal sense, but its obligations and constellation of military bases worldwide put it in an imperial-like situation, particularly because its air and naval deployments will continue in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world. No country is in such an enviable position to keep the relative peace in Eurasia as is the United States—especially if it can recover the level of enduring competence in national-security policy last seen during the administration of George H. W. Bush. This is no small point. America has strategic advantages and can enhance its power while extricating itself from war. But this requires leadership—not great and inspiring leadership which comes along rarely even in the healthiest of societies—but plodding competence, occasionally steely nerved and always free of illusion.

**Alt causes overwhelm**

Copley ’12 (June 2012 (Gregory R., editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, Strategic Policy in an Age of Global Realignment, lexis)

3. Strategic Recovery by the US. The US will not, in 2012 or 2013, show signs of any recovery of its global strategic credibility or real strength. Its **manufacturing and science and technology** sectors **will continue to suffer from** low (even **declining) productivity** **and** difficulty in capital formation (for political reasons, primarily). A significant US recovery **is not feasible** in the timeframe given the present political and economic policies and impasse evident. **US allies will increasingly look to their own needs** while attempting to sustain their alliance relationship with the US to the extent feasible. Those outside the US alliance network, or peripheral to it, will increasingly disregard US political/diplomatic pressures, and will seek to accommodate the PRC or regional actors. The continued economic malaise of the US during 2012, even if disguised by modest nominal GDP growth, will make economic (and therefore strategic) recovery more difficult and ensure that it will take longer. In any event, the **fact that the US national debt exceeds the GDP hollows the dollar and thus makes meaningful recovery impossible** in the short-term. The attractiveness of a low dollar value in comparison to other currencies in making US manufacturing investment more feasible than in recent years is offset by declining US workforce productivity and political constraints which penalize investment in manufacturing, or even in achieving appealing conditions for capital formation. Banks are as afraid of such investment as are manufacturing investors themselves.

**Heg doesn’t solve conflict**

**Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College (Chris, Georgetown University Press, “Dangerous times?: the international politics of great power peace” 173-75)

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that a generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemony, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe. Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “rebound to America’s detriment.” If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually produces stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, the belief that U.S. hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great powers is if self-policing occurs, ifs **states have decided that their interest are served by peace**. **If no pacific normative shift had occurred** among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then **no amount of** international constabulary **work** by the United States **could maintain stability**. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simple could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply **coincidental**. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influence those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited **empirical evidence** we have **suggests** that there is **little connection between** the relative level of U.S. **activism and** international **stability**. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially, By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. **To** internationalists, defense hawks, and other **believers in hegemonic stability this** irresponsible "peace dividend" **endangered** both national and **global security "**No serious analyst of American military capabilities," argued Kristol and Kagan, "doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace."" If the pacific trends were due not to U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: **The world grew more peaceful** while the United States cut its forces. **No state** **seemed to believe** that its **security was endangered** by a less-capable Pentagon, **or** at least none **took any action** that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; **no** **security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred** once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat ofinternational war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are **unrelated** to U.S. military spending. Evidently **the rest of the world can operate** quite **effectively without the presence of a global policeman**. **Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.**

**The only comprehensive study proves no transition impact.**

**MacDonald and Parent 11**—Professor of Political Science at Williams College & Professor of Political Science at University of Miami [Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44]

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a **comprehensive study** of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by **systematically examining** the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine **eighteen cases** of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists’ claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, **peaceful retrenchment** **is the most common** response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61–83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state’s rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute **decline are less likely to** initiate or **escalate** militarized interstate disputes. **Faced with diminishing resources**, great **powers** **moderate their** foreign policy **ambitions** and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. Great powers are able to rebalance their **commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position. Pg. 9-10

# 2nc

## T

“financial incentives” are funding for investors to develop a project – that excludes nonfinancial incentives like acquirement

**Czinkota et al, 9 -** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69 – google books)

Incentives offered by policymakers to facilitate foreign investments are mainly of three types: fiscal, financial, and nonfinancial. **Fiscal incentives** are specific tax measures designed to attract foreign investors. They typically consist of special depreciation allowances, tax credits or rebates, special deductions for capital expenditures, tax holidays, and the reduction of tax burdens. **Financial incentives** offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. **Nonfinancial incentives** include guaranteed government purchases; special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

#### Intended to be temporary – prefer our evidence it’s in the context of previous energy incentives

Piscitello, 98  (E. Scott World Bank, and V. Susan Bogach, "Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy Development," 1998, google books, p. 10-11, accessed 2-24-13, mss]

 Incentives are Intended to be Temporary Measures. In order to (a) help reduce renewable energy technology and project development costs to levels that are competitive with conventional alternatives and (b) government expenditures/loss of revenue, financial incentives are being developed as temporary measures. The incentives are either gradually reduced during a predefined period and/or removed entirely at once. Clearly defining the time frame of the financial incentives' applicability allows project developers to structure projects and develop appropriate strategies. Failure to define the time limit may result in industries that become dependent on the financial incentives, which, in tum, become politically difficult to remove. The move toward **defining** financial incentives as a temporary measure is demonstrated in California's new approach for wind power, which offers incentives that will be gradually reduced and removed over four years. The approach will help California limit the cost of these and other financial incentives to their US$540.0 million budget. Although the framework for the United Kingdom's Nonfossil Fuel Obligation (NF FO) does not specify a time frame, it has created an implementation process in which developers and manufacturers are aware of the temporary availability of financial incentives. NFFO only supports those technologies that "in the not-too-distant future can compete without financial support," and the Government has indicated that it expects incentives for wind power to be removed within five years. Individual "Orders" are subject to government approval and can cease or be modified at any time. Therefore, technologies may be removed from future NFF O Orders if their development costs (a) do not decline or (b) have declined to the point where incentives are no longer required.

#### Two different types of policies

#### DeLaHunt 6 (John DeLaHunt, Assistant Director for Environmental Health & Safety Services in Colorado College's Facilities Services department , July-August 2006 , ( Journal of Chemical Health and Safety Volume 13, Issue 4, , Page 42 sciencedirect)

**Incentives work on a quid pro quo basis – this for that**. If you change your behavior, I’ll give you a reward. One could say that coercion is an incentive program – do as I say and I’ll let you live. However, I define an incentive as getting something you didn’t have before in exchange for new behavior, **so that pretty much puts coercion in its own box**, one **separate from incentives**.

#### Sequence is key- the aff provides the benefit now, an incentive has to be rewarded AFTER the targeted behavior changes

#### Dowling 5 (ENGLE & DOWLING 05 Allen, Univ of Eastern Kentucky, Peter, Univ of Canberra, <http://people.eku.edu/englea/GlobalrewardsWEBLJUB.pdf>.

**Incentives are defined** as promises made in exchange for performance; rewarded

## K

### AT: Case Outweighs

#### Judge is an educator, debaters are energy researchers – the ballot should endorse who’s energy production scholarship is better – that’s Holleman – they cede agency to the state – Independent reason to vote neg

**Trennel 6** (Paul, Ph.D of the University of Wales, Department of International Politics, “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security”)

Thirdly, it can be claimed that the security mindset channels the obligation to address environmental issues in an **unwelcome direction**. Due to terms laid out by the social contract “security is essentially something done by states…there is no obligation or moral duty on citizens to provide security…In this sense security is essentially empty…it is not a sign of positive political initiative” (Dalby, 1992a: 97-8). Therefore, casting an issue in security terms puts the **onus of action onto governments**, **creating a docile citizenry** who await instructions from their leaders as to the next step rather than taking it on their own backs to do something about pressing concerns. This is unwelcome because **governments have limited incentives** to act on environmental issues, as their collectively poor track record to date reveals. Paul Brown notes that “at present in all the large democracies the short-term politics of winning the next election and the need to increase the annual profits of industry rule over the long term interests of the human race” (1996: 10; see also Booth 1991: 348). There is no clearer evidence for this than the grounds on which George W. Bush explained his decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol: “I told the world I thought that Kyoto was a lousy deal for America…It meant that we had to cut emissions below 1990 levels, which would have meant I would have presided over massive layoffs and economic destruction” (BBC: 2006). The **short-term focus** of government elites and the long-term nature of the environmental threat means that any policy which puts the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of governments should be viewed with scepticism as this may have the effect of **breeding inaction** on environmental issues. Moreover, governmental legislation may not be the most appropriate route to solving the problem at hand. If environmental vulnerabilities are to be effectively addressed “[t]he routine behaviour of practically everyone must be altered” (Deudney, 1990: 465). In the case of the environmental sector it is not large scale and intentional assaults but the cumulative effect of small and seemingly innocent acts such as driving a car or taking a flight that do the damage. Exactly how a legislative response could serve to alter “non-criminal apolitical acts by individuals” (Prins, 1993: 176- 177) which lie beyond established categories of the political is unclear. Andrew Dobson has covered this ground in claiming that the **solution** to environmental hazards lies not in **piecemeal legislation** but in the fostering of a culture of ‘**ecological citizenship’**. His call is made on the grounds that **legislating** on the environment, forcing people to adapt, does not reach the necessary depth to produce long-lasting change**,** but merely plugs the problem temporarily. He cites Italian ‘car-free city’ days as evidence of this, noting that whilst selected cities may be free of automobiles on a single predetermined day, numbers return to previous levels immediately thereafter (2003: 3). This indicates that the deeper message underlying the policy is not being successfully conveyed. Enduring environmental solutions are likely to emerge **only** when **citizens choose to change their ways** because they understand that there exists a pressing need to do so. Such a realisation is **unlikely** to be prompted by the **top-down**, state oriented focus supplied by a security framework.

### 2NC – Framework

#### The ballot should foreground process oriented critiques – their obsession on the product of our method causes symptom-focused scholarship – reproduces gendered economic rationality

\*\*\*[PBL = Problem-Based Learning]

Spencer and Nichols 5 (Spencer M.E. – Professor at U of Montevallo - Majors bodies of work on Eco-feminism, embodiment, and elementary science education, Sherry E. – Associate Professor, Science Education Department of Curriculum and Instruction, “Exploring Environmental Education Through Ecofeminism: Narratives of Embodiment of Science,” *The Inclusion of Environmental Education in Science Teacher Education*)

Just as there are many forms of feminism, so too are there many philosophies of ecofeminism, yet all tend to focus on naturism as a central feminist issue (Henderson 1997). According to Warren ( 1997), naturism is “the unjustified domination of nature,” which reflects the ways that women have been and continue to be dominated (p. 4). Ecofeminism resides at the junction of feminism, science and technology, and native perspectives. Through acknowledgement of all parts and processes of the Earth having equal value, ecofeminism embraces the interconnectedness and value of every living being and nonliving entity (Marchant 1980). When nonhuman nature is viewed as a means of sustenance, a source of beauty, or a thing to be controlled through what is erroneously defined as caring, then an anthropocentric worldview is all that is possible. Plumwood ( 1 99 7 ) claimed that “the critique of anthropocentrism, however, unlike the other critiques of centrism, continues to be denied legitimacy in many quarters” (p. 328). Anthropocentric worldviews, even if veiled in notions of caring for environment or nature, **perpetuate ideas of domination** and quite possibly oppression. Nonhuman nature, from an ecofeminist perspective, does not exist in a structure that allows for domination; rather nonhuman nature is deeply and inextricably interwoven with human nature. Environmental education when taught or experienced from an anthropocentric stance rejects embodiment of environment through **ways other than what would be deemed acceptable scientific practices** and beliefs including the hierarchy of nature. We concur with Berman (1994) in that our actions as humans against or for the nonhuman beings in our world depend on our values and beliefs. We often fail to value what we do not understand: things such as garter snakes. Many teachers tend to exhibit an anthropocentric worldview; in other words, “human-centered” rather than life-centered (Plumwood 1997; Warren 1990). During one of the final inter - views, Sally shared how her thoughts had started to change: “For the first time I am beginning to see the big picture connection between science and myself.” As we ponder the interconnectedness between humans and all nonhuman nature and non - living things, we find ourselves in agreement with Kaufman et al. (2003), “The dominant culture does not value embodied knowing, and hence we believe that this ability is not ordinarily explored or expanded as we grow” (p. 138). Science educators and others concerned with science teaching and learning must begin to recognize multiple ways of knowing environment **other than conventional ways**, which often problematize nature and silence the voices of those who are aware of alternative notions of embodied environment. Science educators and others concerned with science teaching and learning must begin to recognize multiple ways of knowing environment other than conventional ways, which often problematize nature and silence the voices of those who are aware of alternative notions of embodied environment. Many activities in the Project curricula (such as Project WILD and Project Learning Tree) espouse mere conservation of the environment or focus only on local bioregional aspects of environment and may fall short of the goal of educating an environmentally literate citizenry. From an ecofeminist perspective, environmental education curricula and programs including science taught in elementary schools in the United States today fail to emphasize “the importance of the continuance of the Earth’s delicate balances and the interconnectedness and sacredness of all life” (Giuliano 1998, p. 14). Elementary science teachers who teach about environment must “help all students to embrace the concept of the web of life and the interdependence of all things” (Giuliano 1998, p. 15) through pedagogical strategies and lived experiences that promote embodiment of environment. Discussion From embracing ecofeminism as a powerful tool and lens with which to critique pedagogical practices and to “extricate patriarchy from nature” (Warren 1990), we now turn to the “problem” of using PBL in environmental education. **PBL has been extensively used as a pedagogical strategy** in medical, nursing, law, engineering, and education colleges and K–12 schools. However, research related to the use of PBL with elementary environmental education remains nonexistent to our knowledge. Part of the appeal of using PBL with environmental education was its underlying philosophical stance of understanding emerging from interactions with content in context. Additionally, PBL’s focus on students’ active construction of knowledge through collaborative learning about “real-world” problems and the synthesis of knowledge across disciplinary boundaries appeared to contain many of the attributes of what is commonly referred to as “best practices” in science teaching and learning (e.g. active engagement with content in an “authentic” context, student ownership, and responsibility for one’s own learning). Through the process of engaging in PBL activities, the participants had not only learned the steps in the pedagogical strategy, but also that **nature was a problem to be solved by humans**. In this study, Greentree University’s campus had been used as an ecosystem model, where participants had been taught to identify “problems” in and with nature that could be solved, without paying little or any attention to the source of the problem

in this case – human actions. For example, one problem the participants engaged in solving was the erosion around a new building site on cam - pus. Another PBL activity was the runoff of pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizer from a nearby golf course into the lake where the slider was found. Never was the question raised regarding the impact of overpopulation of humans on the environment; it was just seen as “progress and growth.” As I modeled and used PBL with my participants, 1 day I became acutely and painfully aware of the lessons about feminism and nature that I had unknowingly taught. Believing that my participants’ perceptions were being respected and that learning and senses of efficacy related to science teaching and learning were increasing, I erroneously thought feminism must be at the heart of PBL. The turtle narrative, presented at the beginning of this chapter, provides examples of the pro - motion of anthropocentric ideals and the reification of the domination of nature. Participants’ separation from nature, even though not in the physical sense, contributed to their understanding of nature as something we should or could control. Utilization of patriarchal structures, such as a strong focus and control of time on task and adherence to preset goals that participants **had no control over** or contribution to, had further **inhibited** corporeal and intercorporeal embodiment of science teaching and learning and environment. PBL provided as a teaching and **learning strategy** positioned science and nature as a **set of problems to be solved** and further reinforced the perceived divide between humans and nonhuman nature. Making a turn from what has been a theoretical discussion, we would now like to propose practical consideration for environmental education premised on ecofeminist philosophy. While problems-based pedagogy is appropriate for many areas of science education, we argue that it is antithetical to humans’ meaningful understanding of the environment. Accordingly, for environmental and science educators and science teacher educators, we would offer ecofeminism as a supporting philosophy to guide many of the existing models presently in use. To provide an example, we offer a learning cycle/5E instructional model (Bybee 1997) based on ecofeminism. The following provides guiding questions, which might be considered in planning components of a 5E learning experience. At this point, we were tempted to re -illustrate or create a graphic re -presenting an ecofeminist learning cycle model. In doing so, however, this would only rein - state a patriarchal and reified vision, which is antithetical to our premises of ecofeminist environmental education. Accordingly, we provide a narrative that reflects the sort of dialogue that we referenced earlier in this chapter. As we revisit the statement made earlier ...dialogue and action must be taken to enable learners to experience science...and situate humans being part of the natural environment, we now conclude by offering the following insights into a notion of an ecofeminist learning cycle. Teachers in the class gave the slider to me expecting me to “fix it.” Looking back on that particular experience, I now see that they appeared willing to give up their power of knowledge to me, the “expert.” From a feminist stance, this was not what was expected nor desired. After the slider died and had been de-fleshed, I placed the skeleton on my desk. Some of the teachers expressed sadness, anger, curiosity, and indifference. Angry teachers were quite vocal as they expressed their feelings of disgust, disillusionment, and madness directly at me for not “fixing” slider. Now looking back at that interaction, I believe they had made a turn– they did not relinquish power over their own experience and learning, instead they espoused their feelings and expected to be heard. From a feminist view, there was no longer a barrier between me, the teacher, and them, the learners. In essence, what took place within our community of learners served as a parallel to what and how we could envision learning in and about environment.

how this philosophy was, and may be, enacted.

### Renewables LW

#### **Renewable energy covers up the root causes of environmental destruction – Reject the aff – the plan locks-in an unsustainable energy system that co-opts alternatives**

Byrne et al 9

(John, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, the Center is a leading institution for interdisciplinary graduate education, research, and advocacy in energy and environmental policy, Member of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) since 1992, 2007 Nobel Peace Prize with the Panel's authors and review editors, <http://bst.sagepub.com/content/29/2/81.full.pdf+html>)

Contesting the imagery is difficult. Big Wind resisters cite noise, bird mortality, and the industrialization of heretofore largely untrammeled land and seascapes in their arguments against Big Wind farms. But supporters counter with scientific evidence offered by experts ranging from ornithologists to acoustics specialists and underscore the larger threat of global warming in defense of these carbon-free alternatives. Importantly, the green energy case pits one set of environmental values against another, and depends on the priority of climate change to win out. But equally important, the environmental case for green energy fails to challenge the affluence-based development path secured by earlier energy systems. **Rather than questioning** the **underlying premise** of modern society to **produce and consume without constraint**, contemporary green energy advocates warmly embrace creating “bigger and more complex machines to spur and sate an endlessly increasing world energy demand” (Byrne & Toly, 2006, p. 3) Marketing slogans originally justifying fossil energy-based obesity can be revamped to suit the new green energy agenda: choosier mothers choose renewables and better living through green energy will motivate the postclimate change consumer to do the right thing. Yet the green energy agenda **will not change the cause of** the **global warming** threat (**and** so many other **environmental harms**), namely, unlimited consumption and production. In this sense, large renewable energy systems, touted as saviors of the planet, actually appear **mainly to save modernity**. A final problem specific to an extra-large green energy project is the distinctive environmental alienation it can produce. The march of commodification is spurred by the green titans as they seek to enter historic commons areas such as mountain passes, pasture lands, coastal areas, and the oceans, in order to collect renewable energy. Although it is not possible to formally privatize the wind or solar radiation (for example), the extensive technological lattices created to harvest renewable energy on a grand scale functionally preempt commons management of these resources.10 Previous efforts to harness the kinetic energy of flowing waters should have taught the designers of the mega-green energy program and their environmental allies that environmental and social effects will be massive and will preempt commons-based, society-nature relations. Instead of learning this lesson, the **technophilic awe** that inspired earlier energy obesity now emboldens efforts to tame the winds, waters, and sunlight—the final frontiers of he society-nature commons—all to serve the revised modern ideal of **endless**, but low- to no- carbon emitting, economic growth. Paradigm Shift Shedding the institutions that created the prospect of climate change **will not happen** on the watch of the green titans or extra large nuclear power. The modern cornucopian political economy fueled by abundant, carbon-free energy machines will, in fact, risk the possibility of climate change **continually because of the core properties of the modern institutional design**.

### Heg

#### Hegemony makes great power wars more likely – Transition war and stabilization theory are wrong and rationalizes aggression that causes structural violence that outweigh the aff

Sjoberg 10 (Laura, Assoc. Prof of Poli Sci @ U of Florida, Gender and International Security: Feminist Perspectives, p 85-90)

**\*\*\*[PTT = Power Transition Theory]**

A feminist approach suggests several critiques of the PTT research agenda which **question the accuracy** of its **causal explanations**, the normative value of its definitions, and the appropriateness of its **empirical predictions**. Feminists argue that gender expectations and assumptions are a constitutive and causal force in global politics. 35 PTT’s failure to acknowledge gender in global politics is reflected in its definition of power, its normative commitment to elitist assumptions about the relevant actors in global politics, and the variables used to explain empirical phenomena. Power in power transition theory Power transition theorists see power as “the ability to impose one state’s will on another.” 36 Feminists identify this interpretation as “power-over” 37 and critique its conceptual narrowness and gendered content. 38 Power-over means that ideologies “suit the changing interests of those in power, and not those whose lives are controlled by them.” 38 This is particularly evident in PTT’s explanation of how a state obtains power(-over). PTT explains the acquisition of power as having three dimensions: population, productivity, and political efficiency. 40 As Tammen et al. explain, “ population is the sine qua non for great power status ” because it is “ the potential resource pool that a nation can begin to mobilize for its economic development ”and “ultimately determines in the long run which nations will remain major powers.” 41 Power transition theorists seem unaware that women’s rights vary inversely with population increases. 42 The same is true of labor productivity. States that increase labor productivity do so by augmenting the export sector. Women fill these new jobs, which are underpaid and risky. Women who had previously been in the household are often still expected to fulfill their household functions. 43 PTT’s view of power also sets up future conflicts. Power-over means that the accumulation of power is necessarily competitive and zero-sum, making conflict likely if not necessary. Viewing power as zero-sum also presumes a stark distinction between self (state) and other(state) where the advantages of accumulated power can be confined to its accumulator. Some states (even “great states”) are not primarily or even secondarily concerned with the competitive acquisition of power. 44 In a globalized world, not all power acquisitions are zero-sum. Presuming the **necessity of competition** puts global politics on a **path towards conflict**, and assuming that power acquisitions can be contained misrepresents the distribution of gains. Feminists argue that people and states without power-over are not powerless. As Allen argues, “To think about power solely in terms of domination neglects the power that women do have ... empowerment.” 45 In fact, “the need to theorize power that women retain in spite of masculine domination” has led feminists to explore different sources and manifestations of power. Two important results are understandings of power which Allen categorizes as “power-to ” and “ power with. ” 46 Power-to is “the capacity of an agent to act in spite of or in response to power wielded over her by others” (i.e., rebellion or revolt). 47 Power-with is the ability to act in concert with other weak actors to match the strength of the dominant power. 48 In this interpretation, “by emphasizing plurality and community ... [feminist theory] consciously seeks to distance power from domination” and understands power “collaboratively. ” 49 PTT focuses on great states to explain the dynamics of international security. Power transition theorists explain that PTT “attacks the central issue of world politics — great power stability.” 54 Great power stability matters because the dominant state defines the structure of the international system. Feminist perspectives question both the state-centrism of PTT and its focus on big states. First, feminists interrogate the state-centrism of PTT. PTT assumes that the state is unitary with definable interests. Feminists define security in broad terms. In these terms, a “secure” world would be one without physical, structural, 55 or ecological violence. 56 Security threats are also found in threats to individual lives at the margins of global politics, such as hunger, disease, sexual violence, and small arms. 57 Feminist research has shown how those at the political margins can **become insecure** even while states are becoming more secure. Women ’ s bodies have been considered the means to an end in debates over the US security force in South Korea, the prevalence of and possible solutions to AIDS, and debates about refugee camp composition, to name a few. 58 These threats are often **more vicious than** the threat of **great power war**. 59 Because many feminists see individual security as central, they critique the hierarchy that PTT values. Feminist theorizing, as a “commitment to under- standing the world from the perspective of the socially subjugated,” recognizes that the least fortunate are the people who are excluded from the consideration of decision-makers and grand theorists. 60 Feminist theorists have been critical of hierarchy for the pressure that it puts on the “bottom.” PTT does not share this interest. In PTT, “the international system is viewed as a pyramid-shaped hierarchy” where “ at the very top tier is the system ’ s dominant power. The next tier contains the great powers, followed by the medium and small powers. ” 61 PTT’s policy prescriptions demonstrate that power transition theorists not only see the model as accurate, they believe it is beneficial. Tammen et al. characterize small powers as irrelevant because they “pose no threat to the dominant nation’s leadership in the international system.” 62 PTT suggests that a dominant nation should convince challengers to live in a world stacked against their interest, because “a dominant nation that successfully co-opts potential challengers ensures that the international status quo will be preserved.

” 63 In other words, PTT has a normative investment in a hierarchical international system. Rather than endorse domination, some feminist theorists argue that empathy and care should be seen as alternatives to domination. Christine Sylvester explains that “empathy rests on the ability and willingness to enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully. It is to hear ... and be transformed in part by our appreciation. ” 64 An empathetic approach “enables respectful negotiations with contentious others because we can recognize involuntary similarities across difference as well as differences that mark independent identity.” 65 As such, “there is no arrogance of uniqueness” and “precious little committed defensiveness.” 66 Instead of an international structure which excludes most citizens of the world, some feminists suggest connectedness as an alternative structure. 67 Explanatory variables in great power politics Gender dynamics also act on the empirical phenomena PTT studies. Even taking the subject matter of PTT (great power competition) on its own merits, feminist analyses question the causal mechanisms that PTT uses. PTT considers power parity and dissatisfaction. These variables cannot explain the events of interest to PTT for two major reasons. First, while the power transition scenario envisions a possibility that a peaceful power transition takes place where the challenger is satisfied, the internal logic of PTT makes that a contradiction in terms. Elsewhere, PTT explains that other states are dissatisfied with the status quo international order because it was put in place by the hegemon for its own benefit. 68 Challengers are, by definition, dissatisfied. Second, parity of material power- over can be very different depending on the influence of power-to and power-with. Additional forces may be acting on the propensity of great powers to come into conflict. One such force is international system patriarchy. Patriarchy is “ the structural and ideological system that perpetuates the privileging of masculinity. ” 69 Feminists have identified “ patriarchy as a **principal cause** for so many of the world ’ s processes [such as] empire-building, globalization, modernization. ” 70 Enloe details: Patriarchal systems are notable for marginalizing the feminine. That is, insofar as any society or group is patriarchal, it is there that it is comfortable — unquestioned — to infantilize, ignore, trivialize, or even actively cast scorn upon what is thought to be feminized. 71 In an international system of patriarchy, one would expect that dominance would be the ultimate place of honor, and states would strive to approximate that position. Feminist work suggests that international system patriarchy could be a key explanatory component of great power (and other) conflict in the international arena. 72 PTT’s research question might be rephrased to ask why, at the moment of equality, great powers are most likely to engage in conflict. Feminists might suggest that relatively equal great powers come to blows because of state masculinity. States compete to **prove their masculinity, irrespective of power parity**. For example, as Ann Tickner explains, “ The 1991 Persian Gulf War was frequently depicted as a personal contest between Saddam Hussein and George H. W. Bush and described in appropriate locker-room or football language. ” 73 In states’ competitions, the winner ’ s masculinity is affirmed, while the loser ’ s masculinity is subordinated. In the dominant narrative of the First Gulf War, the US ’“ tough but tender ” ideal-typical masculinity saved Kuwait ’ s helpless femininity from Iraq ’ s “ hypermasculinity. ” 74 The masculinity of the US was affirmed and valorized while Iraq’s masculinity was called into doubt. 75 Feminist theorists have used the term “hegemonic masculinity” as an analytical tool to understand this competition. According to Charlotte Hooper, “Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to a range of subordinated masculinities in opposition to femininity.” 76 In describing a state’s hegemonic masculinity, feminists argue that “the state organizational practices are structured in relation to the reproductive arena.” 77 An ideal-typical masculinity establishes cultural hegemony through moral persuasion and consent, entrenched ideological ascendency, and an ethos of coercion. 78 Hegemonic masculinity consists of the attributes that “ are most widely subscribed to — and least questioned — in a given social formation: the ‘ common sense ’ of gender as subscribed to by all men save those whose masculinity is oppositional or deviant. ” 79 Each hegemonic masculinity is the set of standards to which men are expected to aspire. Hegemonic or ideal-typical masculinities have been linked to states’ contextual understandings of heroism on the battle field. Feminists have argued that “some men fight wars while other men could fight wars; war-fighting is always tied to the image of masculinity.” 80 Judith Gardam has explained that, often, “the social construct of what it is to be male ... is represented by the male warrior, the defender of the security of the state.” 81 In these models, “masculinity, virility, and violence have been linked together.” 82 Feminists have long argued that hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in ordering the international system. 83 For example, Steve Niva describes the hegemonic “tough but tender” US masculinity during the First Gulf War as valuing bravery on the battle field and sympathy and care for civilians. 84 A number of feminist scholars have noted that, some- times, a state’s hegemonic masculinity becomes **reactionary** or “hypermasculine ” in **response to threat**. 85 Feminists have identified elements of state hypermasculinity in the US in the post-9/11 era, as well as in the Spanish-American War and the beginning of the Cold War. 86 Feminists argue that variations in the characteristics and salience of a state’s hegemonic masculinity over time influence state behavior. Feminist research suggests that the question of whether two powerful states come into conflict as they reach “ power parity ” might result from the characteristics of the ideal-typical masculinity in that state at the time. In such a scenario, conflict becomes more likely when states ’ hegemonic understandings of masculinity involve conquest, war heroism, competition, aggressiveness, or fighting; or some sense of racial or cultural superiority vis-à-vis a challenger. On the other hand, conflict would be less likely when states’ hegemonic understandings of masculinity involved tenderness, stoicism, restraint, or responsibility.

## Cp

**Naval power is good for nothing**

**Reed 8** [John T. Reed, West Point Graduate and platoon leader in the 82nd Airborne Division., June, 2008.<"Are U.S. Navy surface ships sitting ducks to enemies with modern weapons?"http://www.johntreed.com/sittingducks.html]

I have read media stories that said whenever the U.S. Navy did computer war games against the Soviet Union, all significant U.S. Navy surface ships were destroyed by the Soviets within about **20 minutes** of the start of the computerized war. How? Nukes. A reader says that the Soviet submarines in the Cuban missile crisis had nuclear torpedoes which they would have used if we did an amphibious landing. I have no way to confirm that. Although the Navy ships and their carrier-based planes perform spectacularly well against third-rate enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq, I wonder how they would do against Argentina or any other enemy equipped with modern weapons. In short, I wonder if **U.S. Navy surface vessels are obsolete.** Think about it. They are large, slow-moving, metal objects that float on the surface of the ocean—in the Twenty-First Century! Ocean liners were the main way to get across the oceans for civilian passengers until the second half of the Twentieth Century. Since then, most people have used planes because they are much faster and cheaper. Except the U.S. military. Civilians essentially got rid of their “navy” around 1950. Only the hidebound military would still have a Navy in the Twenty-First Century. Nowadays, civilians only ride passenger ships for pleasure cruises. An argument can be made that the Navy does the same. Only maybe the old line, “you can tell the men from the boys by the size of their toys” is a more accurate way to put it. Navy brass want to grow up to captain a ship. A big ship. The bigger the better. Before WW II, they wanted to be captains of battleships. After WW II, British historian B.H. Liddell Hart said, “A battleship had long been to an admiral what a cathedral is to a bishop.” Now Navy officers want to captain aircraft carriers. Very exciting. Very romantic. Great fun. But obsolete. WW II in the Pacific last time they were not obsolete The last time we used them to fight worthy opponents was in the Pacific during World War II. At that time, warring navies had to send out slow-moving patrol planes to search for the enemy’s ships. The motion picture Midway does an excellent job of showing both the Japanese and the Americans doing this. Low-visibility weather would often hide ships back then. Easily detected- Those days are long gone. Surface ships are not only easily seen by the human eye absent fog or clouds, they are also easily detected, pinpointed, and tracked by such technologies as radar, sonar, infrared detectors, motion detectors, noise detectors, magnetic field detectors, and so forth. Nowadays, you can probably create an Exocet-type, anti-ship missile from stuff you could buy at Radio Shack. Surface ships can no longer hide from the enemy like they did in World War II. Satellites- Satellites and spy planes obviate the need for World War II-type patrol planes and blimps, unless someone shoots them down, in which case planes can accomplish the same thing.. Too slow- Anti-ship missiles can travel at speeds up to, what, 20,000 miles an hour in the case of an ICBM aimed at a carrier task force. Carriers move at 30 knots or so which is 34.6 miles per hour. Too thin-skinned- Can you armor the ships so anti-ship missiles do not damage them? Nope. They have to stay relatively light so they can float and go 34.6 miles per hour. Cannot defend themselves-Can you arm them with anti-missile defenses? They are trying. They have electronic Gatling guns that automatically shoot down the incoming missiles. But no doubt those Gatling guns have a certain capacity as to number of targets they can hit at a time and range and ammunition limitations. They also, like any mechanical device, would malfunction at times. Generally, one would expect that if the enemy fired enough missiles at a Gatling-gun-equipped ship, one or more would eventually get through. How many? Let’s say the capacity of an aircraft carrier and its entourage body-guard ships to stop simultaneous Exocet-type anti-ship missiles is X. The enemy then need only simultaneously fire X + 1 such missiles to damage or sink the carrier. In the alternative, the enemy could fire one Exocet-type missile at a time at the carrier. Unless they are programmed otherwise, having only one such target, all the relevant guns would fire at it, thereby exhausting the carrier task force’s anti- missile ammunition more quickly, in which case fewer than X +1 Exocet-type missiles might be enough to put the carrier out of action. As Japan’s top WW II Admiral Yamamoto said, There is no such thing as an unsinkable ship. The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants. U.S. warships also have electronic warfare jamming devices that screw up the guidance systems of some types of incoming missiles. These, of course, are ineffective against nuclear-tipped missiles that need little guidance. Furthermore, if the enemy uses 20,000-miles-per-hour nuclear missiles, there is no known anti-missile defense. They move too fast for the electronic Gatling guns and do not need to ever get within the Gatling guns’ range to destroy the ships. Our enemy certainly would use nukes if they had enough of them and were in an all-out war against us. Cannot hide, run, or defend themselves In summary, Navy surface ships cannot hide from a modern enemy. They cannot run from a modern enemy. And they cannot defend themselves against a modern enemy. Accordingly, they are only useful for action against backward enemies like Afghanistan and Iraq or drug smugglers.

**Naval power not key to heg or stability**

**Goure 10** [Daniel, Department of Defense Transition Team, “Can the Case be Made for Naval Power?” Lexington Institute, 2 July 2010, http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/can-the-case-be-made-for-naval-power-?a=1&c=1171]

More broadly, it appears that the nature of the security challenges confronting the U.S. has changed dramatically over the past several decades. There are only a few places where even large-scale conventional conflict can be considered possible. None of these would be primarily maritime in character although U.S. naval forces could make a significant contribution by employing its offensive and defensive capabilities over land. For example, the administration’s current plan is to rely on sea-based Aegis missile defenses to protect regional allies and U.S. forces until a land-based variant of that system can be developed and deployed. The sea ways, sometimes called the global commons, are predominantly free of dangers. The exception to this is the chronic but relatively low level of piracy in some parts of the world. So, the classic reasons for which nations build navies, to protect its own shores and its commerce or to place the shores and commerce of other states in jeopardy, seem relatively unimportant in today’s world.

## Case

### Solvency

#### Renewables fail

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross 12, senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, “Powering Guantánamo”, August 2, <http://gunpowderandlead.org/2012/08/powering-guantanamo/>

The Naval Station Guantánamo Bay is separate from JTF-GTMO (the latter being responsible for detentions). However, it faces some issues that other overseas bases simply do not. First and foremost, it is the only naval station located in a country with which the U.S. does not have diplomatic relations. As the U.S.’s oldest overseas base, the country has been making use of this territory since February 1903, when it first leased 45 square miles of land to use as a coaling station. In 1934, a treaty between the U.S. and Cuba affirmed the lease agreement, with the stipulation that the lease could not be terminated unless the U.S. and Cuba both agreed to it, or the U.S. abandoned the base. International agreements do not simply expire following revolutions, and hence the U.S. legally maintained its base at Guantánamo Bay even after the Fidel Castro-led revolution. However, in February 1964 Castro cut off water and other avenues of supply to the base, which forced it to be self-sustaining. It has been self-sustaining for more than forty years, generating its own power and — as of 2012 — desalinating about 1.2 million gallons of water per day. Before “war on terror” detainees were moved to Gitmo, the base was almost in a caretaker status. That is, enough people were kept on the base to keep it going, but no money was put into maintaining buildings that were unlikely to be used again. So when JTF-GTMO began, the base was not fully manned: instead, the basic functions included guarding the perimeter, refueling ships coming through, and upkeep of the base. Most of the prominent base facilities — including the Starbucks and McDonald’s that Today’s Zaman specifically noted — are recent additions, specifically created to serve the needs that arose after JTF-GTMO’s establishment.”The JTF was created and suddenly you had a lot more people here, and that created the need to build up the base,” Nettleton told me. “All of a sudden you had a doubling of our base population. You had to feed them, clothe them, build new buildings.” Today there are over 5,400 personnel at the Naval Station Guantánamo Bay, including about 2,435 military and 2,965 civilians (of whom about 1,570 military and 320 civilian personnel are attached to the JTF). Because the base has to be self-sustaining — and because food, supplies, building materials, etc. have to be brought in from elsewhere — that significantly increases costs at the naval station. One thing that I found particularly interesting is that a large percentage of the base’s electrical power comes from liquid fuels. Costs are not just related to the expense of the fuels themselves, but also the expense of bringing them to the naval station in the first place. Given the military’s push for green energy, I wondered if this might be an area where the base could save money in the long term. To be clear, one of the very prominent features of the Guantánamo naval station is four windmills atop one of the hills (only three of which are functioning at present). However, only 2-3% of the base’s electricity on any given day is generated by the windmills. Based on the sheer amount of sunlight it experiences, Guantánamo Bay also seems like it could be an ideal place to harness solar energy. And indeed, the base features a small solar field that is set inside an old high school running track that is no longer in use. But like the windmills, this solar field does not make a significant dent in the base’s overall electricity consumption.

### Grid

#### Status quo solves islanding---the military figured out their advantage and fixed it

Michael Aimone 9-12, Director, Business Enterprise Integration, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 9/12/12, Statement Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection and Security Technologies, http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20-%20Aimone.pdf

DoD’s facility energy strategy is also **focused heavily on grid security** in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department’s fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense Science Board warned that DoD’s reliance on a fragile power grid to deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk.1 Standby Power Generation Currently, DoD ensures that it can **continue mission critical activities on base** largely **through** its fleet of **on-site power generation equipment**. This equipment is connected to essential mission systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid outage. In addition, each installation has **standby generators** in storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production specialists ensure that the generators are **primed and ready to work**, and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD maintains a **strategic stockpile of electrical power generators** and support equipment that is kept in **operational readiness**. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base recovery.

# 1nr

### ! – US – China War – Ext. Wall

-China war escalates- draws in Russia and creates Indo-Pak and Middle East Conflict

Straits Times -2K (Straits Times, June, 25, 2000, No one gains in war over Taiwan] (PDNSS2115)

THE DOOMSDAY SCENARIO -THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibilityof a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase: Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Annaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

China-Russia war causes extinction

**Sharavin ’01** (Alexander, Defense and Security, 10/3)

Chinese propaganda has constantly been showing us skyscrapers in free trade zones in southeastern China. It should not be forgotten, however, that some 250 to 300 million people live there, i.e. at most a quarter of China's population. A billion Chinese people are still living in misery. For them, even the living standards of a backwater Russian town remain inaccessibly high. They have absolutely nothing to lose. There is every prerequisite for "the final throw to the north." The strength of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (CPLA) has been growing quicker than the Chinese economy. A decade ago the CPLA was equipped with inferior copies of Russian arms from late 1950s to the early 1960s. However, through its own efforts Russia has nearly managed to liquidate its most significant technological advantage. Thanks to our zeal, from antique MiG-21 fighters of the earliest modifications and S-75 air defense missile systems the Chinese antiaircraft defense forces have adopted Su-27 fighters and S-300 air defense missile systems. China's air defense forces have received Tor systems instead of anti-aircraft guns which could have been used during World War II. The shock air force of our "eastern brethren" will in the near future replace antique Tu-16 and Il-28 airplanes with Su-30 fighters, which are not yet available to the Russian Armed Forces! Russia may face the "wonderful" prospect of combating the Chinese army, which, if full mobilization is called, is comparable in size with Russia's entire population, which also has nuclear weapons (even tactical weapons become strategic if states have common borders) and would be absolutely insensitive to losses (even a loss of a few million of the servicemen would be acceptable for China). Such a war would be more horrible than the World War II. It would require from our state maximal tension, universal mobilization and complete accumulation of the army military hardware, up to the last tank or a plane, in a single direction (we would have to forget such "trifles" like Talebs and Basaev, but this does not guarantee success either). Massive nuclear strikes on basic military forces and cities of China would finally be the only way out, what would exhaust Russia's armament completely. We have not got another set of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based missiles, whereas the general forces would be extremely exhausted in the border combats. In the long run, even if the aggression would be stopped after the majority of the Chinese are killed, our country would be absolutely unprotected against the "Chechen" and the "Balkan" variants both, and even against the first frost of a possible nuclear winter.

Middle East escalates to nuclear use

Steinbach -02 (John, Center for Research on Globalization, 3-3, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html)

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)

Indo-Pak war causes extinction

Toon ’07 (et al, O. B. Toon -- Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, -- “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism” – Atmospheric Chemistry & Physics – April 19th -- http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/1973/2007/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf)

We assess the potential damage and smoke production associated with the detonation of small nuclear weapons in modern megacities. While the number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen by about a factor of three since its peak in 1986, the number of nuclear weapons states is increasing and the potential exists for numerous regional nuclear arms races. Eight countries are known to have nuclear weapons, 2 are constructing them, and an additional 32 nations already have the fissile material needed to build substantial arsenals of low-yield (Hiroshima-sized) explosives. Population and economic activity worldwide are congregated to an increasing extent in megacities, which might be targeted in a nuclear conflict. We find that low yield weapons, which new nuclear powers are likely to construct, can produce **100 times as many fatalities and 100 times as much smoke** from fires per kt yield as previously estimated in analyses *for full scale nuclear wars* using high-yield weapons, if the small weapons are targeted at city centers. A single “small” nuclear detonation in an urban center could lead to more fatalities, in some cases by orders of magnitude, than have occurred in the major historical conflicts of many countries. We analyze the likely outcome of a regional nuclear exchange involving 100 15-kt explosions (less than 0.1% of the explosive yield of the current global nuclear arsenal). We find that such an exchange could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. Megacities exposed to atmospheric fallout of long-lived radionuclides would likely be abandoned indefinitely, with severe national and international implications. Our analysis shows that smoke from urban firestorms in a regional war would rise into the upper troposphere due to pyro-convection. Robock et al. (2007) show that the smoke would subsequently rise deep into the stratosphere due to atmospheric heating, and then might induce significant climatic anomalies on global scales. We also anticipate substantial perturbations of global ozone. While there are many uncertainties in the predictions we make here, the principal unknowns are the type and scale of conflict that might occur. The scope and severity of the hazards identified pose a significant threat to the global community. They deserve careful analysis by governments worldwide advised by a broad section of the world scientific community, as well as widespread public debate.  In the 1980s, quantitative studies of the consequences of a nuclear conflict between the superpowers provoked international scientific and political debate, and deep public concern (Crutzen and Birks, 1982; Turco et al., 1983; Pittock et al., 1985). The resulting recognition that such conflicts could produce global scale damage at unacceptable levels contributed to an ongoing reduction of nuclear arsenals and improvements in relationships between the major nuclear powers. Here we discuss the effects of the use of a single nuclear weapon by a state or terrorist. We then provide the first comprehensive quantitative study of the consequences of a nuclear conflict involving multiple weapons between the emerging smaller nuclear states. Robock et al. (2007) explore the climate changes that might occur due to the smoke emissions from such a conflict. The results of this study show that the potential effects of nuclear explosions having yields similar to those of the weapons used over Japan during the Second World War (WW-II) are, in relation to yield, unexpectedly large. At least eight countries are capable of transport and detonation of such nuclear devices. Moreover, North Korea appears to have a growing stockpile of warheads, and Iran is suspiciously pursuing uranium enrichment – a necessary precursor to weapons construction. Thirty-two other countries that do not now have nuclear weapons possess sufficient fissionable nuclear materials to construct weapons, some in a relatively short period of time. For these nations, a regional conflict involving modest numbers of 15-kiloton (kt, the TNT explosive yield equivalent) weapons to attack cities could cause casualties that exceed, in some cases by orders of magnitude, their losses in previous conflicts. Indeed, in some case, the casualties can rival previous estimates for a limited strategic war between the superpowers involving thousands of weapons carrying several thousand megatons (Mt) of yield. Early radioactive fallout from small nuclear ground bursts would leave large sections of target areas contaminated and effectively uninhabitable. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were attacked by airbursts, which will not deposit large amounts of local radiation unless it is raining. They were continuously inhabited.) Because of the smoke released in fires ignited by detonations, there is a possibility that 100 15-kt weapons used against city centers would produce global climate disturbances unprecedented in recorded human history (Robock et al., 2007). An individual in possession of one of the thousands of existing lightweight nuclear weapons could kill or injure a million people in a terrorist attack. Below we first discuss the arsenals of the existing, and potential, nuclear powers. We then describe the casualties due to blast and to fires set by thermal radiation from an attack on a single megacity with one low yield nuclear weapon. Next we discuss the casualties if current and projected arsenals of such weapons were ever used in a regional conflict. We then discuss the impact of radioactive contamination. Finally, we describe the amounts of smoke that may be generated in a regional scale conflict. At the end of each of these sections we outline the associated uncertainties. We have attempted to employ realistic scenarios in this analysis. However, we do not have access to the war plans of any countries, nor to verifiable data on existing nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, or plans to develop, build or deploy nuclear weapons. There are obviously many possible pathways for regional conflicts to develop. Opinions concerning the likelihood of a regional nuclear war range from highly improbable to apocalyptic. Conservatism in such matters requires that a range of plausible scenarios be considered, given the availability of weapons hardware and the history of regional conflict. In the present analysis, we adopt two potential scenarios: i) a single small nuclear device detonated in a city center by terrorists; and ii) a regional nuclear exchange between two newly minted nuclear weapons states involving a total of 100 low yield (15-kt) detonations. We do not justify these scenarios any further except to note that most citizens and politicians today are aware of the potential disaster of an Israeli-Iranian-Syrian nuclear confrontation, or a Indian-Pakistani territorial confrontation. Moreover, as nuclear weapons knowledge and implementation proliferates, the possible number and combinations of flash points multiplies. The fact that nuclear weapons of the type assumed here have been used in past hostilities substantiates the idea that such scenarios as we propose are executable.

US-China war escalates- subs increase risk for miscalc

Twomey, co-director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School, 2009 (Christopher P., Arms Control Today, January/February, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009\_01-02/china\_us\_dangerous\_dynamism)

Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

### AT: No CCP Lashout

#### Regime collapse causes nuclear lash-out

Rexing ’05 (San – Epoch Times International – August 3rd -- http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

#### Regime collapse causes China-India war

Cohen ’02 (Stephen, Senior Fellow – Brookings Institution, “Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War in South Asia: An Unknowable Future”, May, http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/views/speeches/cohens20020501.pdf)

A similar argument may be made with respect to China. China is a country that has had its share of upheavals in the past. While there is no expectation today of renewed internal turmoil, it is important to remember that closed authoritarian societies are subject to deep crisis in moments of sudden change. The breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the turmoil that has ravaged many members of the former communist bloc are examples of what could happen to China. A severe economic crisis, rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang, a reborn democracy movement and a party torn by factions could be the ingredients of an unstable situation. A vulnerable Chinese leadership determined to bolster its shaky position by an aggressive policy toward India or the United States or both might become involved in a major crisis with India, perhaps engage in nuclear saber-rattling. That would encourage India to adopt a stronger nuclear posture, possibly with American assistance.

#### Causes nuclear use

Jonathan S. Landay, National Security and Intelligence Correspondent, -2K [“Top Administration Officials Warn Stakes for U.S. Are High in Asian Conflicts”, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, March 10, p. Lexis]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. “Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.” In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia \_ with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources \_ indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

### AT: China Econ Low Now

#### China’s economy is on the brink of collapse – worker shortage crisis, reliance on federal investment, export slowdown

CCTV 3/15/13 (“Xinhua Insight: Remaking Economy Tops Chinese New Leadership Agenda”) http://english.cntv.cn/20130315/106557.shtml

"China's competitive edge in the past three decades was mainly built on low costs, especially the cheap labor of rural migrant workers," said Zhang Yansheng, a researcher with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Some fear that edge will not sustain as China's working-age population dropped in 2012, the first decline in "a considerable period of time," as the country's top statistics official Ma Jiantang put it. "The working-age population is shrinking and this problem will get worse in the coming years," said Wang Tongsan, an economist with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a government think-tank. "We're at an inflection point in terms of labor supply." Vast labor flow from China's rural inland to factories in booming coastal cities has contributed to fast expansion in exports, which account for about a quarter of the country's GDP. With China already having become the world's biggest exporter, there is limited room for further increase in its share of the global market, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis, analysts have noted. A rising yuan also hurts China's export advantage. "A substantial secular decline in the contribution of exports to growth" is one of the most prominent structural challenges China has to deal with, according to Arthur R. Kroeber, nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings-Tsinghua Center for Public Policy. Another challenge is the rapid increase in credit fuelled by the government's 2009-2010 stimulus program, which "almost certainly led to a substantial reduction of the return on capital," Kroeber wrote in a paper published last year. Over the past decade, China's economic growth also largely relied on enormous investment in manufacturing sectors, infrastructure construction and real estate. But as skyrocketing property prices triggered public complaints, the government imposed tough curbs on demand. Moreover, the kind of stimulus package that it is believed injected as much as four trillion yuan into infrastructure and social welfare in 2009-2010 will not be seen again for the coming years, analysts have said.

#### The economy is STABLE now but teetering on the balance of a hard landing – political capital is key to prevent the fall

Green 3/25/13 (Stephen, “The Path Economic Reform Should Take”) http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2013-03/25/content\_16341436.htm

All eyes are on the new leadership, headed by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, to see how it plans to change China into a consumption-led, bubble-free and clean economy. After a soft patch last year, China's economy has now settled into an acceptable growth pace of about 8 percent, defying the critics who forecast a hard landing for the economy. Growth can continue at a slightly slower, but more sustainable pace given the momentum generated by rapid urbanization, industrialization in western China, and rising aspirations of a growing middle class. But we all know that the current investment-led growth model cannot continue to drive the economy in the long run. So, how does the new leadership begin to solve the looming problems and ensure that China stays on the right track? China's economy faces multiple imbalances: between the coastal areas and the western region, investment and consumption, cities and the countryside, and rich and poor. Over the past decade, policymakers have tried to rebalance the economy, building an urban social welfare system, incentivizing manufacturing investment in western China, cutting taxes and boosting subsidies in rural areas and encouraging rural-urban migration. There were some successes. The challenges now facing the economy, though, are more complex. There are dynamics in play that are undermining the sustainability of growth. Rapid economic development generates pollution - a lot of it over time if regulation is weak. Loose monetary policy that saved the economy from a nasty recession in 2009 has pushed up land prices. It is time to re-engineer the system, instead of implementing one-off policy changes, so that positive outcomes are generated again. However, Chinese leaders face big stumbling blocks in the form of interest groups, which are blocking such large-scale re-engineering. Coordinating the reform will be crucial too, because the problems are increasingly interconnected. The focus should be on building long-term institutions and establishing the rules of the game.

### Link – Clean Tech Competiveness – Zero- Sum

#### It’s zero-sum---finite amount of profit to be gained---US is losing now

Mormann and Reicher 12 Felix Mormann Associate Professor at the University of Miami School of Law and Faculty Fellow with Stanford University’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance. Dan Reicher Executive Director of Stanford’s Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, a joint center of the Stanford business and law schools"Smarter Finance for Cleaner Energy: Open Up Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to Renewable Energy Investment," November 2012, [www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/11/13%20federalism/13%20clean%20energy%20investment.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2012/11/13%20federalism/13%20clean%20energy%20investment.pdf)

The worldwide race for technological leadership in clean and renewable energy is on. Valued at $2.3 ¶ trillion globally over the next 10 years, the clean energy market already employs close to 3 million U.S. ¶ workers and continues to grow, making clean energy a key piece of America’s “Next Economy.” In ¶ addition to good-paying jobs, victory in the global clean energy race beckons with enhanced energy ¶ security and significant environmental benefits, including cleaner air and water. Winning this prize, ¶ however, will require an **aggressive push keep up with international competition**. Virtually all industrially developed and most **to** developing nations are competing for a slice of the global clean energy ¶ pie. In 2011, it took $48 billion of clean energy investment for the United States to reclaim the lead from ¶ China ($45.5 billion). But much of this money came from the 2009 American Recovery and ¶ Reconstruction Act’s (ARRA) stimulus funding. As these funds run out, America finds itself at a crossroads.

#### The plan costs capital – Chinese leadership perceives climate cooperation as a thinly veiled threat and a way to collapse China’s economy

Herberg 11 (Mikkal, Research Director, Energy Security Progrma The National Bureau of Asian Research” New America Foundation “China’s Energy Rise and the Future of US-China Energy Relations)

Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level.  Beijing’s leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China.  Criticism of the impact of China’s overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken China’s access to vital oil supplies.  Pressure from Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow China’s economic growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world.  Washington, on the other hand, sees China’s energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies.  This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a “zero-sum” atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides.  The 2005 episode when China’s CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of China’s strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging.

### AT: Thumpers

#### Xi was appointed 2 weeks ago – no reason why he would have gotten blame for something that happened prior to his presidency

Anderlini 3/14/13 (“Xi Jinping Becomes Chinese President”) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b9382c76-8c5a-11e2-8fcf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OrbHBzD4

In a ceremony in the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square, delegates to the National People’s Congress, China’s rubber-stamp parliament, appointed Mr Xi to run the country for the next 10 years. Mr Xi, the only candidate, garnered 2,952 votes with three abstentions and one vote cast against him. The presidency is a largely ceremonial office in [China](http://www.ft.com/world/asia-pacific/china). In November, Mr Xi was appointed to the two most important leadership roles, general secretary of the Communist party and chairman of the Central Military Commission.

### AT: No Impact China Econ

#### Economic collapse will crush party legitimacy and ignite social instability -

Li 9 (Cheng, Dir. of Research, John L. Thornton China Center, “China’s Team of Rivals ” Brookings Foundation Article series,Marcy <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2009/03_china_li.aspx>)

The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring. This year marks the 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the ruling party is no longer led by one strongman, like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Instead, the Politburo and its Standing Committee, China’s most powerful body, are run by two informal coalitions that compete against each other for power, influence, and control over policy. Competition in the Communist Party is, of course, nothing new. But the jockeying today is no longer a zero-sum game in which a winner takes all. It is worth remembering that when Jiang Zemin handed the reins to his successor, Hu Jintao, in 2002, it marked the first time in the republic’s history that the transfer of power didn’t involve bloodshed or purges. What’s more, Hu was not a protégé of Jiang’s; they belonged to competing factions. To borrow a phrase popular in Washington these days, post-Deng China has been run by a team of rivals. This internal competition was enshrined as party practice a little more than a year ago. In October 2007, President Hu surprised many China watchers by abandoning the party’s normally straightforward succession procedure and designating not one but two heirs apparent. The Central Committee named Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang—two very different leaders in their early 50s—to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee, where the rulers of China are groomed. The future roles of these two men, who will essentially share power after the next party congress meets in 2012, have since been refined: Xi will be the candidate to succeed the president, and Li will succeed Premier Wen Jiabao. The two rising stars share little in terms of family background, political association, leadership skills, and policy orientation. But they are each heavily involved in shaping economic policy—and they are expected to lead the two competing coalitions that will be relied upon to craft China’s political and economic trajectory in the next decade and beyond.